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ABSTRACT
Government policies with redistributive implications have been a source of 
many social and political conflicts. Until recently, positive economics has lacked a 
consistent analytical framework that could explain how such policies are formed and 
how they respond to exogenous shocks. This study makes a contribution towards this 
direction by offering a consistent theoretical framework for short-run policy modelling. 
Assuming that tariff rates are the only available instruments of a government’s 
redistributive policy this study addresses the following two specific questions: (i) how 
the tariff rates are determined; (ii) and how do they respond to exogenous shocks?
To answer these questions, a general equilibrium model of a political economy 
is developed by combining a model of the political sphere with a Ricardo-Viner type 
model of the economic sphere. Policies are determined by strategic interactions between 
government and the conflicting interest groups in the political sphere which, in turn, 
determine the welfare of the interest groups in the economic sphere and political 
support for the government in the political sphere. The conflicting interest groups may 
spend resources in predatory political activities or may choose to cooperate. A general 
equilibrium of the political economy is obtained when both the political and the 
economic spheres are simultaneously in equilibrium. Under fairly general conditions, it 
is shown that at least one equilibrium exists in a political economy whether it exhibits 
cooperative behaviour in the political sphere or not
This study has employed the analytical framework of cooperative-bargaining 
theory in obtaining a general equilibrium model of the political economy. This 
approach is taken because a noncooperative equilibrium is not necessarily Pareto 
efficient Several interesting results follow from the comparative static properties of the 
model. In particular, it is shown that: (i) the import-competing sector receives increased 
protection if the relative price of the home importable falls in the world market; (ii) the 
protection afforded to a particular sector declines if the domestic endowment of factors 
moves in favour of that sector, and (iii) so long as the distribution of relative bargaining 
power remains unaffected by the shocks, the response of the tariff rate to the shocks 
will be independent of the distribution the bargaining power. These analytical results 
are very similar to ones that follow from the maximization of a conservative social 
welfare function. The implications are that: (i) a government’s redistributive policy 
could be modelled as an equilibrium outcome of a bargaining process between the 
organized interest groups holding conflicting interests on the level of the redistributive 
policy; and (ii) the bargaining process may be viewed as the mechanism of generating a 
conservative social welfare function. The self-interest, and public-interest approaches in 
policy modelling can thus be reconciled.
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1CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation
Government policies that have redistributive implications have been a source of 
many social and political conflicts. A striking example is the European farm subsidy 
program in which the level of conflict has crossed national frontiers. Tariff and non­
tariff barriers to trade that exist all over the world are other examples. This study is 
concerned with the political economy of the formation of a government's redistributive 
policies.
Until recently positive economics has lacked the sophistication and clarity to 
explain how policy decisions are made, particularly when redistributive issues are 
involved. This is so because alternative (purely) redistributive policies cannot be ranked 
by the Pareto rule, since each one of them is Pareto efficient. The result is that in any 
serious economic modelling exercise either a rule of social choice, such as 
maximization of some kind of a social welfare function, has to be specified so that the 
alternate redistributive policies can be ranked by it or the government policies have to 
be treated as exogenously given. Since there are serious logical problems in specifying 
a social choice rule, positive economic models generally regard government policies as 
exogenously given.1 The question of policy determination therefore has largely 
remained outside the scope of positive economic models.2 Nevertheless, given a set of 
government policies and the other exogenous variables, sophisticated models of 
positive economics, such as computable general equilibrium (CGE) models, can be 
employed to explain how the optimal allocative decisions are made in an economy. 
These models can also be used to explain how the Pareto efficient allocation of 
resources and the distribution of income will change as consequences of a change in 
government policies.3
However, if the policies are endogenously determined as the recent literature 
suggests, then as far as the effects of changes in non-policy exogenous variables on 
endogenous variables are concerned the predictions of a policy-exogenous CGE model 
may be incorrect. Such policy-exogenous models do not allow for the second round
1 For a simple exposition of the logical problems with normative social choice rules see 
particularly chapters 9 and 10 in Mueller (1979).
2 Shoven and Whalley (1984), Decaluwe and Martens (1988), de Melo (1988) and Robinson 
(1989) provide comprehensive surveys of the main features of the CGE models.
3 See, for example, Dixon, et al. (1982), Drevis, et al. (1982), Piggott and Whalley (1985), 
Cassing and Warr (1985); Anderson and Warr (1987); Hertel and Tsigas (1988); and Hertel (1990).
2effects that would take place after the policies respond to the exogenous shocks. Hence, 
the full effects of, say a world price change, on sectoral employment, output and 
income distribution would be different from that predicted by a policy-exogenous CGE 
model. A closer understanding of the true effects of different shocks on the relevant 
endogenous variables may be obtained from a general equilibrium model that can 
determine the policy responses of a government endogenously.
How a government’s policies are determined is therefore a vexing question. The 
present study attempts to answer this question in part by focusing on redistributive 
policies and assuming that trade taxes/subsidies are the only available redistributive 
policies. More precisely, this study addresses the following two specific questions. How 
are the tariff rates in a price taking economy determined? How would the tariff rates 
change if the politico-economic environment changed?
The choice of the tariff policy as the subject matter of this study is motivated by 
the following reasons. First, tariff policy is in itself one of the important forms of 
government policy; second, it has distributive implications; third, its existence is 
difficult to explain on social welfare grounds under complete and perfect market 
conditions because, as is well-known it is not the first-best policy; and finally, tariff 
policy has been a favourite subject matter of previous studies on political economy, and 
there consequently exists a basis of previous work upon which further extensions can be 
made.
Clearly, this study is not the first that has raised questions concerned with the 
formation of redistributive policies in general, and tariff policy in particular. There 
exists a large body of literature on rent seeking, public choice, and political economy 
that has addressed these questions in one way or another.4 This class of literature argues 
that policy changes can alter the welfare levels of private agents, these agents therefore 
have incentives to behave strategically in order to influence the policy choices of the 
government. The government, on the other hand, survives on political support and 
therefore supplies policies strategically in order to maximize its political support. This
4 Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock (1980), Bhagwati (1982b), Collander (1984), Rowley, Tollison 
and Tullock (1988) provide a substantial collection of mainly analytical works that are concerned with 
rent-seeking and the political economy of endogenous tariff determination.
It is useful to note the difference among the three schools - rent-seeking, public choice and the 
political economy. The rent-seeking literature is primarily concerned with the welfare cost of rent- 
seeking when the level of rent generating policy is already given. Nevertheless this literature also 
describes the strategic behaviour of the rent-seekers in seeking rents created by distortionary policies. The 
public choice school is concerned with the application of economic tools in explaining the nonmarket 
decision making or simply the application of economics to political science (Mueller, 1979). This school 
lacks the foundation of general equilibrium in the economic sphere. The political economy school 
combines the methodologies of the public choice school with that of positive economics to obtain a 
political economy framework in which both the political and economic markets are considered and the 
policies are determined endogenously together with the other economic variables.
3class of literature culminates in the contention that government policies are determined 
in the political market, where the policy variables play the role of balancing the 
opposing political forces that are guided by the economic interests of the self-interested 
agents.
These studies have recognized that the political and the economic spheres are 
interconnected (for example, Gardner, 1983). Political activities of economic agents or 
some institutional mechanism that translates economic interests into political 
preferences provide the link between the two spheres. The agents in such a political 
economy face a simultaneous choice problem in both spheres such that the choice made 
in one sphere has an explicit effect on the other sphere. It is therefore natural to expect 
that rational actors would behave strategically in the political sphere to enhance their 
positions in the economic sphere and vice versa. But this means that the policies and, 
consequently, the allocation of resources in the economic sphere depends on the joint 
action of all players. Therefore, an individual’s welfare no longer depends only on his 
or her own actions but also on the actions of other individuals as well. For this reason 
previous studies almost invariably have adopted a game-theoretic framework to study 
the policy formation process and the individual choice problem in the context of a 
political economy.
Moreover, once the political sphere is modelled in conjunction with the 
economic sphere and the strategic behaviours of the individuals are allowed in the 
model of a political economy the price taking assumption of the Arrow-Debreu model 
is violated. Agents can choose their lobbying levels (strategies) in the political sphere to 
affect the prices they face in the economic sphere. Hence, the question of existence of 
an equilibrium in such a model of a political economy becomes a nontrivial issue.
Previous authors who studied the policy formation process in the framework of 
a political economy either did not address the question of the existence of equilibrium at 
all (Yeldan and Roe, 1991, Magee, Brock and Young, 1989) or had no success (Findlay 
and Wellisz, 1982, 1983, 1984; Wellisz and Willson, 1986; Hall and Nelson, 1992) or 
have been able to show it only for an exchange economy (Coggins, 1989; Coggins, et 
al., 1991). Therefore, an attempt to answer the questions posed above in the framework 
of a political economy begs another more basic question - the question of the existence 
of an equilibrium. This question is important for models of a political economy for two 
reasons. First, an analysis based on the equilibrium behaviour of a political economy 
makes sense only if an equilibrium exists. Second, a prior knowledge of the conditions 
under which an equilibrium exists is useful in constructing a computable general 
equilibrium models of a political economy.
4Hence, the research questions of this study are as follows. Does an equilibrium 
exist in a productive political economy? Under what conditions can one be assured of 
an equilibrium? Is it necessary that a political economy in equilibrium should deviate 
from free trade? How would the tariff rates in such a political economy respond to 
exogenous shocks?
In addition to this, there is one more assumption concerning the nature of the 
political process which needs to be clarified. The existing literature on political 
economy has modelled the political process of conflict resolution concerning the 
government’s (tariff) policies as a noncooperative game. Such a model does not allow 
the players to communicate and negotiate with each other and agree on a strategy 
combination that is mutually beneficial. Therefore an outcome of the noncooperative 
tariff game may not necessarily be Pareto efficient, since a cooperative outcome may 
Pareto dominate it  The assumption that the players are rational goal maximizers and 
the assumption that their political behaviour can be characterized by a noncooperative 
game thus appear to be potentially inconsistent. Therefore, there is no reason to stay 
with the assumptions of the noncooperative game theory.
In contrast to the existing studies, this study assumes that the political process 
provides enough opportunities to negotiate a cooperative strategy through bargaining if 
the players find it rational to do so. Moreover, if the players could find a cooperative 
solution it would be the one agreed to by the conflicting parties, and the government 
would maximize its political support by enforcing it. Therefore, even in situations when 
a cooperative solution is not self-enforcing, the presence of a politically motivated 
government guarantees its enforcement. Hence, this study views tariff determination as 
a bargaining problem. This assumption constitutes the major departure of the present 
study from the existing literature on endogenous tariffs formation. This study, 
nevertheless, analyses noncooperative behaviour in the political sphere because the 
outcome from this process describes what will happen to the players if they fail to reach 
an agreement during the bargaining process.
Therefore, this study also attempts to answer the following additional questions. 
How is a bargaining problem defined in the tariff game? What would induce the players 
to reach an agreement during the bargaining process? How can the bargaining 
equilibrium be characterized? What would be the bargained tariff rates? How would the 
bargained tariff rates respond to exogenous shocks? A consistent analytical framework 
that can provide answers to the above questions will extend the existing frontier of the 
endogenous tariff literature.
51.2 Objectives of the Study
The broad purpose of this study is to develop a bargain-theoretic framework to 
model the policy formation process in a political economy.
More specifically this study attempts to
(i) address systematically the analytical issues involved in integrating the political 
and economic spheres into a single model of a political economy and examine whether 
a Nash equilibrium exists in such a model;
(ii) describe the bargaining problem in the tariff-setting game, analyze the 
bargaining process that induces a solution to the problem, and characterize the outcome 
of bargaining;
(iii) obtain a theoretically consistent general equilibrium model in which the tariff 
policy of a government is endogenously determined by the bargaining process; and
(iv) study the comparative static behaviour of the bargained tariff rates.
1.3 The Modelling Approach and the Point of Departure
As in previous studies, the working of the economic sphere has been described 
in this study by a Ricardo-Viner type two-sector general equilibrium model in which 
the policies of the government are initially regarded as exogenous. The economy is 
assumed to be small and open in relation to the world market. Moreover, by invoking 
Lemer’s symmetry theorem (Lemer, 1936) only one tariff rate is considered instead of 
two. This makes the rationalized tariff rate the only instrument of income redistribution 
and sharpens the focus of the study. The model has been employed to predict the 
economic consequences of a given policy change and derive the implications for the 
interests of the individuals. These results, in turn, have been employed to determine 
individual preferences over alternate policies.
One reason why previous studies failed to obtain an existence result in a 
political economy is that they did not specify the structure of the general equilibrium 
model of the economic sphere of the political economy. They worked with general 
forms of production functions of which the properties of the higher order derivatives 
were not known. Learning from these results, this study specifies the forms of the 
production functions. In particular, it is assumed that the production functions can be 
represented by constant returns to scale CES functions. The choice of this functional 
form is a pragmatic compromise between simplicity and generality.
6Following the contention of the endogenous tariff literature, a government’s 
choice of the tariff rate has been viewed as an outcome of the policy game played in the 
political sphere by the government which wants to stay in power, and the owners of the 
specific factors, who behave strategically to maximize their real rental income 
determined in the economic sphere of the political economy. The political process has 
been viewed as an institutional environment in which the conflicts of interests with 
respect to the tariff policy are resolved.
With this stylization of a political economy this study first investigates the 
existence of an equilibrium in a political economy under the assumption that the 
political environment is noncooperative. The noncooperative model of the political 
economy describes the consequences for the respective groups of predatory lobbying 
behaviour on their parts, and exposes the rationale for cooperative behaviour. In 
particular, it is observed that a distinct possibility of saving resources employed in 
predatory lobbying exists if the players cooperate and agree on (i) any tariff rate, and 
(ii) not to spend on lobbying the government.
The bargain-theoretic approach has been adopted to study the tariff 
determination process under a cooperative political environment The bargaining 
problem in the tariff game has been solved using the generalized Nash bargaining 
process in which the players may be endowed with asymmetric bargaining powers. The 
condition characterizing the bargaining equilibrium has been combined with the model 
of the economic sphere to derive a policy-endogenous general equilibrium model, the 
solution of which yields the level of the politico-economic equilibrium tariff rate that is 
determined endogenously.
A comparative static (counterfactual experiments) approach has been adopted to 
derive the endogenous response of the bargained tariff rate as the exogenous variables 
change. Unlike previous studies, which studied the endogenous response of the tariff 
rate with respect to changes in the world relative price only, this study also derives the 
response of the tariff rate as the domestic factor endowments change exogenously. The 
bargaining powers of the players have been held constant, however.
Two central conclusions emerge out of this study. First, though the level of the 
tariff rate depends on the relative bargaining powers of the players and the relative fear 
of ruin (Aumann and Kurz, 1977a, 1977b) held by the players, the changes in it do not 
depend on the distribution of the bargaining power between the players. The extent and 
direction of change in the bargained tariff rate depend on the movement of the relative 
fear of ruin held by the players, which is completely explained by the condition of the 
economic sphere. Second, in general, the bargained tariff rate changes to compensate,
7at least partly, for the relative loss of the loser (compared to that of the other player) that 
arise from changes in the exogenous environment.
The results obtained in this study have some interesting implications for policy 
modelling in general equilibrium. First, it is found that the comparative static behaviour 
of the bargained tariff rate is consistent with the predictions that follow from the 
maximization of a conservative social welfare function (Corden, 1974). The implication 
of this similarity is that, if bargaining is accepted as the underlying process that 
generates the (positive) conservative social welfare function, then the problem of 
identification of the social welfare function vanishes and the implementation of a social 
welfare function will not be inconsistent with the self-interested behaviour of the 
government as well. The difference between the political economy approach and the 
welfare function maximizing approach can be eliminated. Second, the results of this 
study indicate that a bargain-theoretic framework can be adopted to model the policy 
formation process in a political economy and this is consistent with the self-interested 
behaviour of all agents.
Choice of the specific-factor model differentiates the present study from Magee, 
Brock and Young (1989), and imposition of a particular structure on the forms of 
production functions differentiates it from the other studies of political economy (for 
example, Findlay and Wellisz, 1982). This study also differs from the endogenous tariff 
literature in that it allows cooperative behaviour in the political process of tariff 
determination, and the general equilibrium of the political economy is defined 
whenever a solution to the bargaining problem is obtained.
1.4 Scope and Limitation of the Study
Though this study has attempted to be rigorous in deriving the analytical results, 
it, nevertheless, suffers from a few limitations some of which are unavoidable if the 
model is to be kept tractable and simple. Further discussion on the limitations and 
suggestions for future research are provided in chapter 9. Here the reader’s attention is 
drawn in particular to the following limitations.
First, this study assumes that trade taxes are the only redistributive policy 
instruments available to a government. This is, of course, an over-simplification. The 
government has numerous instruments of intervention, none of which is equivalent to 
the other in every respect in many real world circumstances. The choice of instruments 
itself can have another political economy story (see Lloyd and Falvey, 1986, and Falvey 
and Lloyd, 1991). In order to keep the analysis simple and to understand the process of 
policy determination this particular assumption has to be made.
8Second, this study does not consider how the tariff revenue is distributed. It 
simply assumes that the tariff revenue is transferred to the consumer. But, the response 
of the tariff rate with respect to the exogenous shocks could be sensitive to the way the 
tariff revenue is distributed (Long and Vousden, 1991). Our purpose in not modelling 
the distribution of tariff revenues explicitly is to make the rationalized tariff rate the 
only instrument of income redistribution.
Third, this study ignores the other government policies that are directed to 
macroeconomic stabilization and growth. Rausser (1982), Rausser and Foster (1990) 
have argued that a model that does not consider both ‘pie-expanding’ and ‘pie-sharing’ 
policies together is likely to yield incorrect answers to the questions of endogenous 
policy responses. In this sense, the model described here is incomplete. It describes only 
an aspect of a much larger policy game actually played in a political economy. A direct 
reflection of this limitation can be observed in determining the minimum expectation of 
the players in chapter 7.
Within the limitation of these assumptions, the approach adopted in this study is 
sufficiently general to provide a theoretical basis for larger models with endogenous 
policies. Such models for different countries can be combined to analyze issues related 
to regional and global cooperation.
1.5 Overview of the Study
This study is divided into nine chapters. At the beginning of each chapter the 
purpose and a summary of the main results of the chapter is provided. A brief overview 
of the study is as follows.
Chapter 2 provides a selective review of endogenous tariff literature. It 
summarizes the main arguments of previous work holding public-interest and/or self- 
interest views of the government, and draws some implications for the modelling 
strategy of this study.
Chapters 3 and 4 describe the economic sphere of a simple open political 
economy. The structure of a Ricardo-Viner type 2-sector general equilibrium model of 
the economic sphere is described in chapter 3, assuming that the policies of the 
government (tariff rates) are given exogenously. The comparative static properties of 
the endogenous variables are obtained, and on the basis of these results some general 
properties of the solution functions are deduced. These results are employed in chapter 
4 to derive the properties of the second order derivatives of the real rental functions, the 
rent transformation frontier and its comparative static properties. The rent 
transformation frontier summarizes the general equilibrium effects of tariff changes on 
the sectoral rental incomes
9Chapter 5 describes the political process of tariff determination as a 
noncooperative game and studies the existence of a Nash equilibrium of the political 
economy. This chapter establishes that if the government behaves as a Stackleberg 
leader to maximize its political support and offers a pricing function to the conflicting 
interest groups, and the interest groups behave as Nash followers in lobbying the 
government in order to maximize their real rental income, then there exists at least one 
non trivial Nash equilibrium in the political economy. Another interesting aspect of this 
result is that it shows that the two strands of the existing political economy approach to 
endogenous tariff theory, which have either considered support maximizing behaviour 
of the government without considering the reactions of the lobbyists, or considered the 
lobbying equilibrium for a given pricing function without showing how such a function 
was obtained, are mutually compatible. They imply the same policy-equilibrium if the 
political economy admits a unique Nash equilibrium. The formal demonstration of the 
results derived in chapter 5, though conjectured previously by various authors, are new.
In chapter 6, this study proceeds further and allows the interest groups to search 
for a cooperative solution if it is individually rational to do so, and from this chapter 
onwards the political process of tariff determination has been viewed as a bargaining 
process between the two conflicting interest groups. Assuming that the disagreement 
payoffs are known, a priori, the necessary and sufficient condition for a unique 
generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem in the tariff game has been 
obtained in this chapter.
Moreover, in chapter 6, the generalization of a Nash solution in the presence of 
asymmetric bargaining power is discussed in considerable detail. A new 
characterization of the generalized Nash solution is obtained in terms of the players’ 
generalized fear of ruin. It shows that the equality of players’ generalized fear of ruin is 
an alternate necessary and sufficient condition for the generalized Nash solution to a 
bargaining problem. This new characterization is important from the point of view of 
both the endogenous tariff theory and the Nash bargaining theory. Its importance arises 
because this result provides an intuitive explanation of the Nash bargaining process, and 
has been employed in providing intuitive explanations of the results obtained in the 
subsequent chapters.
Chapter 7 combines the results derived in previous chapters to obtain the final 
structure of the policy endogenous general equilibrium model of the political economy 
they describe. It also derives the comparative static behaviour of the endogenous tariff 
rate. The tariff rate that emerges from this model of the political economy guarantees an 
equilibrium in the economic sphere as well as solving the bargaining problem. This 
completes the construction of a policy-endogenous general equilibrium model in which 
the tariff rate (or the redistributive policy) is determined endogenously.
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Furthermore, this chapter discusses the problems that arise in identifying the 
disagreement payoffs and invokes the reference point solution concept to overcome 
them. It is further argued that the payoffs at the point of players’ minimum expectation 
in the tariff game can serve as a reference point in bargaining. With the concept of 
‘disagreement’ thus made operational, the general equilibrium model of the political 
economy with cooperative behaviour is subjected to comparative static (counter- 
factual) experiments in order to see how the tariff rate would change as the exogenous 
variables of the model change. Throughout these experiments it is assumed that the 
relative bargaining powers of the players remain unaffected by the shocks. Intuitive 
explanations for the comparative static results are also provided.
Chapter 8 implements the policy-endogenous general equilibrium model 
numerically using hypothetical data sets chosen carefully to cover some extreme cases. 
The procedure adopted in obtaining the minimum expectation payoffs, and calibration 
of the model are also discussed in detail. The simulation results show that, in general, 
the directions of the responses of the bargained tariff rate with respect to exogenous 
shocks are insensitive to the location of the initial equilibrium and the point of 
minimum expectation. The magnitudes of responses are, of course, observed to be 
sensitive to these variations. Some hypotheses that follow from these comparative 
exercises and which appear potentially robust are stated formally. These hypotheses are 
then checked against the results of previous studies.
Furthermore, the policy-endogenous general equilibrium model has been 
simulated using one particular data set to predict the consequence of a very large 
growth in the stock of the specific factor in the import-competing sector. The results 
showed that the direction of trade in commodities reverses after the shock. The 
commodity that was imported before the shock will be exported and the commodity that 
was exported will be imported after the shock, and the commodity that was being taxed 
before the shock would be subsidized after the shock. This result is used to explain why 
developing countries tax agriculture and the developed countries subsidize it. Finally, in 
chapter 9 this study is concluded, and the limitations of the study are discussed.
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CHAPTER 2
A SELECTIVE REVIEW OF ENDOGENOUS TARIFF LITERATURE 
Introduction
This chapter provides a selective review of the literature to outline the evolution 
of approaches towards modelling the endogenous determination of the tariff rate. More 
elaborate reviews of the theoretical as well as empirical works in this area can be found 
in Baldwin (1982, 1984); Magee (1984); Hughes (1986); Nelson (1988); Magee, Brock 
and Young (1989); Hillman (1989). A summarized version can also be found in 
Vousden (1990, chapter 8).
Most of the previous studies have been prompted by the perplexing observation 
that trade taxes exist in the real world despite the general conclusion that they reduce 
general "welfare". Income redistribution as the sole cause of trade taxes has been 
dismissed by economists on the ground that, so long as the government is a "social 
welfare" maximizer, such taxes do not constitute the first best solutions to the 
distribution problem (see for example, Bhagwati, 1971).
In trying to explain why trade taxes exist, economists have come up with several 
possible explanations that trace the evolution of endogenous tariff theory. The analytics 
of these studies, though, have been geared to predict the response of the tariff rate in the 
face of increased import competition - that is, when there is a terms of trade gain for 
whatever reasons. However, one may possibly be able to utilize their models to 
examine the responses of the tariff rates, when the economy is shocked by any 
exogenous change.
Previous studies differ considerably in several aspects such as modelling 
strategies, time horizon, and degrees of refinements. Different reviewers may group 
them differently depending on the purpose of their review. For example, in a critical 
survey of the literature Nelson (1988) has classified most of the previous theoretical 
works into two groups according to their emphasis on the demand side or on the supply 
side of the political market. This approach treats policies arising solely out of self- 
interested behaviour of government. Nelson's classification is suitable if one intends to 
cover only those works that assume self-interested behaviour on the part of government, 
but it does not provide enough grounds to evaluate those works that emphasize the 
social welfare maximizing role of government or the works that have attempted to 
combine the political market approach with the welfare maximizing behaviour of 
government in their own perspective.
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The fundamental differences among previous studies lie in their assumptions 
regarding the objective of the government, and there are no clear reasons to accept one 
or other of these assumptions. Therefore, we will first classify previous studies 
according to their assumptions on government motivation in taking policy decisions: 
whether the government is assumed to pursue some kind of "public interest" or self- 
interest, or a combination of both.
The studies based on the assumption that government is motivated by self- 
interested behaviour constitute the core of the political economy approach to 
endogenous tariff theory. These studies have tried to model the tariff setting process by 
augmenting the political market with the usual economic market. While these studies 
differ in assigning a more prominent role either to the demand side or to the supply side 
of the political market by being explicit about the underlying market fundamentals, they 
agree on the point that the equilibrium tariff rate should clear the political market. So, 
these studies are further classified into three groups according to their coverage in 
explicit modelling of the political market. Thus, ultimately we will classify the 
endogenous tariff literature in five different groups (see figure 2.5).
Our purpose in this review is to examine the current state of endogenous tariff 
theories and their conclusions to obtain some guidelines to make the tariff 
determination process endogenous in the context of a computable general equilibrium 
model. In the following sections we will review the endogenous tariff literature with 
this objective in mind. While doing so, an attempt will be made to summarize the major 
assumptions and their role in driving the conclusions of each study that are of direct 
concern to the endogenous tariff literature.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section reviews the literature 
that adopts a public-interest view. The second section reviews the literature that adopts 
a self-interest view. Section three reviews the literature that adopts a hybrid approach to 
tariff determination. In particular, this literature maintains that the government responds 
to political pressure as well as to welfare norms. Section four reviews some works that 
have addressed the issues of the choice of a specific protective instrument. Finally, 
section five summarizes the implications to the modelling strategy of the present study.
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2.1 The Public Interest Approach
In this section Corden's concept of the conservative social welfare function 
(Corden, 1974) will be reviewed first, which will be followed by a review of the 
insurance theories of tariff determination (Hillman, 1977; Cassing, 1980; Baldwin,
1982; Eaton and Grossman, 1985; and Cassing, Hillman and Long, 1986; Staiger and 
Tabellini, 1987). All of these works maintain that the government is a social welfare 
maximizer.1 One may also include Findlay and Wellisz (1983 and 1984) in the class of 
"public interest" literature, as they assume that the "prince" is driven to justify his rule 
by maximizing the output of the composite public good financed by the tariff revenue.
2.1.1 The Conservative Social Welfare Function
Corden (1974) introduced the idea of conservative social welfare function 
(CSWF), describing it as being particularly helpful for understanding actual trade 
policies of many countries:
Put in its simplest form it includes the following income distribution target: 
any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section 
of the community should be avoided. This is not quite the same as setting up 
the existing income distribution as the best, but comes close to it, and so can 
indeed be described as 'conservative'. In terms of welfare weights, increases in 
income are given relatively low weights and decreases very high weights (p.
107).
According to Corden, a CSWF expresses the following four ideas.
1. (Fairness). Unless there are good reasons or it is unavoidable, it is unfair to 
allow anyone's real income to be reduced significantly.
2. (Social Insurance). Insofar as people are risk averters, everyone's real income 
is increased when it is known that a government will generally intervene to prevent 
sudden or large and unexpected income losses. The CSWF is part of the social 
insurance system.
1 Yunker (1989) has provided some 'empirical' support to the social welfare maximizing approach
to policy determination. Using a general equilibrium model of the US Yunker evaluated different forms 
of social welfare functions over a range of income tax rates to see whether the actual income tax rate in 
the US confirms to some welfare maximizing notion or not. He found that the income tax rates that 
maximize Benthamite (sum of utilities) or Nash (product of utilities) social welfare function are very 
close to the actual average income tax rate in the US. So, he concluded that the "empirical result is 
consistent with society (or its government) unconsciously maximizing a social welfare function - 
suggesting that the concept of social welfare maximization may indeed possess positive as well as 
normative content (p.l 11)."
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3. (Social Peace). Social peace requires that no significant group's income 
shall fall if that of others is rising. The reason is that social peace might be regarded 
as a social good in itself or as a basis for political stability and hence perhaps 
economic development, and even if social peace does not depend on the 
maintenance of the incomes of the major classes in the community, the survival of 
the government may.
4. (Compensation). If a policy is directed to a certain target, such as 
protection of an industry or improving the balance of payments, most governments 
want to minimize the adverse by-product effects on sectional incomes so as not to be 
involved in political battles incidental to their main purpose.
The concept of the CSWF, as expressed above, is rather informal. It is also not 
clear whether the four ideas are sufficient to identify a unique social welfare function or 
not. It is, however, clear that the CSWF represents a positive concept of social welfare.
It is easy to argue that so far as redistributive policies are concerned idea 1 
(fairness) implies idea 3 (social peace), and idea 2 (social insurance) implies idea 4 
(compensation). Because, if a government intends to avoid a fall in income of any 
community in general, then it will also avoid a fall in income of one community when 
that of others is rising. Similarly, if a government's policies are meant to provide social 
insurance, then it will compensate the loss in income of any community arising out of 
the adverse by-product effects of its own policies. Hence, in essence we can regard 
CSWF expressing two ideas or principles: fairness, and social insurance.
However, fairness is a subjective concept. Corden views that any significant 
absolute reduction in real income of any significant section of the community is 
unfair. Unless a criterion for significance is explicitly specified, the idea nevertheless 
remains vague. Moreover, it has not been explained why a government should be 
concerned with the fairness of its policies at all. In other words, one can always enquire 
into the motivation that induces a government to remain fair. Moreover, the idea of 
fairness can be viewed as embodied into the idea of social insurance, because the losers 
will be compensated unless everyone is a loser. Probably because of this the idea of 
social insurance has been the one most frequently referred to in the literature.
A first Best argument for Tariffs
Corden has made the best use of his CSWF in producing a first best argument 
for tariffs. He writes
...Yet one can base a first best argument for tariffs on the CWSF. Essentially it 
depends on the costs or difficulties of obtaining information.
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Suppose import prices of particular products fall owing to foreign 
suppliers becoming more competitive for one reason or another. This will 
redistribute incomes against producers of import competing goods in favour of 
consumers or using industries. It may be difficult or even impossible to bring 
about a redistribution back to the original situation through taxes and 
subsidies. Quite apart from the institutional difficulties, and collection and 
disbursement costs, there is the crucial information problem: precisely who 
gained and lost, and by how much? This is particularly serious if the effects 
are sudden.
There is only one way of reversing or avoiding the income distribution 
effects precisely, and that is to impose a tariff which will keep the prices 
facing domestic consumers and producers exactly where they were before 
import prices fell. (p. 109-10).
Corden's first best argument for tariff is somewhat unusual in trade theory. This 
prompted many others to examine the insurance aspect of the commercial policy more 
formally.
2.1.2 The Insurance Theories
Eaton and Grossman (1985) explicitly focused on the role of commercial policy 
in providing insurance when the insurance market is incomplete. They started with the 
assumption that there is some uncertainty regarding the international terms of trade. 
They further assumed that in an equilibrium prior to the terms of trade shock, all 
individuals are identical in their taste and factor endowments, and each individual owns 
two factors which earn at competitive market rates. Furthermore, they have also 
assumed that each individual must engage his capital, which is sector specific in the 
short-run, entirely in one activity. Finally they assumed that commercial policy is the 
only policy available to a social welfare (Benthamite) maximizing government to 
allocate the risk of terms of trade change.
With these assumptions Eaton and Grossman have shown that tariff intervention 
favouring the import competing sector can indeed raise social welfare. Moreover, tariffs 
may dominate production subsidies or taxes as a means of providing such insurance. 
Thus, Eaton and Grossman's result not only explains the existence of government 
intervention on trade but also specifies the exact form of the commercial policy to be 
adopted.
Cassing (1980), and Cassing, Hillman and Long (1986) have taken a slightly 
different approach in that these two studies do not explicitly assume that the 
government intends to maximize a social welfare function of any sort. In the context of 
a specific factor model of an economy with 2 sectors, where each individual owns one 
factor only, Cassing, Hillman and Long (1986) have neatly shown, without assuming a 
social welfare function, that if the insurance market is incomplete, then an ex-ante
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commitment to a stable domestic price is individually preferred by all agents provided 
that agents are sufficiently risk averse.
Thus, Cassing, Hillman and Long's study also suggests that if the insurance 
market is incomplete, then some form of market intervention, for example tariff 
intervention, can arise through a general consensus of all agents. One can, however, 
argue that if everybody prefers commercial policies designed to stabilize domestic 
prices to an uncertain free trade price, then a price stabilizing policy outcome is 
definitely welfare improving and therefore Cassing, Hillman and Long's result is 
consistent with the welfare maximizing hypothesis.
It is important, however, to note one difference between Cassing, Hillman and 
Long's approach and that of other insurance theorists who assume a benevolent 
government with a social welfare function. A welfare maximizing government may, at 
times, choose a policy that is not preferred by some individuals in the society. The only 
requirement for a policy to be selected by a social welfare maximizing government is 
that it should raise the aggregate welfare of the society irrespective of the levels of 
individual welfare. But, in Cassing, Hillman and Long's result a tariff arises as a result 
of Pareto dominance - that everybody's welfare rises with a government's commitment 
on terms of trade contingent tariff policy. Thus, in this sense, Cassing, Hillman and 
Long's result is more powerful than that of other studies concerned with the insurance 
problem.
All of the above mentioned insurance theories have justified some level of 
terms-of-trade-contingent tariff protection before the terms of trade changes. This 
means that people would find their expected welfare increased if the government simply 
commits to a protective policy in the event that terms of trade change. However, once a 
government makes some form of commitment it may affect ex-ante allocation of 
resources and all incentive structures may change accordingly. With this new 
possibility, how would the government, the producers and the factor owners behave 
after the shock is actually observed? Once the shock is observed and the uncertainty is 
resolved, will the social welfare maximizing government behave as expected or 
committed? Would the same policies still remain optimal? This leads us to the problem 
of the time-consistency of the optimal policies.
To answer these questions Staiger and Tabellini (1987) took the case of a fall in 
the price of the home importable and posed the problem in the following way. Suppose 
that the timing of the decisions after the shock is observed is that, either: (a) first 
workers relocate and then a tariff is imposed; or (b) the labour relocation and the tariff 
decisions are made simultaneously.
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Staiger and Tabellini have further assumed that (i) the capital incomes and the 
tariff revenue are distributed to the workers in proportion to their wage incomes, (ii) all 
workers have identical homothetic utility function, (iii) all workers are endowed with 
equal amount of labour (iv) there are positive costs of movement for labour, in 
particular labour will lose a part of its productivity if it has to relocate across the 
sectors.
With these assumptions they have proved the following three propositions:
1. The optimal tariff policy is either free trade or the imposition of a 
sufficiently high tariff rate that prevents any sectoral relocation of labour from 
taking place (p. 831).
2. When free trade is the optimal policy, it is not time-consistent. The time- 
consistent policy involves a socially excessive level of protection (p. 834).
3. In the time-consistent equilibrium, the production subsidy (rate) is strictly 
higher than the tariff (rate). If the social gains from redistribution are small 
enough, the tariff welfare dominates the subsidy (p. 836).
These results are interesting. Therefore, it is worthwhile to see whether they 
stand when some of the assumptions are relaxed. In particular, we are interested in the 
validity of the results when labour can move costlessly.
Staiger and Tabellini have argued that if the cost associated with the reallocation 
of labour is zero, that is if there is no loss in labour productivity when labour moves 
from one industry to the other, then the time-consistent tariff rate is zero (see their 
footnote 13). It, therefore, follows that if assumption (iv) is violated then free trade 
results as the time-consistent policy.
The result that free trade is time-consistent, however, depends critically on the 
assumption that workers receive capital income and tariff revenue in proportion to their 
wage income. This assumption implies that initially national income is equally 
distributed among workers and will remain so after the shock if labour can move 
costlessly. But, if capital incomes and tariff revenue are not distributed equally before 
and after the shock because either the initial distribution rule implies an inequality or 
the rule itself changes with the shock, then the equilibrium incomes of workers after the 
price change will not necessarily remain equalized. In this case, a social welfare 
maximizing government may still obtain a non-zero value for its optimal and time- 
consistent intervention instrument and free trade may not be obtained as a time- 
consistent policy. Hence, even if labour movement is costless, Staiger and Tabellini’s 
results may remain valid provided that capital income is not distributed in proportion to 
wage income.
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Hence, what Staiger and Tabellini’s work suggest is that if movement of labour 
is costless, and income is equally distributed, then the optimal and the time-consistent 
policy is free trade. But, either if there are costs in the inter-sectoral movement of 
labour, and income is equally distributed among the workers, or if there are no costs in 
the inter-sectoral movement of labour but the capital income is not equally distributed 
among the workers, then the only optimal and time-consistent policy response to a 
terms of trade shock is an offsetting change in the tariff rate so that labour does not 
move across the industries as the terms of trade change.
Thus the insurance school of endogenous tariff, which views commercial policy 
as a means of sharing risks associated with terms of trade changes, has formally shown 
that if the insurance market is incomplete, then free trade is sub-optimal and/or time- 
inconsistent. An optimal and time-consistent policy involves a compensating change in 
the tariff rate. In particular, when movement of labour is costless and the distribution of 
capital income is unequal, time-consistency of the optimal policy requires that the tariff 
rate should change to offset any change in the terms of trade. Surprisingly enough this 
conclusion, though derived from maximizing a different (Benthamite) social welfare 
function comes close to what Corden had deduced on the basis of his conservative 
social welfare function.
The predictions of the public interest approach to the endogenous tariff theory 
regarding the endogenous behaviour of the tariffs can be summarized as follows.
1. {insurance). Given that all people are risk averters, everyone will be better off 
if the risks associated with the international terms of trade changes are insured by the 
government's tariff policy. So, tariffs will change to offset the effects on the domestic 
relative prices of any change in the international terms of trade. This conclusion is 
shared by both Corden (1974) and various other authors subscribing to the insurance 
school.2
2. {fairness). In general, if any change occurs in the domestic economy that
causes the income of one sector to grow, say due to technological progress or to capital 
accumulation, causing the income of the other sector to decline, then the theory that 
maximizes CSWF predicts that the policy (tariff rate) will change to protect the losing 
sector.
2 See Vousden (1990: 7 3 4 )  for arguments against the use of tariffs as a form of social insurance. 
He has argued that this form of insurance is not free from the problems of moral hazard and adverse 
selection, and therefore it will impose another cost on to the society. This raises a question that whether 
the welfare maximizing government will really choose to provide this kind of insurance at all. For 
rigorous demonstrations of the result see also Dixit (1987a, 1987b, 1989a, 1989b).
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There are two major problems with this approach. First the social welfare 
approach lacks explanation on how a CSWF or any other social welfare function is 
derived (existence) and how one can identify the correct form of the CSWF 
(uniqueness). Second, even if there exists a unique social welfare function one has to 
show that the government will actually maximize it while choosing policies before this 
approach can command some positive value. To claim that a government is a social 
welfare maximizer we require one more assumption that the government is a benevolent 
agent. Its preference is to see others (citizens) happier.
Once the government is assumed as a benevolent agent we run into a logical 
problem. Since, in general, a country is governed by a group of elected or selected 
representatives, who, when not in government, are assumed to be self-interested, then 
how can one expect the same people to become benevolent once they are elected or 
selected to run the government?
Both of these problems do not arise if, instead of assuming that there exists a 
social welfare function, which is maximized by the benevolent government, one 
assumes that the government will choose policies so as to maximize its chance of 
remaining in power or maximize side payments or bribes. This shift in the fundamental 
assumption takes us to the self-interest theory of tariff formation.
2.2 The Self-interest Approach: Political Economy of Tariff Determination
The authors who assume a self-interested behaviour on the part of the 
government view policies as simply another commodity which happens to be traded in 
the political market. As Peltzman (1976: 212) puts it
The essential commodity being transacted in the political market is a transfer 
of wealth, with constituents on the demand side and their political 
representatives on the supply side. Viewed in this way, the market here, as 
elsewhere, will distribute more of the good to those whose effective demand is 
the highest.
We will review the literature that views policies as the commodities of the 
political market in three different groups depending on whether they view the quantity 
of the policies as determined by the supplier or the demanders, or by the market as a 
whole.
2.2.1 The Supply Side Literature:
Stigler-Peltzman Model and Its Refinements
Formal politico-economic approach to tariff determination begins with 
Peltzman's (1976) formalization of Stigler's (1971) theory of economic regulation. The 
theory is based on the assumption that the government, who supplies the regulation, is a
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support maximizer. More votes are always desirable because this implies a greater 
security of tenure, more logrolling possibilities and so on.
The group which benefits from the regulation pays the government with "votes" 
and "dollars" whereas the losers will reduce their support or increase opposition to the 
government. Not all gainers and losers are fully informed and so there is some scope for 
manipulating votes by campaigning, lobbying and so on. Therefore, the "dollar" paid by 
the beneficiaries is productive to the government
The Stigler-Peltzman model was initially developed to solve the problem of the 
regulator confronting a choice of the numerical size of the beneficiary group and was 
cast in a partial equilibrium setting. The generality of this approach makes it possible to 
represent its essential features in of a general equilibrium context and to address other 
redistributive policy issues as well. For example, it is possible to consider the transfers 
of gains (rents) in general equilibrium from one sector to the other by means of a 
regulation - the rationalized tariff rate.
Assuming that the owners of the specific factors in the two sector are the two 
active interest groups we can write the support function of the government as
where, the support M  is increasing and concave in fl, - the real rental income of sector 
/= 1, 2; and Px is the relative price of (the import competing) good 1 such that real rental 
incomes and n 2 increase and decrease with Px, respectively.
The maximization of the support function by choosing a tariff rate neatly 
summarizes the choice problem faced by the government. The government may receive 
an increasing support from sector 1 and a decreasing support from sector 2 by 
increasing the tariff rate, since Px increases with the tariff rate.
The first order necessary condition for a maximum support can be written as
and the second order sufficient condition can be written as
Af = Af(ni(P1) , n 2(/>))
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where the subscripts in M denote partial derivatives of the support function.
Assume that the political support function and the real rental functions are 
sufficiently well behaved so as to admit a unique support maximizing solution. The 
unique value of Pl that satisfies the above condition will solve the support maximizing 
problem of the government for a given world price, P\ . The relation between the world 
and the domestic relative price then determines the politically equilibrium level of the 
tariff rate.
Since the economic equilibrium depends on the values of the exogenous 
variables, the equilibrium rents will respond to changes in the exogenous variables as 
well. However, for each configuration of the exogenous variables, the equilibrium level 
of the policy variable has to satisfy the condition of political equilibrium - support 
maximization.
Differentiating the first order condition for equilibrium totally we get 
dP,
dP? dP’ ~
Since
d2M
dP2
d^_
dp;
< 0 by the second order condition, therefore it follows that 
- = 0 .
This result suggests that a support maximizing government will always adjust 
tariff rates so as to offset the effect of the terms of trade changes on the domestic 
relative price.
Thus, the prediction of the Stigler-Peltzman model, which is based on the self- 
interested behaviour of government, is the same as that of insurance theory or that of 
Corden (1974). The reason is simple. Essentially, one can view the political support 
function as the welfare function being maximized by the government choosing a 
redistributive policy, which benefits one group and harms the other. The two functions 
may differ in parameters that are irrelevant in determining the optimal choice of the 
government.3
Hillman (1982), however, contested this result. He argued that political support 
from each interest group depends not on the levels of rents but on the extent to which 
they have gained over their free trade levels. His main argument in this regard is that
3 See also Baldwin (1987) for a similar result.
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agents are responsive in their political support only to gains and losses that are due to 
the authorities acting to cause the domestic price to deviate from the world price via 
tariff intervention. Political support is not affected by changes in variables that are not 
due to the authorities' actions. Hence, Hillman(1982) respecified the political support 
function so that the government solves the following problem
max M = Af (II, (/>) -  n , (/>*), r i2 (/>) -  n 2(p; » .
By following the steps as in the Stigler-Peltzman model it can be shown that, for 
given world relative price P*, the first and second order conditions for the maximum of 
the support function are exactly the same as those in the Stigler-Peltzman model. To see 
the equilibrium response of the domestic relative price with respect to a small change in 
the international relative price we differentiate the first order condition totally and 
obtain
d 2M dP{ 
dP2 ' dP*
M n dl\* dTll 
(IP* dPx
+ Mn dU*2 d lIj 
(IP* dPx
+ Af2i
(Kl\ dU2 
dP* dPY
M  22 dU*2 dW2 
dP* dPx *
Given the above properties of the real rental functions and the concavity of the political 
support function we can deduce, by employing the second order condition, that4
provided Af12 > 0 and M21 > 0. However, sign ambiguity results if there is envy effect - 
that is if Mn < 0 and A/21 < 0.
Hence, in the absence of envy effects, if the price of home importable in the 
world market falls, then its price in the home market will also necessarily fall. Thus, 
Hillman came to the conclusion that ‘a declining industry will continue to decline.’ 
Despite the existence of protectionist motives the decline of a declining sector can not 
be arrested by a politically motivated (support maximizing) government.
If a support maximizing government does not provide a complete protection 
against import competition then the rate of return in the declining industry will fall 
below that which can be obtained in the other sector. When sufficient time is allowed 
for adjustment a part of the capital stock will exit from the declining sector. This will 
further lower the employment level in the declining industry. By assuming that the 
capacity to provide political support to the government also depends on the size of its 
labour employment, Cassing and Hillman (1986) have shown further that the protection
4 See also Long and Vousden (1991) for this result
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to the declining industry will also continue to decline and such industries will 
eventually reach a stage of catastrophic collapse.
Hillman's (1982) argument that led to the hypothesis that individuals base their 
political supports on the divergence of rents from the free trade levels was questioned 
by Long and Vousden (1991). In particular, they raised two pertinent issues. First, if 
individuals or groups only praise or blame the government for changes directly 
attributable to the government's actions, then any changes in the tariff revenue and its 
distribution associated with a fall in the world price should be included in the political 
calculus. Second, it may be more reasonable to suppose that people care about changes 
in welfare relative to the situation before the fall in the world price of the home 
importable good. Moreover, because Hillman's conclusion was based on a partial 
equilibrium model its validity in the context of general equilibrium was not clear.
Long and Vousden (1991) studied the policy choice of a support maximizing 
government in the general equilibrium of a 2-sector specific factor model of a small 
open economy. In their model the government is assumed to maximize the aggregate of 
the supports from the three different factor groups given by the following function:
M(P,P*) = '£a,V(P,Y,)
where each aL is a positive constant, which they assumed to have been determined by 
previous lobbying contests, V1 is the indirect utility function, and Yi is the total income 
of the factor group i, which includes respective factor income and its share of the tariff 
revenue, which is distributed parameterically among the three factor groups.
Under reasonable assumptions they have shown that if all tariff revenue is given 
to either the mobile factor or the specific factor in the protected sector, a fall in the 
world price will lead to a fall in the corresponding domestic price. On the other hand, if 
the revenue is given entirely to the specific factor in the unprotected sector, or if each 
factor receives the recycled tariff revenue in the same proportion as it receives factor 
income, then the domestic price may actually rise or fall as the world price falls 
depending on the relative risk aversion of the three factor groups. However, they have 
concluded that in the absence of any good reason why the factor groups differ in their 
relative risk aversion ‘the model would appear to offer good support for the proposition 
that a declining industry will continue to decline.’ (p. 100)
In summary, the supply side literature of the political market is still inconclusive 
in tracking the endogenous behaviour of the tariff rate. It seems that the authors have 
agreed on the point that the domestic and world relative prices will not move in the
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opposite direction. It is not clear whether the domestic relative price will move at the 
same rate as in the world market or not.
This ambiguity results simply because different authors assumed different 
reference points to which the interest groups would compare their current outcome to 
determine whether they need to adjust their support to the government or not. The 
Stigler-Peltzman model uses the origin, Hillman preferred the free trade point and Long 
and Vousden employed the recent past as the reference point. One possible solution to 
this problem could be to model explicitly the demand side of the political market, or the 
behaviours of the interest groups and obtain the reference point empirically.
In terms of modelling difficulties, the assumption that the government is a 
support maximizer and that the government is a social welfare maximizer are not very 
different. There are difficulties in defining an appropriate political support function as 
well as there are problems in defining a social welfare function. However, the support 
maximizing assumption has the advantage that it is internally consistent. It maintains 
that all agents are self-interested maximizers.
2.2.2 The Demand Side Literature:
Nash Equilibrium in a Lobbying Economy
Findlay and Wellisz (1982) were the first to study the question of political 
equilibrium in conjunction with a general economic equilibrium of a political economy. 
Although Findlay and Wellisz were mainly interested in demonstrating Tullock's (1967) 
thesis that the welfare cost of tariffs determined by lobbying contests is much higher 
than the conventional dead weight loss, their model of the political process of tariff 
formation as a noncooperative game between interest groups became more important 
than their welfare result.
Findlay and Wellisz also used a 2-sector, specific-factor model to describe the 
general equilibrium of a small open economy producing two goods - food and 
manufactures - with land and capital as the respective specific factors and labour as the 
mobile factor. Under free trade the country is assumed to have comparative advantage 
in the production of manufactures. In this context Findlay and Wellisz conjectured,
The landed interest would try to introduce a tariff on food at a prohibitive 
level if they could get away with it, whereas the manufacturing interest would 
try to preserve free trade. Depending upon the relative strengths and 
commitments of the two sides it is plausible to think that some tariff between 
zero and the prohibitive level will emerge. The social value of the resources 
used up by both sides in this struggle would constitute a welfare cost over and 
above the familiar deadweight loss associated with whatever tariff level 
emerges from the political process, (p. 225)
26
In their model, they represented the supply side of the political market in 
reduced form by a tariff (supply) function. Specifically, they assumed that a tariff level 
is determined as a stable function of the resources committed to the political process by 
each of the two interest groups such that the tariff function is increasing and concave in 
the resources used in lobbying by the landed interests and decreasing and convex in the 
resources used in lobbying by the capitalists. They did not specify what sort of 
government behaviour is implied by this supply function, however.
Given this supply side, the demand side of the political market is described by a 
noncooperative game between the two interest groups. The landed interest is assumed 
to maximize its rent, measured in units of food, over and above the free trade level by 
choosing its lobbying levels, and the capitalists were assumed to maximize their rents, 
measured in units of manufactures, over and above the autarkic level by choosing their 
levels of lobbying. Findlay and Wellisz then attempted to solve the game for the 
lobbying levels at its Nash equilibrium. Once this could be obtained, the tariff function 
would then yield the equilibrium tariff rate.
However, Findlay and Wellisz were unable to show the existence of a Nash 
equilibrium in the lobbying game. They simply assumed a unique, stable and interior 
Nash equilibrium to make the point that the welfare costs of the endogenous tariff 
determined through the political process exceeds the conventional deadweight loss of a 
tariff rate. For example, they write
Unfortunately, however, each of these cross-partials is the sum of a long 
succession of individual terms of conflicting or indeterminate signs. We 
therefore simply assume that, whatever their slope, the reaction functions have 
a unique and “stable” intersection defining a Coumot-Nash equilibrium in the 
“political” sphere.... (p. 229).
In two other papers, Findlay and Wellisz (1983 and 1984) illustrated 
endogenous determination of the tariff rate in two different regimes - the democratic 
pluralistic case and the bureaucratic authoritarian case. In the former case they used the 
same ‘tariff formation function’ as in their (1982) paper to describe the political 
process. Their description of the game remained relatively informal. Consequently, they 
had to make appropriate assumptions on the nature of the reaction curves to obtain an 
equilibrium and thus their implications.
In the bureaucratic case, however, Findlay and Wellisz have outlined the 
endogenous determination of the tariff rate by assuming that 'the prince' is driven to 
justify his rule by maximizing the 'output' of his regime, considered as a composite 
public good that requires real resources for its production. The resources have to be 
acquired from the private sector by means of taxation (Findlay and Wellisz, 1983: 476). 
This model is more or less equivalent to assuming that the government is a maximizer
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of the tariff revenue which is paid in units of labour. It does not allow interest groups to 
influence the decision taken by the "prince" and therefore, comes more closer to the 
"public interest" theory of tariff determination.
Similar attempts to analyze the political process of tariff determination as a 
noncooperative game between the specific factor owners were also made by Wellisz 
and Wilson (1986) and Hall and Nelson (1992). Wellisz and Wilson have been more 
explicit in specifying the structure of the 'tariff function'. However, both of these studies 
failed to establish the existence of a Nash equilibrium formally. For example Wellisz 
and Wilson (1986: 370) write
Although it is easy to construct examples where this equilibrium exists, a 
general existence proof does not appear possible because each group's utility- 
maximizing lobbying effort need not always be a continuous function of the 
other group's lobbying effort. On the other hand there may exist more than one 
equilibrium.
Similarly, Hall and Nelson (1992: 72) write
... a long succession of terms involving second derivatives whose signs are not 
derivable without further assumptions on the model. Whether the reaction 
functions are positively or negatively sloped we will simply assume that there 
is a unique, stable solution between the three groups.
The problem of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a lobbying game between 
different interest groups was further studied by Coggins, et al., (1991), in the context of 
a small open exchange economy. Their model had two persons each endowed with a 
single tradeable commodity. The government's role was to announce the domestic price 
of the two goods and to take responsibility for clearing the markets by trading in the 
world market at internationally given prices. While setting domestic prices, the 
government, in their model, responded to lobbing expenditures of the two agents, which 
created an incentive to each of the agents to spend resources in lobbying for higher 
relative price for their commodity.
The supply side of the political market in their model is also summarized by a 
‘pricing function’ announced by the government, which is assumed to be common 
knowledge. Their pricing function is similar to the tariff formation function of previous 
studies in that it satisfied similar assumptions - differentiable in lobby expenditures, 
yields positive but diminishing returns to lobbying expenditures, and sets some form of 
bounds on the tariff rate or the domestic relative prices - and it transformed the 
lobbying expenditures of the individuals with conflicting interest into a relative price of 
the commodities.
With one additional assumption, which they call own good bias, that each 
person consumes more of the good with which he is endowed than of the other good,
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Coggins, et al. (1991), have shown the existence of a non-trivial Nash equilibrium in a 
lobbying game in an exchange economy. The assumption of own good bias made the 
indirect utility functions quasiconcave in respective lobby expenditures, which in turn 
allowed Coggins, et al. to apply Debreu's existence theorem. But this assumption also 
imposed a restriction on the nature of the utility functions of the players. The utility 
function with own good bias implies that the indifference curves will have either 
horizontal segments to the right of the 45 degree line if the individual is endowed with 
the y-commodity or vertical segments to the left of the 45 degree line if the individual is 
endowed with the x-commodity.5 Therefore, as they have indicated, the existence result 
does not hold generally for any pair of arbitrary utility functions. Nevertheless, their 
study has made a definite contribution to the literature.
In summary, the authors who have tried to explain the endogenous 
determination of the tariff rate in the context of conflict resolution have had difficulties 
in simply proving the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the lobbying game. Moreover, 
these studies have abstracted from the political market by assuming that there exists a 
‘tariff formation function’ or a ‘pricing function’ that satisfies certain properties. They 
have neither shown nor explained what sort of government behaviour is consistent with 
these assumptions.6 This approach has remained limited to analysis of the demand side 
of the political market. To incorporate this approach into a CGE model, at this stage, 
does not seem straightforward.
2.2.3 The Political Market
Mayer's (1984) approach to the study of endogenous tariff formation is slightly 
different. He replaced the tariff formation function of Findlay and Wellisz (1982, 1983) 
by the majority voting rule. Mayer assumed that the interest groups do not lobby for 
favourable tariff policy, rather they vote for it In his framework the conflict of interest 
is resolved by majority voting.
Mayer's model, in contrast to other models, allows a person to own more than 
one factor of production. By assuming that factor ownership patterns differ among 
people he demonstrated, both under Heckscher-Ohlin and the specific factor model, that 
each factor owner has an optimal tariff rate whose value is uniquely related to the
5 A question of noncommensurability of units of different commodities may arise, which Coggins 
et al. claim to have solved by their price normalization rule. That is, the units of commodities were 
chosen so that the prices of the two commodities add up to unity.
6 It is, however, claimed in Coggins, et al. (1991), that the pricing function ‘could be considered a 
component of a more general model in which the government chooses the pricing function as a 
Stackelberg leader, with individuals in the economy reacting to the pricing function in an associated 
lobbying game. Any number of postulates regarding the government behaviour could be consistent with 
this approach.’ (p. 535)
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individual's factor ownership. However, in the specific factor model it was necessary to 
assume that each person possesses at most one type of specific factor in addition to one 
unit of the mobile factor.
In the special case of majority voting with no voting costs, he showed that it is 
the median factor owner's optimal tariff rate that will be chosen by the majority. Any 
shock that changes the position of the median voter would alter the equilibrium tariff 
rate. By introducing a positive cost of voting, which he assumed to be the same for 
every voter, Mayer showed that a small minority of big potential gainers had a far 
greater chance of gaining protection. The large number of losers will find it rational not 
to vote because the cost of voting exceeds the loss due to increased tariff, thus 
confirming the hypothesis rigorously of the interest group theories without introducing 
the lobbying and self-interested behaviour of the government. In fact, in Mayer's model, 
the government does not play any active role at all. The decisions are made by the 
voters themselves.
Magee, Brock and Young (1989) - henceforth MBY - have cited previous 
studies that provide powerful arguments, particularly relevant when redistributive issues 
are involved, against the majority voting rule. The major argument against the majority 
rule is the absence of single peaked preferences.7 Mayer was aware of this limitation, 
since he acknowledged this problem somewhat indirectly in his assumption that voting 
takes place on a single issue - that is, in each case only one industry will be trying to 
gain tariff protection. When all industries try to get protection there may or may not 
exist any equilibrium under the majority voting rule.8 This has been regarded as the 
major conceptual flaw in Mayer's approach (Magee, Brock and Young, 1989: 73)
In a major study MBY, on the other hand, used a probabilistic voting model, 
which was developed previously by Brock and Magee (1978) to analyze the industry 
structure of protection. In their model of the political market with two lobbies and two 
political parties each party aimed to maximize its chance of being elected by offering 
either a tariff or a subsidy rate, and the lobbies were contributing to the parties for 
favourable policies to maximize the income of their members. Voters were rationally 
ignorant Their choice, however, could be affected positively by the resources spent by 
the parties in voters' education and negatively by the distortionary effects of the 
policies.
7 Let us consider n proposals, and arrange them in any arbitrary order. If there exists any one voter 
whose preference over these n proposals first declines and then rises, then his preference over these n 
alternatives is not single peaked. Majority voting rule can produce an equilibrium outcome if voters’ 
preferences are all single peaked. Note that voters’ preferences on a single issue are always single 
peaked. For details see Mueller (1979: 40-44) and references therein.
8 See footnote 19 in Mayer (1984).
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Each party can obtain more resources to spend on voters’ education from the 
self-interested lobbies of the two factors, who prefer either tariff protection or export 
subsidy, by deviating more from free trade, but this will also increase the deadweight 
loss associated with their policy position and antagonise the general voters.
A hierarchy in terms of the possession of relevant political and economic 
information has been assumed. Political parties, who have all the information regarding 
the reactions of their lobbies and the voters, were at the top level. Therefore the political 
parties were assumed to employ Stackelberg strategies against their respective lobbies 
and the general voters, whereas the parties were assumed to behave as Nash players 
against each other. The respective lobbies were assumed to have less information than 
their parties, but better informed than the general voters. So, the lobbies were assumed 
to follow the parties, but employ Stackelberg strategies against the general voters.
Thus, in MBY’s model of the political market each party included its respective 
lobby's and voters’ reactions in its calculus, and each of the lobbies included voters’ 
reactions in their calculus. The parties maximize their probability of election by taking 
policy positions, lobbies maximize their income by choosing their lobbying 
contribution, and the general voters, though can be influenced by political campaigns of 
the lobbies and the parties, generally dislike deviations from free trade. MBY have thus 
defined a very interesting noncooperative game involving two political parties, two 
lobbies and the rationally ignorant voters. Their study did not address the question of 
the existence of an equilibrium in this game. They assumed it.
MBY developed their endogenous tariff theory in general equilibrium (Part II) 
using a 2 sector Heckscher-Ohlin type general equilibrium model, which assumes 
perfect factor mobility. Obviously, in such models the conflict of interest arises between 
labour and capital, not between the industries. Therefore, their politico-economic model 
yields a long-run behaviour of the tariff rate that is determined by the political 
behaviour of the agents holding a long-run view on the economic sphere. Such a model 
is less suited in explaining the short-run behaviour (or immediate response) of the tariff 
rates.
Moreover, MBY have studied the endogenous behaviour of the tariff rate under 
either the Leontief or the Cobb-Douglas production technologies only, and the 
probabilistic voting model was represented by a logit election function. To a certain 
extent, their conclusions are shaped by these structures as well. Nevertheless, they have 
obtained many interesting results some of which are as follows.
1. With a Leontief production function, they obtained a ‘compensation effect’ in 
policy changes with respect to exogenous shocks. In particular, the following two
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results are very interesting in the sense that these results are similar to the predictions of 
the CSWF or that of the insurance theories.
(i) In general, an increase in a country's terms of trade causes the equilibrium 
level of protection to rise and the export subsidy to fall. Terms of trade are the 
ratio of the price of a country's exports over that of its imports, (p. 157)
(ii) Endogenous politics is progressive with respect to exogenous 
changes in prices and technology. When a factor's income falls, ...the injured 
factor lobbies harder, and the political system provides policies that generate a 
partial offset to the initial decline in income, (p. 18).
2. In a simulation of their model with Leontief production functions, MBY 
observed that multiple equilibria were pervasive. The equilibria contained cases of 
either ‘Prisoner's Dilemma’ equilibrium, where each factor was worse off compared 
with free trade or ‘Dominant Player’ equilibrium, where one factor gained and the other 
lost compared with the free trade outcome. The actual outcome was dependant on the 
factor endowment ratio of the country. Extreme ratio implied a Dominant Player 
solution and intermediate ratio implied a Prisoner's Dilemma. For example, higher 
capital-labour ratio implies, in their model, that capital wins and labour loses and vice 
versa (p. 171).
3. It is then natural to ask why the lobby groups do not cooperate if they get 
trapped into Prisoner's Dilemma outcomes? MBY’s simulation showed that the 
cooperation that can make both lobbies better off was not feasible because of 
enforcement problems. Note that their model does not contain a government that 
benefits from enforcing cooperative agreements. The political parties, who are the 
potential rulers of the country, have an incentive to make the game more 
noncooperative.
When Cobb-Douglas production and utility functions were used in defining the 
general equilibrium structure, MBY obtained a change in some of the results.
First, MBY found that domestic politics is independent of international price. 
That is, even though the terms of trade change had distributive effects, it had no effect 
on the expenditures on lobbying, probabilities of election and the policies offered by the 
parties in equilibrium. This is quite different from the previous result.
Second, an increase in the endowment of a factor had the effect of generating 
policies favouring the factor itself. The main reason is simple: an increase in the 
endowment of a factor, say capital, will increase the resource base of the capital lobby 
which then spends more on lobbying for the pro-capital party; this, in turn, increases the 
success rate of the pro-capital party as well as improves the policy position of the pro- 
capital party. Both considerations increase the relative price of the capital intensive
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good, increase the return to capital, and lower wages in their expectational equilibrium. 
This is what they call increasing return on politics. This result is maintained irrespective 
to a shift in production technologies.
Third, and more surprising, they observed that if the factors were moderately 
risk averse (with relative coefficient of risk aversion equal to unity) and the factor 
intensities (measured by the ratio of physical units of the factors) in the two sectors 
move together, then an economic black hole could result. That is, all of the economy's 
factor endowment could be exhausted in predatory lobbying while the equilibrium tariff 
rate may actually fall (p. 223).
The most important aspect of MBY’s approach is that it describes both the 
supply as well as the demand side of the political market, which has been appended to a 
general equilibrium model of the economic sphere of the political economy. This is 
apparently the only study which has analysed the endogenous determination of the tariff 
rate covering both political and economic markets in detail and in which self-interested 
behaviour on the part of all agents in the model is maintained.
MBY's model of the political market contains a special assumption that deserves 
scrutiny. It is the assumption that the labour lobby uses labour only in lobbying for the 
pro-labour party, whereas the capital lobby uses capital only in lobbying for the pro­
capital party. Some of MBY’s interesting results are the direct consequences of this 
assumption. For example, consider the compensation effect or the progressivity of the 
endogenous politics as referred in point 1 above. MBY explain these results as follows. 
When capital is harmed by a rise in the world price of the labour-intensive good it 
becomes cheaper for the capital lobby to be involved in political activity whereas it will 
be relatively more expensive for the labour lobby to spend more labour in lobbying.(see 
Magee, Brock and Young, 1989: 150).
However, they have not explained why the labour lobby, rather than allowing 
the capital lobby to seek protection through the political process, cannot utilize cheaper 
capital in lobbying for the pro-labour party and maintain political power when the price 
of the labour-intensive good, and hence the wage rate, increases. Similar arguments can 
be made when the relative price of the capital-intensive good increases in the world 
market and the wage rate falls in the domestic market Why do the capital lobby and the 
pro-capital party not utilise cheaper labour in political campaigning to secure a higher 
subsidy rate or at least block the labour lobby and the pro-labour party in seeking a 
higher rate of protection on the labour-intensive good? The question whether their result 
stands with the factors allowed as substitutes in the political activities remains 
unanswered.
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MBY have also assumed that the political market clears faster than economic 
markets, as if the parties contest an election every now and then, and therefore the 
economy may alternate between a tariff regime and a subsidy regime. While making 
decisions, the agents take the expected prices, not the actual prices, in the economic 
sphere of the model. The expected prices are determined by the equilibrium 
probabilities of electoral success and the prices that would result in the event of the 
success of each of the political parties. Thus, the expectational equilibrium, as they call 
it, is an important property of their model.
However, to study endogenous tariff formation in the short-run Magee, Brock 
and Young's model is not directly useful for two reasons: it is based on the Heckscher- 
Ohlin model, and it does not have a government in place.
To study the behaviour of the policy variables in the short-run the specific-factor 
model is more suitable to describe the general equilibrium of the economy than the 
Heckscher-Ohlin model. Similarly, it would be more relevant to consider the political 
process under one party rule, since elections are actually held at an infrequent interval 
of, say five years, and one party will be ruling in between any two elections. The 
incumbent party (or the government), however, would be in constant threat from the 
opposition and so it will always keep an eye on its re-election prospects. It would be 
more realistic to assume that the ruling party (or the government) prefers to raise its 
level of political support.
Under these assumptions, the agents know the actual prices determined by the 
policy responses of the government. The equilibrium in this type of setting can then be 
based on ex-post outcomes, rather than on expectations.
A slightly different approach to policy modelling is taken by Yeldan and Roe 
(1991). They were mainly interested in the implementation of export subsidy rates in 
the presence of rent seeking activities holding tariffs and tariff-like instruments 
exogenously constant. In doing so, they have embedded the political sphere of a 
political economy with its economic sphere described by a conventional CGE model.
Their CGE model contains four economic sectors - agriculture, industry, 
commercial service, and the public service - of which the public service is nontraded; 
and eight households - four worker households, one civil-servant household, and three 
private-sector capitalists (or the producer) households. Worker households receive 
sectoral wage bill and civil-servant household receives residual profit from public 
service operation and the ‘bribes’. The three producer households get the sectoral rents. 
They have further assumed that the rent seeking activities are carried out only by the 
producer households by the payments of bribes out of their rental income.
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Given this political and economic structure, they have modelled the supply side 
of the political market as follows. They assume that the public authority (civil-servant 
household) responds to rent-seeking activities of the private producers by setting the 
sectoral subsidy rates in an attempt to maximize the following objective function
subject to the CGE model;
where Vk is the indirect utility level of the producer household k, and the influence 
weights Ik are endogenously determined by the rent-seeking process
where, Rk are the monetized costs of the rent-seeking activity or ‘bribes’ paid by the 
producer household k, and ßk are calibration parameters.
The demand side of the political market is described by the utility maximizing 
behaviour of the producer households. The producer households spend a part of then- 
income in ‘bribing’ the civil-servant household (the authority) to increase their 
influence weights in the authority’s objective function, which in turn returns with a 
favourable policy that increases their disposable income, and utilities. The workers’ 
households were assumed to be nonstrategic. The politico-economic system will be in 
equilibrium at a policy level when no one wants to adjust his rent-seeking activity or 
bribes.
The model was implemented using Turkish data of 1981. Simulation results 
with different closure rules, fixed versus flexible exchange rate, with or without 
government foreign borrowings, etc. provide an innovative application of the model. 
The results show that different agents gain differently with different closure rules.
The results, however, may imply that the closure rules, for example fixed or 
flexible exchange rates, limits to government borrowing, etc. themselves could be the 
targets of rent-seeking activities, a problem which has not been addressed in the study.
In terms of policy modelling in general equilibrium this study has appended an 
objective function of the government which is simply a weighted average of the welfare 
of the rent-seekers, with weights responding positively to the rent-seeking expenditures 
of the rent-seeking agents. It does not state clearly whether the government is a welfare 
function maximizer but with weights being affected by political activities of the agents, 
or is simply a self-interested agent using the Stackelberg strategy vis a vis the rent
k e  {producer households},
k
Ik =
seekers.
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Yeldan and Roe’s study has not addressed the existence issue either, and has not 
explained how the calibration parameters, ßk, contained in the influence functions are
obtained. These parameters, nevertheless, play a critical role in translating the ‘bribes’ 
into the influence weights in the ‘objective function’ of the government.
2.2.4 Summary of the Political Economy Approach
The endogenous tariff literature that adopts the political economy approach to 
the question of tariff determination is distinguished by its explicit assumption of self- 
interested behaviour on the part of government. The literature was classified into three 
groups according to their emphasis on the dimension of the political market.
The supply side literature assumed support maximizing behaviour of the 
government and argued that the government would choose a tariff rate which 
maximizes its political support. But, it did not analyse explicitly how the individual 
interest groups would react to the policy choice of the government. Moreover, they 
differ considerably on the appropriate specification of the political support function 
itself.
The demand side literature has made use of the deduction that there are 
incentives to the rational agents to behave strategically in influencing the policy 
decision of the government. For a given policy-supply function (tariff function), this 
literature has attempted to explain the existence of the tariff ‘distortion’ as an 
equilibrium outcome of the policy game played by various interest groups. This class of 
literature has progressed up to the proof of the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a 
lobbying game in an exchange economy. It has not been explicit in linking the tariff 
function to particular behaviour of government. Therefore, the supply side of the 
political market has remained more or less unexplained.
The literature that has considered both the demand and the supply side of the 
political market is much richer in several aspects than the studies focusing on either the 
demand side or the supply side. It shows that government policies are the outcome of a 
complex interaction among interest groups, political parties and general voters in the 
political market. However, its economic sphere is described by an expectational 
equilibrium of a long-run model. Therefore, it is not suitable to study the short-run 
behaviour of the actors in the political market and the short-run outcomes of the 
political process. Moreover, the simulation results show that the results are highly 
sensitive to the choice of the production functions. The conditions under which the 
existence of an equilibrium can be assured are not known.
The following points emerge as the most common ingredient of the political 
economy approach to endogenous tariff theory. First, all of the existing studies appear
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to agree on the point that given an institutional process of policy supply, different 
interest groups lobby for favourable tariff policies. Second, the supplier of the (tariff) 
policy uses it as an instrument for maximizing its own self-interest - of remaining in 
power or being (reflected.
23  The Hybrid Approach:
A Combination of both Public-interest and Self-interest
There is a third approach to the endogenous tariff theory. It assumes that
The actions of the government are determined jointly by its willingness to 
grant (or perhaps its inability to resist the granting of) tariffs in the face of 
political pressure and by its desire to maximize social welfare (Feenstra and 
Bhagwati, 1982: 245).
Feenstra and Bhagwati further explain (p. 246)
Our underlying assumption that one part of the government responds to the 
protectionist pressures while another tries to maximize welfare subject to this 
response suggests, as some conference participants wittily remarked, a "left- 
brain, right-brain" or an "ego versus id" type of approach to the political 
economy at hand. It does reflect, however, the classic division and 
confrontation between the (protrade) executive and the (lobbying dominated) 
legislature in countries such as the United States.
Feenstra and Bhagwati employed a 2 x 2 Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson model to 
describe the general equilibrium of the economy, which is implicitly assumed to be in 
free trade equilibrium initially. Furthermore, following Findlay and Wellisz (1982) 
Fenestra and Bhagwati have assumed that the self-interested ‘part’ of the government 
offers a tariff function to each factor group, which is increasing and concave in 
quantities of labour and capital employed by the factor group in lobbying. Given a 
group-specific tariff function, Feenstra and Bhagwati assume that a factor group 
intending to lobby the government for tariff protection faces the following "reasonable 
form for the lobbying cost function"
where, t is the tariff rate, w and r are the wage rate and the rental rate respectively, p*0 
and p are the international relative prices of the import competing good respectively 
before and after the shock. The function 0(w,r) is assumed to be increasing and 
quasiconcave.
By construction, this cost function has some special properties. First, it implies 
that only one factor will lobby at a time. This is so because, the expression on the 
denominator of the lobbying cost function implies that a factor will never engage in
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lobbying whenever its income is increasing through favourable terms of trade change, 
because the cost of lobbying remains infinitely large. The factor whose income has 
fallen, because of an adverse terms of trade change in the international market, will find 
it rational to engage in lobbying. Second, the injured factor will never lobby for a fully 
offsetting tariff protection when its income decline is caused by a change in the 
international terms of trade, because the cost of lobbying will tend to infinity, while the 
benefits of lobbying will remain finite for every reason. This cost function holds the key 
to the results obtained by Feenstra and Bhagwati.
With these assumptions Feenstra and Bhagwati obtained some interesting 
conclusions. For example, take the case of an increased import competition in the 
context of a specific factor model.9 The specific factor (or its owner) in the import 
competing sector will lose as the price of the import competing good falls. To protect its 
interest it will lobby the government for increased protection.
The government, by assumption, has to respond to the lobbying (political) 
activity of the injured factor, and may raise the tariff rate on imports. But, this will 
create a gap between the world prices and the domestic prices, and for obvious reasons, 
domestic welfare will fall. The government, by assumption, is also a social welfare 
maximizer. Therefore, it would prefer not to raise tariff rates if other means are 
available that can provide protection to the injured sector, and would be interested in 
keeping the domestic prices as close to the world prices as possible.
Under these circumstances the government will necessarily raise the tariff rate 
on imports if other nondistortionary (lump-sum) taxes are not available or are not 
feasible. Nevertheless, the government can utilize the tariff revenue strategically so that 
the injured sector reduces its lobbying activity and the difference between the domestic 
price and world price is minimized.
In fact, Feenstra and Bhagwati obtain an efficient tariff rate at which the 
combined effect of the tariff rate and the tariff revenue when transferred fully to the 
injured factor is just sufficient to make the injured factor indifferent between the 
reduced level of lobbying that is just sufficient to induce the efficient tariff rate and its 
optimal lobbying in the absence of such an income transfer. The government's act of 
bribing the injured factor with the efficient tariff revenue is welfare improving for two 
reasons. First, the deviation of the domestic price from the world price is reduced with 
this transfer scheme, and second, the resources absorbed in lobbying for efficient tariff 
is lower than it would absorb otherwise.
9 Strictly speaking, the basic conflict runs along the factor lines in Feenstra and Bhagwati’s 
model, however, the essential ideas of their model can be captured by a specific factor model as well.
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This result accomplishes several things. First, it explains why a tariff exists in 
the first place. Second, it identifies, in principle, the efficient tariff rate. Third, by virtue 
of their assumed lobbying cost function, it follows that a declining industry will 
continue to decline. Fourth, it maintains that the government is basically a benevolent 
agent.
However, as a guide to policy modelling, this approach is still far from being 
useful for several reasons. First, it is not clear why the government is supposed to 
respond to the lobbying effort of the injured factor.10 Second, the nature and the form 
of the objective function of the government have not been specified. Third, the lobbying 
cost-of-tariff function for the injured factor has an ad hoc character. It has not been 
explained why the cost rises tremendously as the tariff rate approaches to offset the 
terms of trade change. Fourth, as Baldwin argued in his comments on Feenstra and 
Bhagwati's paper, it is not clear why the gaining factor does not spend resources in 
counter lobbying to maintain its gains when the terms of trade change and the injured 
factor lobbies for an increased tariff protection. Fifth, it is not clear at all whether the 
hypothesized behaviour of the government has a normative or a positive content. In 
summary, the approach suggested by Feenstra and Bhagwati, though interesting, does 
not seem very useful for modelling the process of tariff formation.
2.4 The Form of Protection
The studies reviewed so far have assumed that tariff policy is the only 
instrument available to the government to pursue its objective, whatever it may be.
With this assumption these studies have established that the government will change the 
tariff rate especially when international terms of trade change. Strictly speaking, these 
studies have shown that it would be in the interest of the government, for political or 
welfare reason, to insulate the domestic economy from foreign price shocks. They have 
not determined whether commercial policy interventions will be in the form of a tariff 
rate, quota, subsidies or something else.
10 The reason why the government in their model responds to lobbying by the injured facto- is not 
clear. In the text Feenstra and Bhagwati use a ‘tariff function’ of Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and say that 
‘this lobbying function should be interpreted as derived from given political behaviour and institutions, 
such as the desire of politicians to maximize their probability of reelection’ (p. 247), and later on in 
footnote 10 they write, ‘the government's desire to maximize social welfare is consistent with its 
willingness to grant tariff protection, in that the latter can represent its reaction to distributive equity 
whereas the former corresponds to allocative efficiency’ (p. 257). If the government is prepared to grant 
protection on equity grounds, then to invoke a lobbying function' and a reference to Brock and Magee 
(1978) is not justified. The social welfare function used by the government should be sufficient enough to 
generate the optimal tariff rate. On the other hand, if the government is assumed to maximize political 
support while granting tariff protection to the injured sector, then to claim that it represents the 
government's reaction to distributive equity is not justified. Thus, the position of Feenstra and Bhagwati 
is not easily understandable.
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There are situations in which the protective instruments are not equivalent. For 
example, Warr and Parmenter (1986) have shown that in a situation with labour market 
disequilibrium, protection awarded through government procurement policies may 
dominate tariffs in terms of maintaining employment elsewhere in the economy, in 
terms of an increase in employment in the protected sector, or in terms of maintaining 
the total volume of trade.
How would a self-interested government choose between the tariff and the 
competitively auctioned quota as a protective instrument, since a relative-price 
protection to a ‘declining’ industry can be provided in either way? This problem was 
studied by Cassing and Hillman (1985) in a partial equilibrium setting, but assuming 
that the industry concerned has a monopoly power in the domestic market.
Cassing and Hillman have shown that the superiority of either instrument 
depends on the value attached by the government on the tariff revenue. If the 
government does not value the tariff revenue, and is concerned only with its political 
support, then tariffs dominate quotas, whereas if the government also values tariff 
revenue, then the tariff no longer unambiguously dominates the quota as an optimal 
instrument.
The irrelevance of the welfare comparison of various instruments, when the 
level of ‘distortion’ is endogenously determined through the political process, was 
noted by various authors (for example, Rodrik, 1986). Skirting this limitation, however, 
Rodrik concluded that tariffs could be welfare superior to production subsidies if the 
protected sector contains a sufficiently large number of firms. His main argument is that 
under the tariff regime the free rider problem will lead to ‘under-demand’ of protection 
than relative to the subsidy regime and therefore the level of distortion under the tariff 
regime will be lower. A Similar conclusion can also be found in Hall and Nelson 
(1992).
Lloyd and Falvey (1986) studied the choice of policy instrument when there is 
uncertainty in the international terms of trade using a political economy approach. They 
have shown that, for a given distribution of the international terms of trade, the 
distribution of the domestic relative price depends upon the nature of the protective 
instrument employed to provide protection. Given that all interest groups are risk averse 
the preference orderings of the protective instruments will differ across the interest 
groups and the choice of a particular instrument therefore determined by the domestic 
process of conflict resolution. In particular, they argue that such a choice would be 
determined by the relative political power of the interest groups.
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Lloyd and Falvey’s study indicates that any of the numerous protective 
instruments could be observed in place as an outcome of the political process depending 
on which of the conditions that guarantee the equivalence of the protective instruments 
is violated. In our study, we will ignore this issue by assuming that the conditions of 
equivalence between the protective instruments are satisfied.
2.5 Implications to the Modelling Strategy
We have reviewed the class of endogenous tariff literature which assumes that 
government is motivated by public-interest and the class of endogenous tariff literature 
which assumes that government is motivated by its own self-interest. As far as the 
behaviour of the tariff rate is concerned the predictions of both approaches are similar. 
Both approaches predict a compensating nature of tariff changes. However, they imply 
different strategies in modelling the endogenous process of tariff determination.
If one follows the public-interest approach in modelling government behaviour, 
then the implication of this choice to our modelling problem is that a social welfare 
function has to be specified somehow and the condition(s) that will be satisfied at the 
maximum of the social welfare function has to be included in the system of equations 
describing the general equilibrium of the economic sphere. A solution of this 
augmented system will yield the welfare maximizing tariff rate in general equilibrium.
However, there are conceptual problems in adopting this approach which need 
to be solved before such a model can be made operational. In particular, the existence 
and uniqueness of a social welfare function is a very real problem.11 Moreover, to 
guarantee that the social welfare function is maximized through policy choices, it is 
necessary to assume that the policy makers or the politicians are benevolent and they do 
not pursue their own self-interest while making policy decisions at the cost of the 
society. Similar problems arise with the hybrid approach as well. Such problems, 
however, do not arise if we view the government or the politicians as a class of self- 
interested agents. In this study, therefore, we will assume that the government is guided 
by its own self-interest - the interest of remaining in power.
This assumption leads the present study into the class of endogenous tariff 
literature that adopts a political economy approach to tariff formation. On the basis of 
the experiences of the previous studies we may draw the following guidelines to model 
the endogenous process of tariff determination.
n For a critical view on welfare economics as such see Sen (1979).
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The first issue is related to the stylization of political economy. Several ways of 
stylizing the political and economic spheres exist in the literature. However, this study 
selects a particular stylization of these two spheres based on the following 
consideration.
Most of the previous studies have agreed on the conclusion that domestic tariffs 
respond to international terms of trade shocks. Since international market condition may 
change frequently for different exogenous reasons, it is natural to expect that domestic 
tariff rates are being reviewed continuously. Therefore, this study explicitly assumes 
that the marginal changes (adjustments) in domestic tariff rates are essentially short-run 
phenomenon.
Note, however, that this assumption does not necessarily imply a compensating 
nature of tariff changes. Tariffs may change in either direction in response to a shock. It 
simply implies that tariff changes do not involve long-run commitments on the part of 
the policy maker, and because of time inconsistency, the private sector cannot base its 
optimal decisions involving long-run commitments, including the capacity adjustments 
in the production sector, on the levels of the existing tariff rates.
This means that the adjustments in the economic markets triggered by tariff 
changes will be driven by short-run economic interests, and the economic consequences 
of tariff changes to the private sector are best described by a specific-factor model 
rather than a model that assumes perfect factor mobility in the economic sphere of the 
political economy. Because of this reason, in contrast to MBY, this study will employ a 
specific-factor model to stylize the workings of the economic sphere of the political 
economy.
On the demand side of the political market this study will allow the players to 
spend resources in order to obtain favourable tariff policies. In this respect, as in 
previous studies, it will be assumed that only the owners of the specific factors behave 
strategically, and the rest behave nonstrategically.12
Whether the country is in a pluralistic or in a dictatorial regime, it will be 
assumed that the government wants to maximize political support while making policy 
decisions. The relevant description of the political market will have a ‘certain’, not an 
‘expected’ government of two or more parties, in place. In contrast to MBY, who 
studied the politico-economic system based on an expectational equilibrium, this study 
will be based on the actual (certain) outcomes of the politico-economic process. Thus,
12 See for example Findlay and Wellisz (1982,1983,1984), Rodrik (1986), Yeldan and Roe 
(1991), and Hall and Nelson (1992).
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the present study differs from MBY in its stylization of the politico-economic 
environment, and provides an exposition of endogenous determination of tariffs in the 
short-run. Hence, this study may be regarded as a short-run compliment of MBY’s 
long-run model.
Given this politico-economic environment, this study will attempt to attain its 
objectives in the following steps.
1. Extend Coggins, et al.'s existence result to a productive economy for a given 
pricing function that satisfies the properties stated in previous studies.
2. Show that the properties satisfied by the pricing function of the government are 
consistent with the support maximizing behaviour of the government.
These two steps will show that the studies that have focussed on the demand 
side of the political market and studies that have focussed on the supply side are 
compatible. Moreover, it will also show that the political economy approach can 
consistently explain the existence of an ‘active’ commercial policy, since at least one 
nontrivial Nash equilibrium exists in the politico-economic system. These results will 
be obtained in chapter 5.
The noncooperative approach of the existing literature in modelling the demand 
side of the political market implicitly assumes that the firms in each industry group 
cooperate with each other, whereas the industry coalitions do not. Adherence to this 
assumption in modelling the political process may lead to inefficient policy outcomes. 
For example, it is well known that in a noncooperative game, unless some arbitrary 
restrictions are imposed, the existence of multiple and sub-optimal equilibria cannot be 
ruled out. Such has been the experience of MBY who observed a pervasiveness of 
multiple equilibria, which also displayed the presence of Prisoner’s Dilemma 
equilibrium, in simulations of models of political economies with endogenous tariff 
policy.
There is no compelling reason to assume that the political market is 
characterized by noncooperation only. One can view the political market as an 
institution which also facilitates communication and negotiation among the interest 
groups and the political activities as a bargaining process through which the conflicting 
interests reach an agreement that is individually rational.13 Such a view of the political
13 For applications of cooperative game-theoretic approach in addressing the question of policy 
determination see Zusman (1976), Zusman and Amiad (1977), Beghin (1990), and Beghin and Karp 
(1991). Zusman’s approach provides a game-theoretic basis for a policy preference function of the 
government, which is the sum of the government’s own objective function and the interest group’s 
objective functions weighted by their respective marginal strength of power over the government. He had
sphere, however, does not rule out the possibility of noncooperation. The players may 
play the game noncooperatively if they choose to do so.
However, in MBY cooperation did not arise as a viable solution in a tariff­
setting game, which they attributed to the presence of multiple equilibria, and the 
absence of an enforcement mechanism. In the presence of multiple equilibria a double 
cross in a cooperative solution could lead at least one player to an even worse 
noncooperative outcome. This result is possible in their model because they had taken a 
very long-run view in modelling the political economy in which there were two 
political parties contesting to govern the country. As a result, they had no government 
in place to enforce a cooperative solution. The problem of enforcement does not arise if 
one takes a short-run view in modelling the political economy because one can always 
observe a government in the short-run, which is interested in maximizing political 
support to remain in power. Enforcement of the cooperative agreement eliminates 
opposition that would otherwise arise from a policy choice and thus a government will 
have incentives to enforce cooperative agreements. More importantly, the tariff rates 
thus obtained at a cooperative solution will be Pareto efficient.
Therefore, in the third step we will extend the scope of the tariff-setting game by 
permitting cooperation in the strategy sets of the players. The policy making process 
will be defined in the framework of a Nash bargaining problem in which players will 
explicitly bargain over the appropriate level of the tariff rates, and also agree on not to 
be engaged in predatory lobbying activities. We will obtain the condition that will be 
satisfied by a Nash bargaining solution, and combine it with the conditions of general 
equilibrium in the economic market A full model thus obtained will allow us to study 
the comparative static behaviour of the bargained tariff rate with respect to the 
exogenous variables of the model. Chapter 6 to chapter 8 will be devoted to this
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also suggested a programming technique to estimate the marginal strengths of the interest groups. 
Zusman’s approach was subsequently applied to explain the price polices, and estimate the marginal 
social powers of different producers and consumers of diary products under the Israeli Diary Program. 
Beghin (1990), and Beghin and Karp (1991) also adopted a bargain-theoretic approach in explaining the 
food pricing policy in Senegal. Their approach differs from that of Zusman in that they have attempted to 
estimate the game econometrically. However, their specification of the estimating equations is rather ad 
hoc.
All of the above studies have described the game in general terms in which the government, just 
like any other player, has interest in policies that are in conflict with the interest of the other private 
players. Since they have not described a theory of government it is not possible to identify what the 
objective of the government is. However, in the application of their model to the pricing problem of a 
particular regulated commodity or a commodity group they have assumed that the government is a 
revenue maximizer, which could be a reasonable assumption because the game being studied is a small 
part of the overall policy game in which the government is involved. An application of their approach in 
a CGE framework does not seem straightforward. However, these studies may provide alternative 
methods of implementing a bargain-theoretic approach to study the problems of policy formation that 
could be a matter for future research.
44
exercise, which will, in totality, represent the major departure of this study from the 
existing literature.
However, it is observed in the review of the existing literature that the 
predictions of the political economy approach are surprisingly close to that of the 
approach that maintains ‘public interest’ hypothesis in characterizing the government 
behaviour. Hence, the conclusion of our study can not be expected to be very different 
from that of these studies. In the event of agreement, the bargain-theoretic approach of 
the political economy may provide a political economy foundation for the CSWF. The 
two contending schools can thus be reconciled.
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CHAPTER 3
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF THE ECONOMIC SPHERE 
OF A SMALL OPEN POLITICAL ECONOMY
Introduction
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the workings of the economic sphere 
of a small open political economy treating the equilibrium outcome of the political 
sphere, that is the policies of the government, as exogenously given. This chapter is set 
out in three steps. First, the structure of a general equilibrium model of the economic 
sphere of a political economy is described in which the government policies, factor 
endowments, production technologies, and tastes are treated as exogenous. Then, the 
model is linearized in terms of percentage changes of the model variables around an 
arbitrary equilibrium point, and solved to obtain the comparative static responses of 
the endogenous variables. Finally, the properties of the shares and elasticity parameters 
involved in determining the comparative static responses are employed to deduce the 
general properties of the equilibrium solution functions that hold at all equilibrium 
points of the model.
Because government policies are considered exogenous, the model described in 
this chapter belongs to the class of policy-exogenous general equilibrium models. 
Moreover, the structure of the general equilibrium model of the economic sphere 
follows the specific-factor model, which is a sub-class of policy-exogenous models. 
Therefore, the results of this chapter are fairly well-known in the literature (see for 
example Jones, 1971; Mussa, 1974; Neary, 1978). This chapter, nevertheless, derives 
them because these results form the building blocks for the subsequent chapters.
The choice of a specific-factor model is motivated by the following reasons. 
First, the problem of tariff determination, the specific modelling issue of this study, has 
already been studied extensively by Magee, Brock and Young (1989) in the context of a 
Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson type general equilibrium model of the economic sphere. 
Second, tariffs and other redistributive policy changes can be viewed as short-run 
phenomenon in the sense that they can, in principle, be adjusted quite frequently by the 
government, whereas the optimal responses of the producers to the tariff and other 
redistributive policy changes would be constrained by the specificity of some of the 
productive factors.
Moreover, unless there are reasons, such as credible commitments by the 
government, to believe that the government’s redistributive policies will not change
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over a long period small variations in such policies are unlikely to affect the allocations, 
within the private sector, of factors that are relatively immobile in the short-run.
This chapter is divided into four sections. The first section outlines the main 
assumptions of the model. The second section develops the structure of the general 
equilibrium system. The comparative static results and the properties of the solution 
functions are studied in the third section. A short summary of the chapter is provided in 
the fourth section.
3.1 The Economy
In order to simplify and make the model tractable the following assumptions are 
made. The economy has two single-product sectors, each one with many identical 
firms. The firms in each sector employ capital and labour according to constant returns 
to scale CES technology to produce a homogenous good. The existence of intermediate 
inputs is ignored. All firms are price takers in all commodity, factor and foreign 
exchange markets. All firms in both production sectors are profit maximizers. Under 
these assumptions, the aggregation of all firms producing a homogenous commodity 
into one single sector is valid. It is simply a scalar multiple of a single firm.
In the short run, capital is (firm) sector-specific, whereas (homogenous) labour 
is perfectly mobile. The endowment of all factors is exogenously given.
Both goods are internationally traded. The economy is small and open relative 
to the world market of the two goods. Transportation costs and other margins on trade 
are ignored. As a result, the relative price of the commodities in the domestic market 
are exogenously determined by the international relative price and government 
interventions, which can be expressed in equivalent nominal tariff rates.
To simplify further it is also assumed that all factor owners have identical 
homothetic preferences, and each one is a price taker in goods, factor and foreign 
exchange markets. The implication of this assumption is that the personal distribution 
of income plays no role in determining the aggregate demand for commodities, and 
aggregation of preferences across individuals is valid. More specifically, it is assumed 
that the economy has a single national (or a representative) consumer with a preference 
structure that can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function defined on the two 
commodities, and all final demand is treated as consumption of the national consumer. 
The consumer receives all factor incomes and the tariff revenue. The consumer is a 
utility maximizer.
Furthermore, it is assumed that all prices are fully flexible, and all markets clear 
instantly. All factors are internationally immobile. With these assumptions we proceed
onto derive the general equilibrium structure of the economic sphere of a small open 
political economy.
3.2 The Structure of the Policy-exogenous General Equilibrium Model
This section specifies the basic structure of the policy-exogenous general 
equilibrium model (PXGEM). First, under the above assumptions, we analyze a 
producer’s behaviour facing a quantity constraint on the stock of capital. Given the 
wage rate and the output price, we derive an expression for the virtual rental rate of 
capital such that the existing stock of capital is optimal to produce a given level of 
output. We then derive the virtual cost of production at each output level by paying the 
fixed capital its virtual rental rate and labour its market wage rate. It is then shown that 
a unique profit maximizing output level can be determined by requiring that average 
virtual cost be equal to the given output price.
The ‘zero-profit’ condition and the rental function are then solved to obtain the 
equilibrium output level and the virtual rental rate in terms of the wage rate and the 
commodity price. This solves the producer’s problem of determining the profit 
maximizing output level and yields the sector specific rental rate for each sector, (and 
for each firm) per unit of the specific capital at given prices of commodities and the 
wage rate.
Moreover, the conditional labour demand functions are expressed in terms of the 
wage rate and the output prices, since these determine the optimal output levels.
A simple labour market has been specified in which the supply of labour is 
fixed. Sectoral labour demand functions are aggregated to obtain the market demand for 
labour, at given commodity prices. The wage rate adjusts to clear the labour market. 
Thus, the labour market yields the equilibrium wage rate as a function of commodity 
prices, quantity of labour supplied, and other technological parameters.
Consumer demands are generated by maximizing a Cobb-Douglas utility 
function. 1 Goods market, and the foreign exchange market clearing conditions 
simultaneously determine the quantities of net trade on the two goods and the exchange 
rate.
Thus, the equilibrium conditions of the goods, factors, and the foreign exchange 
markets are completely specified. This yields a system of equations in fourteen 
endogenous variables. But, one of the market clearing condition is redundant by
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1 Cobb-Douglas utility function has been chosen to reduce parametric information, since the
demand side is of not much importance to the main purpose of the study.
48
Walras’ law, we delete the market clearing condition for the foreign exchange, and end 
up with thirteen equations in fourteen variables. The system is closed by choosing 
exogenously the nominal exchange rate equal to unity.
The closed system, however, satisfies the homogenous properties - that the real 
quantities are homogenous of degree zero, and the nominal quantities are homogenous 
of degree one in commodity prices. This property has been used, as in any other such 
Walrasian models of small open economies, to normalize the commodity prices by 
choosing one commodity (exportable) as the numeraire. Furthermore, trade taxes have 
been rationalized into a single import tariff rate using the Lemer symmetry theorem. 
This makes the domestic and the foreign price of the numeraire commodity equal to 
unity, and reduces the number of endogenous variables and the number of equations in 
the system by one. Thus, we finally obtain a system of twelve equations in twelve 
endogenous variables that describes the general equilibrium structure of the ‘real’ 
economic sphere of a small open economy. The following sections derive these 
relations formally.
3.2.1 The Production Sectors
For each sector j= l, 2, the production function can be described by the CES 
function:
(3.1) y ,= (a ,L 7 '
where, Yj is the quantity of output, L; is the units of labour, K . is the unit of capital2 
employed; a } and ß} are distribution parameters, which are strictly positive and add up 
to unity; c } -1  / (1 + p -) defines the constant elasticity of factor substitution. The 
parameter pj can take any value such that <7y remains non-negative. It is
straightforward to verify that the production function represented by equation (3.1) 
implies constant returns to scale.
Let W be the market wage rate of labour and let R denote the rental rate of 
capital, then Cy(Ty) = (RKj +'WLJ) is the cost of producing output Y}. Given Y}, the 
problem of a price taking producer is to choose the levels of Lr  and K . so that the cost 
of producing Y} is minimized. Formally, suppressing the subscripts3, the problem may 
be stated as:
2 One may view as capital encompassing all factors that are sector-specific in the short run, and as 
labour encompassing all factors that are perfectly mobile.
3 So long as the problems remains symmetric to both the sectors the subscripts denoting the 
sectors will be suppressed.
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(3.2) min (WL + RK)
L,K
subject to Y -  ( aLp + ßK~p  ^ Up
The solution to this minimization problem yields conditional factor demand 
functions. The conditional demand function for capital stock can be obtained as
(3.3) £  _  ß i / u + p ) ^ - i / ( i + p ) j ’^ i / ( i + p ) ^ p / ( i + p )  ^ i / ( i+ p ) ^ p / ( i + p )  •
and the conditional demand function for labour can be obtained as
(3.4) a l / ( i + p ) ^ - l / ( l + p ) j ’a l / ( l + p ) ^ p / d + P )  + ß l / ( l + P ) ß P / ( l + P ) j 1/ p y >
Upon substitution, the minimum cost function is given by
(3.5) =  Jct1/(1+p)Wp/(1+p) +  ß l / v +p'> f t p / v + p ) ^ +p ,^p y
The equations (3.3) - (3.5) represent a straightforward solution to the cost 
minimization problem which assumes perfect mobility of factors, both capital and 
labour, across the sectors in response to higher rewards. This assumption is more 
reasonable for the longer run than the short run.
However, it is well understood that in the short-run production sectors are 
unable to adjust their existing stock of some factors to their desired level. One can 
effectively introduce this constraint imposed by the time horizon into the model by 
taking some of the factors as sector specific - that their opportunity cost is zero. The 
specific-factor models could be more relevant in analysing producer behaviour 
whenever the production sectors are making decisions regarding the short run issues, 
such as rent-seeking. Therefore, the modelling strategy in this study closely follows the 
specific factor model (Mussa, 1974; Neary, 1978; and references therein).4 In what 
follows, the term 'capital' represents all factors that are sector specific in the short-run, 
and the term 'labour' represents the mobile factors.
Thus, with the assumption that capital stock is given for each sector, equation 
(3.3) can be solved for the sector-specific rental rate that would make the existing stock 
of sector specific capital optimal for given wage rate and the level of activity. Solving 
equation (3.3) we get:
(3.6) ' R = [ ( K I Y f - ß ] {Ul,)", a llpßW.
4 For a long run view on this issue see Magee, Brock and Young (1989).
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The rental rate R obtained from equation (3.6) is the maximum rental rate that a 
firm would be willing to pay if it had to hire the stock of the specific factor from the 
rental market to produce an output level Y under the CES production function and a 
given wage rate W. In other words, at the rental rate R given by the equation (3.6) and 
the wage rate W, the producer will find the existing stock of capital optimal to produce 
Y. In line with the literature (for example, Neary and Roberts, 1980) that address the 
issue of valuation when the choice is quantity constrained, we distinguish this rental 
rate from the market clearing long run rental rate by stating the following defmition:
Definition 3.1 (Virtual Rental Rate ). For a given level of output and price of the 
mobile factor, an endogenously determined rental rate that makes the given stock of the 
specific factor optimal is defined as virtual rental rate of the specific factor.
Substituting the virtual rental rate, R, from equation (3.6) into the equation (3.4) 
and solving for L, the labour demand, we get:
This function essentially represents short run conditional demand for labour. 
The equation (3.7) shows that given the technological parameters, the short run 
conditional demand for labour depends on the level of output and the stock of fixed 
factor but not directly on any price including the wage rate. The reason is very simple - 
if output is to be increased in the short run the only way is to employ more labour in 
proportion to the level of output. The constant factor of proportion (input-output 
coefficient) is determined by the stock of the specific factor and the elasticity of 
substitution. Therefore, this conditional demand for labour can alternately be derived 
directly from the production function under the assumption that the capital stock is 
fixed.
Substitution of the virtual rental function from equation (3.6) into the equation 
(3.5) yields
Given a wage rate W and the capital stock K, equation (3.8) describes the short 
run total minimum cost of producing the output level Y. In order to distinguish this cost 
function from the usual cost functions we make the following definitions:
Definition 3.2 {Virtual Cost). The minimum cost of producing a given level of output 
when the mobile factor is paid its market rate and the specific factor is paid its virtual 
rental rate is defined as the virtual cost of production; the corresponding cost function is 
defined as the virtual cost function.
(3.7)
C(Y) = a}lp[Kl‘ l {Kp - ß Y p)]
Id +P ) / P
WY.(3.8)
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Definition 3.3 {variable Cost). Given a stock of the specific factor, and price of
the mobile factors), the minimum cost of employing the mobile factor so that a given 
level of output can be produced is defined as the variable cost of the given level of 
output. The function that yields the variable cost of production for each level of output 
is defmed as the variable cost function.
In the long run when all factors are variable and command a market price virtual 
cost becomes equal to the variable cost. However in the short run, when there is at least 
one sector specific or fixed factor of production, the virtual cost and the variable cost 
diverge. Virtual cost exceeds variable cost. The cost C(Y), defined in equation (3.8), is 
an example of virtual cost of producing the output level Y. Wage cost only is an 
example of the variable cost when labour is the only mobile factor of production.
3.2.2 Determination of Profit Maximizing Output:
Zero Pure Profit Condition
A simple manipulation of equation (3.8), using the production function, yields 
(3.9) C(Y)/Y = W l[a(Y I L)Up\.
It can be easily seen that W l\a (Y  /  the expression on the right hand side of the
equation (3.9), represents the marginal cost (wage rate divided by marginal product of 
labour) of producing Y, when labour is the only variable factor of production. This is 
the derivative of variable cost function. Whereas the expression on the left hand side, 
C(Y)  / Y , is the average virtual cost of producing Y. This means that the average virtual 
cost of production (when capital is paid its virtual price) is exactly equal to the usual 
marginal cost o f production for each value ofY.
Since profit maximization under competitive condition requires that output level 
be chosen so that marginal cost equals price5, equation (3.9) implies that under similar 
conditions profit maximization requires that output level be chosen so that average 
virtual cost be equal to the price. This means that when we are dealing with virtual cost 
functions profit maximization requires zero profit condition to hold. So long as the 
production function implies a falling marginal product the average virtual cost curve is
5 The problem of a profit maximizing sector when the stock of specific factor is fixed at K, can be 
written as max 11 = max {P(aL~p 4- ßK~p) — WL). The condition for profit maximization
under competitive conditions then becomes W = Pa(Y  /  L )(1+p) that is, in equilibrium, the mobile 
factor should be paid the value of its marginal product. Or alternately, the condition may be stated as
P =  W /  [cc(Y /  L )(1+p)] which means that, in equilibrium, the marginal cost should be equal to the 
price of output
upward sloping for given price of mobile factors, and 'zero pure profit' also becomes 
sufficient condition of profit maximization.
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Average virtual cost, the usual marginal cost and the 
zero profit condition 
Figure 3.1
For given output price, P, and wage rate W, Figure 3.1 shows the determination 
of the profit maximizing output level. The horizontal axis measures output level and the 
vertical axis measures virtual cost and price. The average virtual cost curve is drawn 
slopping upwards which is implied by the derivative of the average virtual cost 
function. We know from the equation (3.6) that as output level rises the virtual price of 
capital also rises. It is precisely so because the marginal productivity of the specific 
factor, capital, increases and the marginal productivity of labour falls with more 
employment of labour.
Equation (3.6) can also be rewritten as
This equation represents nothing more than what can be seen from the first order 
conditions of cost minimization: that the price paid to each factor be proportional to 
their corresponding marginal product. However, the way it is expressed in equation 
(3.6) helps understand the nature of the virtual cost function.
The right hand side of equation (3.6) contains two parts: the first is the value of 
marginal product of capital and the second is the ratio of wage to the value of marginal 
product of labour. It shows that if labour is paid less than the value of its marginal 
product, then the virtual price of a given stock of capital will also be proportionately
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less than the value of its marginal product. This means that if producers want to produce 
less than the profit maximizing level of output at a given wage rate, capital stock and 
output price, they can hire labour at the market wage rate which will be less than the 
value of the marginal product. Hence the virtual price of capital will also be less than 
the value of its marginal product. Therefore, for all output less than that which 
maximizes profit, it follows that, the virtual cost of production will be less than the 
value of output6 and the average virtual cost will be less than the output price.
This explains why in figure 3.1 for all Y < Y* we have C(Y) / Y less than the 
output price P. Similarly to the right of Y* labour has to be paid more than its value of 
marginal product and so the virtual price of capital will also be more than its value of 
marginal product. Linear homogeneity of the production function implies that the value 
of output will be short of the virtual cost of production and hence the curve depicting 
C(Y) IY  lies above the revenue line. At point E average virtual cost equals price, so the 
value of output is just sufficient to pay for the factors. This means that at E ‘zero pure 
profit condition’ holds and the given stock of capital obtains its maximum feasible 
virtual rental rate.
It is also clear that the output level at which the zero profit condition holds is 
unique so long as the production function admits a unique profit maximizing output for 
any configuration of factor and product price. The implication of this discussion is that 
imposition of a ‘zero pure profit’ condition with the virtual cost function is sufficient to 
identify the profit maximizing output level. The average virtual cost function can serve 
as a short run output supply function.
Therefore, using equation (3.8) we can write the zero pure profit condition as
(3.10) p = « '" ’[at'’ / { k p -ß r',)]<1+',>"V.
Solving equation (3.10) for Y one can obtain the output supply function as
(3.11) Y = Kß-'lp[ 1 -  a 'm*p)(W/
It can be seen from equation (3.11) that the supply of output increases with 
output price and falls with the wage rate. An increase in the stock of specific factor 
raises output level at unchanged prices.
6 To see clearly that the above assertion holds, let us take any linearly homogenous production 
function Y = f (L ,K)  and hold K at certain level. Then by Euler's theorem we have 
PY = PfLL + PfKK , and the virtual cost is given by C(Y) = WL + RK . For output levels less than 
the profit maximizing level we have W < PfL and R < PfK\ which implies C(Y) < P Y .
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For each w age and product price com bination, the value o f  the output given  by 
the equation (3 .11) m axim izes the quasi-rent. Substitution o f  the value o f  Y  from (3 .11) 
into equations (3 .6) and (3 .7) yields the equilibrium  rental rate and the equilibrium  
labour dem and functions respectively  for given  w age rate and the product price.
(3 .12 )
The equilibrium  rental function can, therefore, be written as 
r = ß-up^pp'v+p)  _  a i/( i+ p ) jy p /o + /» y i+/,)/p
Thus, equation (3 .12) y ields an equilibrium  virtual rental rate o f  the sector-specific  
capital for g iven  output price and the price o f  the m obile factor. It show s that in 
equilibrium  the virtual rental rate rises with output price, P, and falls with the price o f  
the m obile factor, W . M aking use o f  the equation (3 .11 ) it can also be seen from the 
equation (3 .12) that the equilibrium  rental rate is equal to the value o f  marginal product 
o f  the sector specific  factor - capital.
The equilibrium  labour dem and function can be obtained as 
(3 .13 ) L =  K- a 1,<1+p)]',P.
The equation (3 .13) show s that equilibrium  dem and for labour increases with output 
price and falls with w age rate. Furthermore, at given  prices, an increase in the stock o f  
the specific-factor raises the equilibrium  dem and for the m obile factor.
Thus, the equilibrium  behaviour o f  the production sectors in terms o f  output 
supply, labour dem and and the paym ent to their specific  factors can be obtained from  
the equations (3 .1 1 )-(3 .1 3 ) by appending appropriate sectoral subscripts on the 
variables and the parameters.
3.2.3 The Labour Market
A  sim ple form  o f  labour (m obile factor) market is assum ed. The supply o f  
labour is assum ed to be exogenou sly  given. For a g iven  output price, production sectors 
determ ine their profit m axim izing lev e l o f  em ploym ent at each w age rate, w hich  
determ ine the aggregate dem and for labour. The aggregate dem and for labour has to be 
consisten t w ith the supply o f  labour. A  flex ib le nom inal w age rate clears the labour 
market and allocates labour to the production sectors.
A ppending appropriate subscripts to denote the sectors in equation (3 .13), 
sectoral dem and for labour can be written as
(3 .1 4 ) Lj  =  K jOL-m *Pi) ß-U p>
P;/(l+P>) _  1/(1+P; )
U j
1/p)
j  =  1,2.
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Let L be the total stock of labour in the economy, then equilibrium in the labour market 
requires that
(3.15) L = f^ L l - j  = 1,2.
j  =  1
The equilibrium wage rate is the value of W that solves equations (3.14) and
(3.15) . Although an exact analytical expression for W is not possible it is clear from 
equation (3.14) that the equilibrium wage rate is homogenous of degree one in output 
prices. Because, if all commodity prices and the wage rate double, then equilibrium 
labour demands remain unchanged and the labour market equilibrium is undisturbed.
3.2.4 Demand for Goods
All final demanders are merged to form a single national consumer. The 
consumer includes all factor owning households, government as an institutional 
consumer, and all investment activities. This assumption is equivalent to assuming that 
all of the final consumers have identical and homothetic preferences, and there is no net 
investment taking place in the economy. This national consumer receives all payments 
to the primary factors, and tariff revenue. In this framework, lending, borrowing and tax 
payments within the group cancel out and the aggregate budget constraint holds. The 
purpose of this assumption is to abstract from the distributional issues7.
The preference ordering of this national consumer over the two goods is 
assumed to be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. The objective of the 
consumer is to maximize utility, which depends on (CX,C2): the quantities of the two 
goods consumed. In particular, the problem of the consumer can be written as:
(3.16) max f/(C,, C2) =  Cf'C*1; <5, + <S2 = 1,
c l >c 2
subject to
(3.17) PXC,+P2C2 = I
where, the income, I, of the consumer is given by
(3.18) /  = fJYj +  P2Y2 +  Z ; 
and Z is the total tariff revenue.
For a model that distinguishes between households that own different factors see Long and 
Vousden (1991).
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Solution to this maximization problem leads to the following demand functions:
(3.19) C ^ S j / P r ,  i = l,2.
The demand functions expressed in equation (3.19) imply that the income 
elasticities of consumer demand are unity, own price elasticities are -1, and cross price 
elasticities are zero for both goods. Furthermore, it also implies a constant share of each 
good in the consumer's budget. These restrictions are the consequences of assuming a 
Cobb-Douglas utility function. A more realistic representation could be obtained by 
specifying the utility function accordingly. However, for the purpose of this study the 
Cobb-Douglas utility function is quite sufficient.8
3.2.5 Price Determination
The country under study is assumed to satisfy the small country assumption.
This implies that the country is a price taker in the international market. It can affect its 
domestic prices through various policies, but not the international prices. Let O denote 
the nominal exchange rate, P* denote the international price of good i, and 7] denote the
ad valorem trade tax (positive entry for tax on imports and negative entry for tax on 
exports) rate on good i , then we can write the domestic price of good i as
(3.20) Pi -  Of)*(l + 7’); i = 1,2.
In writing the equation (3.19) it is implicitly assumed that no other taxes and/or controls 
are used to affect the domestic price of commodity i, and there are no transportation or 
other margin costs. Of course, these assumptions are for simplification.
3.2.6 Equilibrium in Goods and the Foreign Exchange Markets
Let A/-(P) denote the volume of net import (export, if negative) of commodity i 
at domestic price P = (Pl,P2), then the domestic market clearing conditions for 
commodities can be written as
(3.21) Ct.(/>) = ^(P) + A/t(P).
The tariff revenue collection is given by
(3.22) z  = j ^ o p ; i
»'=1
8 A rigorous justification of Cobb-Douglas utility function, however, can be found in Willig
( 1976)
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The value of export at world price represents the supply of, and the value of 
imports at world price represents the demand for foreign exchange in the domestic 
economy. Equilibrium in the foreign exchange market requires these two quantities be 
equal. Therefore we have,
(3.23) P*MX ( P)  + P*M2(P)  = 0.
This equation implies that for all domestic prices the value of domestic exports 
has to be equal to the value of imports at world price. In other words, trade account at 
the world price should remain balanced in equilibrium. The implicit assumption here is 
that there are no capital flows in and out of the country. Of course, this is another 
simplification.
3.2.7 The Basic Model of the Economic Sphere: PXGEM
Now we can complete the description of the real sector of the economy by 
collecting equations (3.11) - (3.13), (3.15), (3.19) - (3.21) and (3.23). These equations 
reflect the equilibrium behaviour on the part of the respective agents, and are rewritten 
in Table 3.1 to give an overall picture of the economy.
The model consists of fourteen equations in fourteen variables: two domestic 
output supplies, two consumer demands, two net import quantities, two domestic 
commodity prices, two sectoral labour demands, two sectoral rental rates, one wage rate 
and one exchange rate. The system contains seven exogenous variables: two world 
prices, two tax rates, two quantities of sector specific factors, and one national 
endowment of mobile factor - labour.
The story told by this system of equations is the following. For given domestic 
prices, the three equations of the labour market determine the three variables: wage rate, 
and sectoral allocation of labour. The sectoral output levels can be determined from the 
two sectoral supply functions, since the market clearing wage rate and the commodity 
prices are already determined. Similarly, sectoral rental rates are determined from the 
two rental functions.
Table 3.1
The basic structure of the general equilibrium model of the economic sphere
(PXGEM)
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The Goods Market
The supply functions of domestic production sectors
VP;/0+Pj) 11 Pj(3.11') Yj = KjP"'"’i 1 - a ^
Consumer demand functions
(3.19’) Cj = (8j / P,)^(P.y, + « M tfX ) j  = 1,2
Goods market equilibrium 
(3.21’) Ci = Yi + Af., i = 1,2.
y = u
The Labour Market
Sectoral labour demand
(3.14’) L = ß ~l l P i / w)'Va+'>' ) -  a ' ,<1*p' >
Labour market equilibrium
Up I
; y = 1,2.
(3.15’)
7=1
Domestic Price Determination 
(3.20’) />=0>/>*(l + 7;); 1 = 1,2.
Rental Rates
(3.12') R, = fS?*>( / f /<' ^ ) -  ; j  = 1,2
The Foreign Exchange Market
Equilibrium in the Foreign exchange market 
(3.23’) P*Ml + P2*M2 = 0.
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Once commodity prices are given, the production side of the economy is 
completely determined without any reference to the structure and the level of consumer 
demand. This independence of the supply side from the demand side of the economy 
occurs because the model describes a small open economy that does not produce any 
non tradeable commodity. This feature of a small open economy simplifies the 
modelling problem considerably, and will be utilized extensively in the subsequent 
sections and chapters.
The five variables - two consumer demands, two net import quantities and 
consumer's income (that is, the tariff revenue part of the consumer's income), are 
simultaneously determined by the five equations, two consumer demand functions and 
three market clearing conditions, at given product prices. The domestic prices of the 
two commodities will be determined by the pricing equations (3.20), if the nominal 
exchange rate is known.
Multiplying both sides of equation (3.20), the market clearing conditions for 
commodities, by Pt, and using equations (3.17), (3.20), and (3.22) we can obtain
equation (3.23). This means that equilibrium in the commodity markets (equation 3.21) 
implies equilibrium in the foreign exchange market (that is, a balanced trade at world 
prices). This is, in other words, Walras' Law. Therefore, one of the three market 
clearing conditions is redundant. We can delete any one of them without loosing any 
information contained in the system. We have chosen to delete the trade balance 
constraint.
However, once equation (3.23') is dropped out, the system contains only thirteen 
independent equations in fourteen variables. We are left with two pricing equations 
(3.20'), and three price variables: exchange rate and two commodity prices. Therefore, 
one price (or any one nominal quantity) has to be exogenously determined (that is, one 
more price relation has to be added into the system). This is precisely the point where 
the money market of the macro economic system becomes quite useful for a model of 
the present type. In the absence of such a system, we choose the nominal exchange rate 
to be determined exogenously.
A common feature of the Walrasian general equilibrium models of a small open 
economy is that the equilibrium real quantities (the demands and the supplies) are 
homogenous of degree zero in commodity and factor prices, and the nominal quantities 
(factor prices, and incomes) are homogenous of degree one in commodity prices. 
Therefore, equilibrium levels of real quantities - outputs, consumption, net trade, and 
employment - will be unaffected by proportionate change in all commodity prices. This 
property can be employed to eliminate one of the price variable from the system.
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First, we note that the commodity prices are homogenous of degree one in the 
nominal exchange rate. Hence, a normalization of the nominal exchange rate does not 
affect the real quantities. So, we set the nominal exchange rate exogenously equal to 
unity. This normalization has the following consequences. First, all nominal quantities 
are expressed in terms of the foreign currency. Second, the commodity prices become 
completely exogenous - determined by foreign prices and the tariff rates, which are 
exogenous. The government’s policies of affecting the domestic economy will operate 
through the tariff rates.
Now, we have thirteen equations in thirteen endogenous variables. The system 
is closed by a (fixed) exogenous exchange rate regime.9
3.2.8 Price Normalization Rule10
It can further be verified from equations (3.12'), (3.14') and (3.15') that even 
after the exogenous determination of the nominal exchange rate the nominal quantities - 
the wage rate and the sectoral rental rates are homogenous of degree one in commodity 
prices, and therefore, it follows from equations (3.1 T), (3.14'), and (3.19’) that the real 
quantities - sectoral output supplies, sectoral demands for labour and the consumer's 
demands - are all homogenous of degree zero in commodity prices.* 11 These real 
quantities are unaffected by equiproportionate change, for whatever the reasons, in both 
commodity prices. Only the nominal quantities will change, which are of no 
significance.
To eliminate these uninteresting cases of pure nominal changes, commodity 
prices are normalized and the tariff rates are rationalized in the following way.
For a discussion on closure rules in a CGE model see Robinson (1989). Robinson has concluded 
that ‘a macro model is needed to determine any two, but no more than two, of the following variables: the 
domestic aggregate price level, the balance of trade, and the nominal exchange rate.’ (p. 921). In our case, 
we have both tradeable goods, and the trade balance holds by Walras law, the exogenous determination 
of the nominal exchange rate is sufficient to close the model.
For the consistency of an exogenously specified exchange rate, and the trade balance constraint 
see Dervis, et al. (1982: 184-87).
10 A good discussion of price normalization rule and its implication can be found in chapter 6 of 
Dervis, etal. (1982).
11 Note that the tariff revenue is homogenous of degree one in commodity prices when the nominal 
exchange rate is exogenously determined, and therefore the consumer’s income is homogenous of degree 
one in commodity prices. The Marshallian demand is homogenous of degree zero in commodity prices 
and income.
Table 3.2
A Model of the Real Sector
The Goods Market:
The supply functions o f domestic production sectors: 
(3.11') Yj = Kjß ]',p‘ 1 - a ) n'*Pl
UPj
Consumer demand functions:
(3.19') ci = (8j /  y = 1,2.
V *=i y
Goods market equilibrium:
(3.21’) Cl(P) = Yt(P) + Mi(P \ 1 = 1,2.
7 =  1, 2.
\lpj
The Labour Market:
Sectoral labour demand:
(3.14') Lj = Kj<xf''ß~'lp‘
Labour market equilibrium:
(3.15’) £ =
y = i
Domestic price determination:
(3.26’) />=/>*(l + ri*).
Rental Rates:
(3 12') /? = ß _1/p> __ a l/ Q +Pj'>yyPj/ (l+P j ' >^ +pi )lpi .
7 =  1, 2.
7 = 1,2.
Price Normalization Rule 
(3.25) P2 = l
List of Endogenous Variables:
7 = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral outputs
c , 7 = 1,2. : 2 Domestic demands
W. i = 1,2. : 2 Net import quantities
L, 7 = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral employment of labour
R, 7 = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral rental rates in units of commodity 2
w : 1 Wage rate in units of commodity 2
p, : 1 Price of commodity 1 in units of commodity 2
Total number of endogenous variables: 12. 
Total number of equations 12.
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First, we invoke the Lemer symmetry theorem (Lemer, 1936) and replace 
export tax by its equivalent import tax. Suppose that the economy exports good 2, and 
imports good 1, and let
(3.24) T ' ^ O l - T J / a  + TJ].
Then, the Lemer symmetry theorem implies that in terms of revenue and relative price 
effects the imposition of a single tariff rate T* on the imports of good 1 and no tax on 
exports of good 2 is equivalent to the joint imposition of export tax rate T2 on good 2, 
and a import tariff rate on good 1. We will call 7j* the rationalized tariff rate.
Second, with the nominal exchange rate set to unity and a rationalized tariff rate 
imposed on the imports of good 1, the domestic price of good 2 becomes equal to its 
international price. Now, we choose good 2 as the numeraire, and express all nominal 
quantities in units of good 2. As a result we get
(3.25) P2 = P2 = 1, and
(3.26)
Clearly, equations (3.25) and (3.26) replace the original pricing equation (3.20') 
in the system of equations described in Table 3.1.
Note that, 7\R is invariant of pure inflationary (relative price neutral) change in 
both export and import tax rates.12 Therefore, for given world relative price, 7\R is in 
one-to-one correspondence with the domestic relative price Px. The sign of T* indicates 
whether the economy is subsidizing or taxing foreign trade. In particular, T* > 0 
implies a net tax and T* < 0 implies a net subsidy on foreign trade.13
3.2.9 A Model of the Real Economic Sphere
Now, we obtain a general equilibrium model of the real sectors of the economic 
sphere by applying the normalization rules of the previous section. This concludes the 
construction of a simple policy-exogenous general equilibrium model of the economic 
sphere of a small open economy. By deleting the trade balance constraint, writing unity 
for the nominal exchange rate, and replacing the pricing equation (3.19') by equations 
(3.25) and (3.26) the system of equation describing the general equilibrium can be 
written as in Table 3.3.
12 For any positive number X , the relative price neutral tariff rates, 7 ] , are given by
(2.27) T- =XTi + X - l ,  fori = 1,2.
13 For more discussions on the Lemer symmetry theorem, see chapter 2 in Vousden (1990).
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The model of the real sector organized into Table 3.2 contains twelve equations 
in twelve endogenous variables (excluding the price normalization rule), which are also 
listed in the table. The exogenous variables are domestic factor endowments KX, K2,L,  
the rationalized tariff rate TR, and the international relative price of commodity 1, P*. 
This model of the real economic sphere is an example of a policy exogenous general 
equilibrium model (PXGEM), because the tariff rate is being treated as an exogenous 
variable. The model is of the standard text-book type the existence of a solution to this 
model is not a problem ( see, for example, Shoven, 1974).
3.2.10 Factor and Employment Shares
Let SLj and SKj denote respectively the share of labour and the share of the
sector specific factor in the value of output (which equals total cost) of sector j. Then, 
by making use of the equations (3.11') and (3.14'), and keeping in mind that P2 = 1 we 
can write:
(3.28) SL. = ' ^  = a im*p){Pl l w y l,"l‘) j  = 1,2.
\ r i
Using equations (3.11') and (3.12') the share of the specific factor in sector j  can be 
obtained as:
(3.29) = 1 -  / W')"P/<" P) j  = 1,2.
pr i
Thus the equations (3.28) and (3.29) show that, in equilibrium, the distributive 
shares add to one.
Let us further define
(3.30) II jr- r? j  = 1,2;
(3.31) ff, = i / ( i + Ply, j - 1,2;
and,
(3.32) T =  1 /  (1 + T ’ )
then, Xj represents the employment share of the sector j  in total employment of labour, 
(Jj is the elasticity of factor substitution, which is a constant; and r  represents the
rationalized tariff coefficient.
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3.3 Comparative Static Results and the Properties of the Solution Functions
For use in subsequent chapters, we will derive the comparative static responses 
of the endogenous variables under three different tariff regimes: free trade, 
intermediate, and autarkic. The comparative static responses under a free trade regime 
are included in Appendix -2A, and that under autarkic regime are included in Appendix 
- 3B. This section derives the comparative static responses of the endogenous variables 
under an intermediate tariff regime. These responses are analyzed to derive some 
general properties of the solution functions. The equilibrium under the intermediate 
tariff regime has also been called the observed equilibrium, because we assume that the 
observed ‘general equilibrium data set’ contains a positive rationalized tariff rate. The 
issues related to the construction of a general equilibrium data set are not addressed in 
this study. Such a data set is assumed to be given.
The endogenous variables, and the share parameters that are specific to a 
particular equilibrium point are distinguished by superscripts. Superscript ‘o’ refers to 
the ‘observed’ equilibrium, superscript **’ refers to the free trade equilibrium, and 
superscript ‘a’ refers to the autarkic equilibrium.
Let E = (Tj, Y2, Cj, C2, Lj, , R2, W, Px) be the vector of the solution values of
the endogenous variables of the general equilibrium model of the real sector . Let E°,
E* and Ea be the general equilibrium solution vectors of the endogenous variables in 
the three different tariff regimes but with the same factor endowment and the world 
relative price. Then the solution vector in observed equilibrium can be written as:
(3.33) E° = E°(Ki,K2,L,T* ,P’);
and the solution vector in free trade equilibrium can be written as
(3.34) E* = E \ K vK2,L,P*)\
and the solution vector in autarky can be written as
(3.35) Ea = Ea(K„K2JL);
where, the E s on the right hand side of the above equations represent the appropriate 
vectors of the solution functions.
In following sections the model of the real sector will be linearized around the 
observed equilibrium, and then the comparative static results will follow.
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3.3.1 Linearization of the Model around the Observed Equilibrium
The model described in the previous section (Table 3.2) contains non linear 
functions making its analytical solution impossible. Comparative statics, however, can 
be performed with ease, if the equations are linearized around an equilibrium point. In 
this subsection, the model will be linearized in terms of percentage changes in the 
variables around the observed equilibrium point. This technique was initially introduced 
by Johansen (1960) as a method of solving multi-sectoral models.
The variables of all equations in Table 3.2 are in levels, and they have been 
written in upper case letters. Let the percentage change of the variables be denoted by 
corresponding lower case letters with one exception. The exception is that the variable 
7 represents change in percentage point of variable T* rather than percentage change in 
T*. This will allow T* to take any value, positive, negative or zero. Once it is 
understood that t represents a change in the percentage point of the rationalized tariff 
rate the superscript becomes redundant, and as it applies to only one sector the subscript 
is also unnecessary. So, in what follows the superscript and subscript on t are 
suppressed.
As mentioned before, consumer demand plays no role in determining output, 
employment, and prices in the economy. Therefore, changes in consumer demand are of 
no consequence for changes in the variables of interest - the variables related to the 
supply side. Consumer demand only affects the quantity of net imports, linearization of 
consumer demand equations, and goods market equilibrium conditions have been 
deferred until the comparative statics are performed around the autarky equilibrium 
where the consumer demands matter. However, it greatly simplifies the algebra.
With these definitions and preliminaries, let us assume that the vector E° 
describes the observed equilibrium of the economy for a given set of values of the 
exogenous variables. Let us perturb this equilibrium by changing the exogenous 
variables infinitesimally. By taking logarithmic total differentials around E° most of the 
model equations can be linearized by expressing the variables in their percentage 
change form. Making use of the defining equations (3.28)-(3.32), the linearized 
expressions for the model equations can be obtained as follows:
Output supply functions:
Taking logarithmic total differential of equation (3.11') and using equations 
(3.28), (3.29) and (3.31), which define the cost shares and the elasticities of factor 
substitution, and evaluating the shares around the ‘observed’ equilibrium we get
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(3.36) y°j =  kj +  (jj
f  c o  \
ZJ±
s iv kj y
( P l - w 0); j  = 1, 2.
In equation (3.36) y* is the percentage change in the supply of output in sector j; 
vv° is the percentage change in the normalized wage rate; p° is the percentage change in 
the normalized price of commodity j; k} is the percentage change in the stock of sector
specific factor (physical capital) in sector j.
Equation (3.36) shows that the sectoral supply of the equilibrium output 
increases with the increase in the stock of the sector specific capital, and the 
equilibrium relative price of the product, and decreases with increase in the equilibrium 
wage rate. The magnitudes of the effects depend on the degree of ‘ease’ in factor 
substitution.
The labour market:
By linearizing the labour demand functions given by equation (3.14') and the 
labour market equilibrium condition (3.15') around the ‘observed’ equilibrium and 
simplifying the resulting expressions by making use of the equations (3.28) - (3.31) we 
can obtain
Labour demand functions:
(3.37) ~ w°y>7 = 1.2; and
^ K j
The labour market equilibrium condition:
(3.38) / = X ^ J .
7=1
where, / is the percentage change in the total endowment of labour in the economy, and 
/ /s  are percentage change in the sectoral employment of labour.
Equation (3.37) shows that the change in the sectoral equilibrium demand for 
labour (employment) is governed by change in the quantity of the sector specific factor, 
change in the product price, change in the equilibrium wage rate, and the ‘ease’ of 
factor substitution. Increased product price or increased stock of the sector-specific 
factors would increase sectoral labour demand, and an increased wage rate would
depress the sectoral demand for labour. The equation also shows that the real wage 
elasticity of sectoral labour demand is equal to o  ■ /  SKj.
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Equation (3.38) means that any change in the national endowment of labour has 
to be accommodated by changes in the equilibrium sectoral employments of labour. 
Other things remaining the same, this is possible only if the wage rate, measured in 
units of commodity 2, falls.
Sectoral rental rates:
Similarly, the equilibrium rental function can be linearized by logarithmic 
differentiation. Simplifying the expression by using equations (3.28) and (3.29) and the 
fact that the factor shares add up to unity we get
(3.39) r° = -—-(.p" ~^vv°); 1,2
^Kj
where, r° is the percentage change in the equilibrium virtual rental rate in sector j. The
equation (3.39) shows that the equilibrium virtual rental rate in each sector rises with 
relative price of own output and falls with the wage rate.
Price equations:
Similarly, linearizing the price equations (3.25) and (3.26) we get
(3.40) p° = p\ + r, and
(3.41) p°2 =0
where r° is defined in equation (3.32), and t, as indicated above, is 100 xdT* the 
change in the percentage point of the rationalized tariff rate.
Equation (3.40) shows that the normalized price of import competing good, 
good 1, in the domestic market moves with international price of good 1. So long as the 
economy is not adopting a net subsidy (subsidy payments exceeding tariff collection) 
policy in international trade, the rationalized tariff rate, T*, is always positive. It can be 
seen from the defining equation (3.32) that x° < 1. So, at an unchanged international 
relative price, the rise in the domestic relative price with respect to an increase in the 
rationalized tariff rate is less than proportionate. However, the elasticity of the domestic 
relative price of import competing good with respect to the rate of protection is unity.14 
Equation (3.41) simply shows that the price of good 2, the numeraire, does not change.
14 The rate o f protection is given by (1 + T* ), and the percentage change in the rate o f protection 
is given by T t .
Table 3.3
Linearized version of the PXGEM
( Around the Observed Equilibrium of the Economy)
Output supply functions: 
(3.36) y°j =kj + G]
Labour demands functions:
(  no \
ZR
n o ( p j - w 0);
(3.37) 1° =ki +-i - (p° -w°) \] 1 c o  n
The labour market equilibrium condition: 
(3.38) / =
j = 1
7 =  1, 2.
7 = 1, 2.
Sectoral rental rates:
(3.39) r°=Rp°i-s^°y,
dKj
Price equations:
(3.40) p[ = p\ + x° t,
(3.41) 0
7 =  1.2
and
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The system of the linearized equations is brought together in Table 3.3. The 
exclusion of the demand sides of the goods markets has left the linearized system with 
only eight variables in eight equations. This system will be used in the following 
section to derive the comparative static results around the ‘observed’ equilibrium.
33.2 Comparative Statics around the Observed Equilibrium
Wage effects:
Substituting the equilibrium labour demand functions from the equation (3.37) 
into the market clearing equation (3.38) and solving for the wage rate, w, we get:
(3.42) w° = A"1 [Aft + A ft + (AJoi / S°Kl) t f  - /],
where, A = X°lGl / S°Kl + X°2g2 / S°K2 > 0
is the magnitude of the real wage elasticity of the aggregate labour demand.
Equation (3.42) fully describes the behaviour of the equilibrium wage rate with 
respect to changes in the exogenous variables in the model. Since px is completely and 
independently explained by exogenous variables - foreign price and tariff rate, it can be 
regarded as a given datum. By setting all exogenous variables equal to zero except one 
at a time we can obtain the elasticity of wage rate with respect to the exogenous 
variables.
In particular, by setting changes in all endowment variables equal to zero, the 
elasticity of wage rate with respect to the relative price of commodity 1 can be obtained 
as
(3.43) T)° = ^ - =  A ~ ' ( X " a ,/  S ^ ) .
A
Both the numerator and the denominator of the right hand side of the expression
(3.43) are positive, because all the share parameters and the elasticities of factor 
substitution are positive. Since, the numerator of the term is less than the denominator, 
it follows that 0 < 77 < 1. That is, as the relative price of good 1 increases, the wage rate 
will increase but by less than in proportion.
Similarly, it can be inferred from equation (3.42) that the equilibrium wage rate 
will increase with an increase in the stock of the sector specific factor in either sector 
but will fall with an increase in the stock of labour in the economy.
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Employment effects:
Substituting back the response of the equilibrium wage rate from equation (3.42) 
into equation (3.37) we can obtain the changes in the sectoral employment of labour as
(3.44) I? = A-1 K a7n o
ÖK2
f  _ A
77“ A° + K
V ^  K\ 1
and,
(3.45) i - i ^ 1  ° 1  K _  n o  n o
1 2
M
From these two equations (3.44) and (3.45) we can obtain the extent and 
direction of changes in sectoral employment with respect to given changes in the 
exogenous variables. For example, the equilibrium employment of labour in sector 1 
expands if (1) the relative price of commodity 1 increases, (2) the stock of capital in 
sector 1 increases, (3) the stock of labour in the economy increases, and (4) the stock of 
capital in sector 2 decreases.
Similarly, in equilibrium, the employment of labour in sector 2 increases if (1) 
the capital stock in sector 2 expands, (2) the stock of labour in the economy expands,
(3) the stock of capital in sector 1 decreases, and (4) the relative price of commodity 1 
falls (that is the relative price of good 2 rises). The rate of change of sectoral 
employment with respect to the exogenous variables can be obtained as in the case of 
the wage rate.
Some properties of the labour demand functions follow from equation (3.44). 
These properties are generally valid irrespective of the location of the point of 
equilibrium. Since the equilibrium level of employment of labour in sector 1, ceteris 
paribus, is a strictly increasing function of the relative price of good 1 (equation 3.44), it 
follows form labour market equilibrium condition that if the tariff rate (that is, the 
relative price of good 1) is increased in steps, then the employment share of sector 
1, will increase at successive equilibrium points. Hence, we write the following 
proposition for future reference.
Proposition 3.1 Ceteris paribus, the employment share o f sector 1, Xx(Px), is a 
strictly increasing function o f the relative price Px. That is, dXx / dPx > 0. In other 
words, increased protection of the import competing sector increases the share of the 
import competing sector in total employment o f labour in the economy.
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In a non-specialization case 0 < Xx < 1, and = 1 when the economy 
specializes in the production of good 1. It can be seen from the equation (3.43) that the 
relative price elasticity of the wage rate is an increasing function of the employment 
share of sector 1. Hence using proposition 3.1 we can write the following proposition 
regarding the property of the price elasticity of the normalized wage rate:
Proposition 3.2 The relative-price elasticity of the wage rate (measured in units 
of commodity 2) is an increasing function of the relative price of good 1. That is, 
dr\! dPx> 0.
The propositions 3.1 and 3.2 capture the second order effects of a relative price 
change. In particular, proposition 3.2 means that the relative price elasticity of the wage 
rate depends upon the size of the price change. The larger the price change the larger 
the elasticity of the wage rate. However, the relative-price elasticity of the wage rate 
will never exceed unity. Hence, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 3.3 Protection o f the import competing sector always lowers the real 
wage faced by the import competing sector, and raises the real wage faced by the 
exporting sector.
Effects on the sectoral rental rates:
The endogenous variable, the wage rate, can be eliminated from the rental 
equation (3.39) by using the equation (3.42). This yields expressions for the percentage 
changes in the sectoral rental rates in terms of the percentage changes in the exogenous 
variables. After simplification, the sectoral rental rates can be written as
(3.46) r° A j <t2
LV
+ X\gx P t - S l^ + X 'A - I )
J
and,
(3.47) r2°
\
p°\ + KK + ~ i
)
The equations (3.46) and (3.47) show that the rental rates in both sectors 
increase as the supply of labour in the economy increases; and the rental rates in both 
sectors fall if the stock of capital increases in either sector. In other words, an increase 
in the stock of capital in sector 1 not only lowers the rental rate in sector 1 but also 
lowers the rental rate in sector 2 as well. It is because, an exogenous increase in the 
stock of capital in sector 1 increases the demand for labour, which bids the wage rate up
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causing the rental rate in sector 2 to fall. Similar reasoning holds if the stock of capital 
in sector 2 increases exogenously.
The elasticities of the sectoral rental rates with respective to any exogenous 
variable can be computed from the equations (3.46) and (3.47). In particular, by setting 
all endowment changes to zero the elasticities of the rental rates with respect to the 
relative price of good 1 can be obtained as
(3.48) —  =  A ”1 + n o  n o
^ k \ ^ k 2 y
> 1, and
(3.49) Ji_ = 
Pi
i
V i *
< 0.
v Ki y
Equation (3.48) shows that the elasticity of the rental rate in sector 1 with 
respect to the relative price of commodity 1 is greater than unity. Mussa (1974) has 
provided the following interpretation of this result. As the price of commodity 1 rises, 
the value of the share of initial output of sector 1 that went to fixed capital also rises 
proportionately. Since the wage rate does not rise in proportion to the output price, 
some surplus arises from part of the initial output, which went to the payment of wages, 
but that will now accrue to the capital. Moreover, there will be an increase in output, 
which means a part of the incremental output will again go to the given stock of capital. 
Hence the rental rate in each sector will rise more than proportionately as the relative 
price of its output rises.
Equation (3.49) shows that the elasticity of the rental rate in sector 2 with 
respective to the relative price of good 1 is negative. The magnitude of the elasticity 
depends on the elasticity of the wage with respect to the relative price of good 1, and 
the labour intensity in sector 2. The absolute value of the elasticity will be higher, the 
higher the distributive share of labour in sector 2, and the higher the relative price 
elasticity of the wage rate.
From these results we can state the following proposition regarding the property 
of the rental functions:
Proposition 3.4 The rental rate in sector 1, , is a strictly increasing, and the
rental rate in sector 2, /^, is a strictly decreasing function of the relative price of 
commodity 1, Px. That is dRx / dPx > 0, and dR  ^I dPx< 0.
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Output effects:
Using the wage equation (3.42) the output supply functions given by the 
equation (3.36) can be rewritten as
(3.50)
(3.51)
-1 Ko?
n o
LV
+  Aj<7j K +
GXS[
\  ^K2
-1
_V J 2 K K + ^ pI - i
, and
From these two equations it is clear that an increase in the relative price of good 
1 results in an increase in the output of sector 1 and a fall in the output of sector 2; and 
an increase in the stock of labour in the economy leads to an increase in the output of 
both sectors. These effects are quite intuitive. What is interesting is that an increase in 
the stock of capital in sector 1 leads to an increase in the output of sector 1 and a fall in 
the output of sector 2. Similarly, an increase in the stock of capital in sector 2 leads to 
an increase in the output of sector 2 and a fall in the output of sector 1. In other words, 
irrespective of the capital intensity of the sectors, an increase in the capital stock in one 
sector leads to a fall in the output of the other sector. This effect is quite different from 
the Rybczynski Theorem, which predicts that increase in the stock of capital will lead to 
an increase in the output of capital intensive good and a fall in the output of labour 
intensive good.
The reason is quite simple. An increase in the stock of capital in sector 1 (the 
sector specific factor) raises the productivity of labour (the mobile factor) in sector 1 
and therefore, at unchanged prices, the demand for labour goes up. Consequently, wage 
rate will go up. The result is, as can be seen from the equation (3.37), that the 
equilibrium employment for labour in sector 2 falls, and hence the output of sector 2 
falls.
Since the rent in sector 1 can be increased through increased protection, and if 
the resulting surplus is ploughed back to increase the stock of capital in sector 1, then 
over time the output of sector 1 will exceed its domestic demand and will be exported at 
the world price, and the output of sector 2 will be insufficient and will have to be 
imported to meet domestic demand. This means that commodity 2 will turn into an 
import competing good.
Thus, under the assumption that the new rent generated through increased 
protection will be reinvested within the sector, the comparative static results in a 
general equilibrium framework provide some support to the classical ‘infant industry’ 
argument of a protective trade policy.
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3.4 Summary
A simple general equilibrium model of a small open economy has been 
described in this chapter. The model assumes that the tariff rate that creates a wedge 
between domestic and foreign relative price is exogenously determined.
Comparative static results have shown that the rental income of each sector is a 
strictly increasing function of the relative price of own commodity and a strictly 
decreasing function of the relative price of other's commodity. This remains valid 
whether the rental income is measured in units of own commodity or in units of the 
numeraire commodity.
This result clearly demonstrates that changes in tariff rates are capable of 
redistributing rents from one sector to the other. The mechanism behind this transfer is 
the difference in the real wage faced by the two sectors, which induces a reallocation of 
labour between the two sectors, and hence the outputs and the rents.
Therefore it can be inferred that, for given endowment of factors, technologies 
of production and the international prices, the choice of a particular tariff rate by the 
government determines a particular combination of sectoral rental incomes in the 
general equilibrium of the economy. In the next chapter, an attempt will be made to 
obtain an analytical relationship between the sectoral rental incomes that summarize the 
mechanism and redistributive effects of the tariff changes in general equilibrium.
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Appendix-3A: Comparative Statics around the Free Trade Equilibrium
The free trade environment can be mimicked by setting the tariff rate to zero in 
the model of the real sector listed in Table 3.3. This means nothing more than that the 
domestic relative price will be equal to the international relative price. Given the 
parameters of the model the free trade equilibrium levels of the endogenous variables 
can be obtained by replacing PL by P* and solving the model for endogenous variables.
Since, at the observed level of other exogenous variables, E* denotes the vector 
of the equilibrium levels of the endogenous variables in the free trade environment, a 
linearized version of the model around E* can be obtained by following the same 
procedure as was done in linearizing the model around the observed equilibrium. The 
linearized system of equations is listed in Table 3A.1.
Table 3A.1
Linearized version of the PXGEM
(Around the free trade equilibrium)
The supply functions: 
(3A.1) y] = k} + Gj ZRS* j
(pj-w*);
Labour demands functions: 
(3A.2)
^Kj
Labour market equilibrium condition:
(3A.3) ‘ = l K ‘r
7=1
The rental rates 
(3A.4) rj = -^r(p‘ ~S'Qw‘);
*->Kj
The price normalization rule 
(3A.5) p2 = 0.
7 = 1, 2.
j  = 1, 2.
7 =  1, 2.
The set of equations listed in Table 3A.1 contain three different changes 
compared to the equations listed in Table 3.3 of the text. First, the domestic relative 
price has been replaced by the international relative price. Second, all shares have been 
evaluated at the free trade equilibrium point. Third, the endogenous variables now 
represent a percentage change over their free trade equilibrium levels. However, the
levels of the exogenous variables are assumed to be the same in all the three states 
hence they represent a percentage change over their observed levels.
The comparative static results will be similar to that described by equations 
(3.42) - (3.51) except that the shares correspond to free trade equilibrium and the 
percentage change in the domestic relative price p° has been replaced by the 
percentage change in the international price ratio p*.
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In particular, the response of the rental rates around free trade equilibrium will 
be given by
(3A.6) ri =
1
/
S*° K  1 Ic*
V S* y
^ -+ V . a - 5ö(A>,+r2^ -/)
V y
; and
(3A.7)
S*°L2 + * ;* ,+ a; * , - /
V $Kl
fX\a, I r2q
V
°AT2 C*° at2 y
The natures of these rental response functions are similar to those of the rental 
response functions (3.46) and (3.47). The difference is in the magnitudes of their 
elasticities. These equations have been derived for future reference.
Appendix-3B: Comparative Statics around the Autarkic Equilibrium
The other extreme of free trade is the autarky, in which the economy does not 
trade with the rest of the world. An equilibrium under autarky requires that the domestic 
demand and supply of each commodity be equal. Thus, an economy under autarky can 
be described by the presence of domestic market clearing conditions.
Since there are no imports, collection of tariff revenue will be zero. The 
consumer’s income will be equal to total value added in the economy. Since, the 
consumer satisfies the budget constraint, the market for one commodity clears implies 
that the market of the other commodity clears (Walras' Law). Hence, by choosing 
commodity 2 as the numeraire, as before, and ignoring the market clearing condition for 
commodity 2, the autarkic representation of the economy can be obtained as listed in 
Table 3B.1 simply by modifying the model of a trading economy listed in the Table 3.3.
Table 3B.1
Description of an autarkic PXGEM
The Goods Market:
The supply functions of domestic production sectors:
(3.11') K ß - ' ^ X - a ' ^ W I P ) P j I U + P j )
Upj
Consumer demand functions:
(3B.1) CV = (<S; //>)£/>}'; ; = 1,2.
i = l
Market clearing conditions for commodities: 
(3.29’) Cx = Yx
y = 1,2
Labour Market:
Sectoral labour demand:
(3.14’) L } =  K j CCj
m+pj) 11 P i
Labour market equilibrium:
(3.15’) £ = 7 = 1,2.
7=1
y = 1,2.
Rental Rates:
(3.12’) Rt = ß~'IPl j  = i 2
Price Normalization Rule:
(3.30) P2 = 1
List of Endogenous Variables:
Yj j  = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral outputs
C, j  = 1,2. : 2 Domestic demands
L; j  = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral employment of labour
/?y y = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral rental rates in units of commodity 2
W : 1 Wage rate in units of commodity 2
Px : 1 Price of commodity 1 in units of commodity 2
Total number of endogenous variables: 10.
Total number of equations 10.___________________________________
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The dimension of the model in autarky is reduced to ten equations in ten 
variables. The autarkic relative price is completely endogenous, there is no foreign price 
effect. Trade taxes will be adjusted to maintain the autarkic equilibrium. Therefore, 
there will no trade, and tariff revenue collections will be zero.
Assume that Ea represents the vector of the level of endogenous variables at 
autarky equilibrium. Then the model can be linearized around Ea. The linearized 
version of the model is listed in Table 3B.3.
Table 3B.2
Linearized version of the CGE model in autarky
The supply functions:
(  ca ^
(3B.2) y j —  kj -+■ &j
sa 7 = 1, 2.
Commodity demand functions
2
(3B.3)
*=i  
 ^2
where,
;= i
c ; = - p ; + £ / / r ( p f + y ; ) ;  7 =  1,2
»' 1
h: = p; y; i Y p; y‘.
Labour demands functions:
(3B.4) l ° = k . + £ L ( p ‘ - w°);
^ K j
Labour market equilibrium condition:
(3B.5) i = 1
j= 1
The rental rates:
(3B.6) r; = —{p‘-siw‘y,
Market clearing condition 
(3B.7) cx= y {
Price Normalization Rule
j  = 1, 2.
7 = 1, 2.
(3B.8) P2 =
One of the important features of the set of equations presented in Table 3B.2 is 
the presence of demand functions, which were absent in other models. The reason is 
that the demand functions may play an important role in determining relative
commodity price in autarky whereas in the observed state of the economy the relative 
price is determined by foreign price and tariff rate.
Substituting the demand function for commodity 1 from the equation (3B.3) into 
the market clearing condition (3B.7) and solving for the relative price, noting that 
pi = 0 and that = 1, yields
(3B.9) P := ya2 - y l
The equation (3B.9) has a strong15 rule of price change. It shows that the 
relative price of the commodity, whose supply grows at a relatively faster rate falls. The 
rate of fall is equal to the differential in the growth rate o f outputs in the two sectors. 
For future reference we call it the autarky rule of price.
Substituting the output supply function from the equation (3B.2) into the
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equation (3B.9) and solving for price we get
(3B.10) A ~ Ao(^ 2 1^ )>
where,
(3B.11) = 1 / (l + (7,50 /5^,) > 0 and
(3B.12) „ — ®\^L\ &2Sl2' 1 ra r*a
^K\ 2
Solving the labour market equilibrium condition (3B.5) for the wage response 
using the demand functions given by the equation (3B.4) yields
(3B.13) wa = + / %  -  /) + w ?>
where,
(3B.14) y/0 = 1 / [A“c x / S + X\o1 / SaK2\ > 0 and
(3B.15) V'. s  ^ a , / 5 ^ > 0 .
15 The above assertion is based on the underlying assumptions that the economy does not trade, 
and that the preferences of the consumer can be represented by a Cobb-Douglas utility function. It is 
shown by Willig (1976) that if the price elasticities of demand are locally constant, then the only form of 
utility function that is consistent with neo-classical utility maximization is the Cobb-Douglas. In a two 
good case it can be easily seen that the direction of price change (not the magnitude) implied by the 
equation (2B.9) is valid with any utility function that yields demand functions with income elasticity 
equal to unity. Finally, if the economy trades with the rest of the world, then the autarky model could be 
applied to the world economy. The market clearing condition that will be applicable at a global level will 
imply a similar conclusion at global level. But the conclusion will not necessarily hold at a national level.
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The equations (3B.10) and (3B.13) can be solved for the two variables p* and 
wa. The solution yields
(3B.16) *v'= — ---------+ and
(3B.17) p‘ = - r r ^ — [(i+M2V'o)*2-( i-M ? v 'o )* i- P i W \
The effects of changes in endowment variables on the equilibrium wage rate and 
the relative price of commodity 1 are given by the equations (3B.16) and (3B.17). 
Substitution of the values of p* and wa into the equations (3B.2), (3B.4) and (3B.6) 
yield the effects on sectoral outputs, employment and the rental rates respectively. The 
elasticities o f the endogenous variables with respect to the change in endowment 
variables can be evaluated in turn by changing one endowment variable at a time. In 
particular, the response of the rental rate in sector 2 can be obtained from the equation 
(3B.6) as
(3B.18) r‘ = - [ (  VoK ~Wo )K +  ( W o  + KV o )*2
Since the price of commodity 2 is held fixed (it is the numeraire), it is obvious 
that the channel through which a change in exogenous variable may affect the rent in 
sector 2 is the wage rate. If the shock leads to an increase in the wage rate the rental rate 
will fall, and if it leads to a decrease in the wage rate the rental rate in sector 2 will rise.
The mechanism through which the effects of an exogenous shock are 
transmitted to the wage rate is as follows. Ceteris paribus an increase in the stock of 
capital in sector 2 produces effects on the wage rate in two rounds. In the first round, 
the productivity and hence the demand for labour is increased in sector 2. Therefore, the 
aggregate demand for labour increases and the wage rate will go up to clear the labour 
market. As a result, the employment of labour and the level of output in sector 2 rise 
whereas the employment of labour and the output in sector 1 fall. It will produce the 
second round effect - the relative price effect. The positive relative growth o f output in 
sector 2 will raise the relative price of good 1 (equation 3B.9) which, in turn, raises the 
demand for labour of sector 1 and the wage rate will rise further.
Similar arguments can be provided to explain the effects of an increase in the 
stock of capital in sector 1. The first round effect on the wage rate of an increase in the 
stock of capital in sector 1 is quite similar - it will lead to an increase in the wage rate. 
However, the relative price effect is different. As the stock of capital in sector 1 
increases, the employment of labour and output in sector 1 increase and the
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employment of labour and output in sector 2 fall. The relative decline in the output of 
sector 2 lowers the price of commodity 1 at constant price of commodity 2. The real 
wage rate faced by sector 1 increases and the labour demand schedule shifts back 
producing a fall in the wage rate.
The net effect of a change in Kx on the wage rate, therefore, depends on the 
relative size of the productivity effect and the relative price effect. It can be shown that 
the productivity effect dominates the relative price effect if the elasticity of factor 
substitution in sector 1 is less than unity16 That is, the wage rate rises if the capital stock 
in sector 1 cannot easily substitute labour.
Thus it is clear from the equation (3B.18) that the rental rate in sector 2 will 
increase in autarky if (1) the supply of labour in the economy increases, or (2) stock of 
capital in sector 2 declines, or (3) stock of capital in sector 1 increases with > 1 or 
stock of capital in sector 1 decreases with CTj < 1. If ^  = 1 then change in the stock of 
capital in sector 1 will have no impact on the rental rate of sector 2.
Using the defining equations (2B.11), (2B.14) and (2B.15) it can be shown that
_______x  ______s ; , ( i - g , )
¥ o X ' Wo Wg1/%+A*2a2/s ;2](s;l + oiS
Therefore, the sign of the coefficient of in the equation (3.74) depends on the size of 0 \ .
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CHAPTER 4
THE RENT TRANSFORMATION FRONTIER
Introduction
It was shown in the previous chapter that, as far as the owners of the sector 
specific factors are concerned, any change in the rationalized tariff rate means a 
reduction in the rental income of one sector and a gain in the rental income of the other. 
An increase in the rationalized tariff rate increases the rent to the specific factor in the 
import competing sector, and decreases the rent to the specific factor in the exporting 
sector. In other words, a change in the tariff rate, ceteris paribus, effects a transfer of 
rents between the owners of the sector specific factors. The purpose of this chapter is to 
derive a rent transformation frontier that describes the combinations of Pareto efficient 
distributions of rental incomes, and to study its nature and comparative static properties. 
This chapter together with chapter 3 completes the description of the economic sphere 
of a small open political economy.
A study of the nature and comparative static properties of the rent 
transformation frontier is important for two reasons. First, it shows the condition under 
which the rent possibility set is compact and convex, which is a sufficient condition for 
a unique bargaining solution. This, in turn, provides a preview of the applicability of the 
bargain-theoretic approach in endogenizing the tariff formation process. Second, it also 
describes the way the rent possibility set responds to the changes in the exogenous 
variables. A clear understanding of this feature of the rent possibility set is necessary in 
understanding the comparative static behaviour of the bargaining solution that will be 
derived in the later chapters.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section analyzes the second 
order properties of the rental functions and derives the rent transformation function. The 
second section discusses the shape of the frontier. The third section compares the rent 
transformation frontier with the product transformation frontier. The fourth section 
derives the comparative static properties of the frontier. The chapter is concluded in 
section five.
4.1 Derivation of the Rent Transformation Function
Given the world relative price, domestic factor endowments, technologies and 
tastes, a general economic equilibrium can be defined for each level of tariff rate. A 
vector of levels of endogenous variables that solves the system of equations (model) 
listed in Table 3.2 constitutes the economic equilibrium. Since, the rental incomes to the
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sector specific factors are among the endogenous variables of the model, a particular 
combination of the rental incomes is associated with each tariff rate. Using the fact that 
the domestic relative price is in one-to-one correspondence with the tariff rate a one-to 
one correspondence can be defined between the domestic relative price and the 
combination of sectoral rental rates.
Let us define, for each sector i
(4.1) R ^ R J P ,
where R{ and R2 measure the equilibrium rental rates in units of the numeraire, the 
commodity 2. It is clear from the defining equation (4.1) that Rt simply measures the
(virtual) rental rate of the specific factor in each sector in units of the respective 
commodity - that is commodity i. We will call the real rental rate of the specific
factor.
We know from equation (3.48) that the real rental rate in each sector are 
increasing functions of the relative price of their own commodity. When commodity 2 
is chosen as the numeraire and the domestic price of commodity 1, P{, is expressed in 
terms of commodity 2, then P{ becomes the only price variable in the model that is 
affected by tariff (policy) changes. Moreover, the result (3.48) implies that /?, is an 
increasing function of P^ whereas R2 is a decreasing function of Px. The second order 
properties of the rental functions can be assessed in the following way.
We can obtain from equations (3.6), (3.11) and (3.12) that
(4.2) Ä = A
Equation (4.2) simply restates that the real rental rate in each sector is equal to the 
marginal physical product of the specific factor. Differentiating both sides of equation
(4.2) totally with respect to yields
(4.3)
d^
dP, A*r<Uft)(i+ A )if^ FdP,
Equation (4.3) confirms the first order property of the rental function mentioned 
above. Differentiating both sides of equation (4.3) again with respective to Pi we get
(4.4)
dP‘ AArr^’a+ A )^ 1p,y,
- i dY,
\ 2
Vu'iV
d%
dP*
We know that for each sector i,
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A-^f <1+A>(1 + pt )Yf‘ > 0, and
Therefore, for each sector i, the sufficient conditions for
(4.5)
are that
(i) -1 <p. <0; and
(ii)
Now we can interpret the second order property of the rental function of each 
sector by taking the commodity of the other sector as the numeraire in turn. In other 
words, while evaluating the second order property of the rental function (and also the 
output supply function) of sector 1, we will consider commodity 2 as the numeraire and 
express the price of commodity 1 in units of commodity 2, and while evaluating the 
second order property of the rental function (and the output supply function) of sector 2, 
we will consider commodity 1 as the numeraire.
The first of the above two conditions requires that in both sectors the long run 
elasticities of factor substitution be finite and greater than or equal to unity. The second 
condition requires that, in general equilibrium, the supply of output of each sector grow 
at a decreasing rate as its relative price (in terms of units of the other commodity) 
increases. Whether condition (ii) is met generally or not when condition (i) is satisfied, 
is a pertinent question. Instead of evaluating the second order property of the supply 
functions we make the following assumptions on the production technologies (and, 
hence on output supply functions).
Assumption 4.1 In what follows we will assume that the above conditions (i) and 
(ii) hold. In other words, we assume that the elasticities of factor substitution in both 
sectors are at least unity; and that in each sector the output supply is a concave function 
of its relative price.1
1 The statement that the output supply of each sector is a concave functions of its relative price is,
in fact, a conjecture rather than an assumption. The reason is that given the production functions, and the 
factor endowments it should be possible to obtain the exact natures of the sectoral output supply 
functions. For example, if the production functions are Cobb-Douglas in both sectors, then the condition
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It follows from condition (4.5) that if Assumption 4.1 holds, then the real rental 
function of each sector is increasing and concave in the relative price of own 
commodity. Since the relative price of commodity 1 is the inverse of the relative price 
commodity 2 and vice versa, the following proposition follows:
Proposition 4.1 The equilibrium real rental rate in each sector is an increasing 
and a concave function o f the relative price o f own output, and decreasing function o f 
the relative price o f the output o f the other sector.
Now, clearly if the domestic relative price of commodity 1 is Px, then the 
combination of the equilibrium rental rates of the two sectors is given by the pair 
(RX(PX\  R2(PX)). Various combinations of equilibrium rental rates can thus be obtained 
by varying the domestic relative price of commodity 1 to obtain a rent transformation 
frontier analogous to Gardner's (1983, 1987) surplus transformation curve.2
Definition 4.1 The locus o f the combinations o f equilibrium rental incomes (or
rates) in units o f own output corresponding to each tariff rate (or domestic relative 
price) is defined as the Rent Transformation Frontier (RTF). A function that describes 
the locus is the Rent Transformation Function.
(ii) directly follows from the sectoral output supply functions given by equation (3.36), the elasticity of 
the equilibrium wage rate given by equation (3.43), and Proposition 3.2. This result can be seen as 
follows.
Holding capital stocks fixed, the equilibrium sectoral output supply functions given by equation 
(3.36) can be expressed as
dPL
(  n \
( i - n w )
■ \ Ki
Differentiating this equation with respect to Pi we get
where e(/> ) =  ( l-T K /> )) .
Sr P ÄKi I
Yfi(e-\)+p& d0_
dP,
Since 0 < #(/*) < 1 by equation (3.43), and 0(Pi) is a decreasing function of PL by Proposition 3.2, it 
follows that
< 0 ,
if production functions are Cobb-Douglas.
Whether this result holds for any arbitrary CES production function with elasticity of factor 
substitution finitely greater than unity or not is still a question. When the elasticities of substitution are 
greater than unity, then the distributive shares will not remain constant as the relative price changes. For 
example, if the relative price of commodity 1 increases, then the distributive share of the mobile factor in 
sector 1 increases and the distributive share of mobile the factor in sector 2 decreases. Evaluation of the 
second order derivatives of the real rental functions when the elasticities of factor substitution are greater 
than unity thus became quite involved and is left for future studies.
2 See also Bullock (1992) for an application of Gardner's concept of surplus transformation
curve.
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Given the relative price of commodity 1, the equilibrium real rental rates for the 
two sectors, (RX(PX), R2(P{)), can be obtained from equation (3.12') as functions of the 
wage rate and the relative price of commodity 1. Since both sectors face the same wage 
rate, the rental function for sector 2 can be used to eliminate wage rate from the rental 
function for sector 1. As a result we can obtain the Rental Transformation Function as
(4.6) *. = PT A
£l_
—1 O  1 — <Ti
<X2 (l-< X l) l-<Tl
P'~a' -  a?'a2 1-01
l — (Ti
Equation (4.6) expresses the rental rate to the specific factor in sector 1 as a 
function o f the rental rate to the specific factor in sector 2. It is a condition that will be 
satisfied by the rental rates at all equilibrium points and defines a locus in Rx x R^  plane 
which coincides with the sectoral output plane.3
The slope of the rental transformation function can be obtained from the 
properties o f the rental functions. Since,
dRx dRJ dPx 
dR1 ~ dR./dP,
_ d(Rx / Px) / dPx 
dR1/dP][
' (AYi LEi ~ i n
V «2 A h/Px 2
and from equation (3.48) we have rx /  px > 1, and from equation (3.49) we have 
r2 /  P\ < 0 , it follows that
3 Two points may be noted here. First, the correct expression that describes the transformation of 
the real rental incomes as the relative price change can be obtained as follows.
Let fl, = RiKi . Then FI, measures the real rental income in sector i. By following the same
procedures we can obtain the rent transformation frontier as
OjO-oj) (
(4.61) H .
<JX
) - l  O  1—(TiPC' A P'~* -  a?  a 2 1~ (Jj i - ß t
i -< j t
( n , T a2\ ~ a2
ViV2 y
l
I-«*
It is clear that equation (4.6’) can be obtained from equation (4.6) simply by dividing and multiplying the 
rental rate terms in (4.6) by the respective values of the sectoral capital stocks. The properties of the two 
forms of expression are essentially the same. The frontier described by equation (4.6) will be referred as 
the rental transformation frontier, and that by equation (4.6’) will be referred as the rent transformation 
frontier.
Second, so long as commodity 2 is used as the numeraire the nominal rental rate equals the real 
rental rate in sector 2, and so the nominal rental income equals the real rental income in sector 2.
Therefore, we will continue to use R2 to denote the real rental rate R2 in sector 2.
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(4.7)
dRx
dR2 v1^  A
ri / A ~ 1
r2 I P\
< 0 .
Thus, the rental transformation frontier slopes downward to the right. This result 
holds for any arbitrary equilibrium of the economic sphere, and does not depend on the 
values of the share parameters at any specific equilibrium point. Hence, a proposition 
follows:
Proposition 4.2 At every equilibrium of the economic sphere, a tariff change 
benefits the owner of the specific factor in one sector and hurts the owner of the specific 
factor in the other sector. Therefore, the owners of sector specific factors will have a 
conflict o f interest with respect to tariff changes A
4.2 The Shape of the Rent Transformation Frontier
Substituting the expressions for rx / px and r2 / px from the equations (3.48) and 
(3.49) into the equation (4.7) and simplifying the expression making use of equation 
(3.43), which gives the price elasticity of the wage rate, yields
(4.8) dRL= R, (A2ct25l1 " 
dR, R,
Differentiating both sides of equation (4.8) with respect to R2 yields, on further 
simplification,
(4.9) <72A2SLi (  * ' )
 ^OxX xS L2 j U 2 J
R2dRx
RxdR2
- 1
dX2 dXx 
X2dR2 XxdR
\  r
+
2 y ^ L \ ^ 2 ^ L 2 ^ 2
Since Xi - L i / L , and since the motive variable for change in this general 
equilibrium system is the domestic relative price, then
4 This may not be true if we are analysing endogenous tariff changes ex ante in which case the
owners of the specific factors may agree in the direction of tariff changes. For a demonstration of this and 
other interesting results see Cassing, Hillman, and Long (1986).
Furthermore, this apparent conflict between the owners of the sector specific factors is a 
consequence of the adoption of the specific factor model. If we take a long run view and adopt Hecksher- 
Ohlin-Samuelson model that allows capital to move across the sectors, then the basic conflict will be 
between labour and capital as predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson theorem (see for example, Brock, 
Magee and Young, 1989). In this case it would be more useful to obtain the factor income transformation 
frontier and evaluate its properties than to stay with the RTF defined here.
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(4.10)
(4.11)
dSQ = dSQ/dPx 
dR2 dR2 / dPx '
dL, _ dLi / dPx .
j  = 1,2; and
i = 1,2.
dH2 dtf, / d/J 
Using equation (4.8), equation (4.9) can be rewritten as
(4.12) d 2R1 _ <72^ 2‘^L1 Y ^ 1
dRi A ^ J
-
<72^ 2^ L1
 ^ ct1A15L2 j
(^ 2 ! P\ h ! Pi )~^~ (■$£,! / 5^ 2 / Pi)
r2> A
Making use of the equations (3.28), (3.44) and (3.45) around any arbitrary 
equilibrium equation (4.12), after a simplification, can be rewritten as
(4.13) d 2R, ^2^2^L\ ( Ai11<S%
^((TiA iS ^ )  jU2J
[ (^2^'2'^L l ^ 1^ 1  *^,2 )  ^ 1 ^ 2  (1 ^lX^2^2 ^2^2*^L l) (1
On a further simplification using the adding up property of the distributive and 
employment shares the equation (4.13) can be rewritten as
(4.14) d2Rt _ 02^2 $Ll (Ai
dRl k(oX S L2) >UiJ
\ ^ 2 ^ 2 ^ L l ^ \  1) +  ^ 1 ^ 1  *^ £,2 ( ^ 2  1 ) ^ l ^ l ^ K 2  ^ 2 ^ 2 '^ Ä 'l]*
Thus, it is clear from the right hand side of the equation (4.14) that the condition
d2 R(Jj > 1 and cr2 > 1 is sufficient for — j- < 0. These conditions hold under assumption
dR2
4.1, and thus we have the following proposition:
Proposition 4.2 I f  the rental rates are measured in units of own output; and the 
long run elasticities o f factor substitution are at least unity in both the sectors, then the 
rental transformation function is concave and negatively sloped. That is, the rental 
transformation frontier slopes downward to the right and is concave to the origin in the 
rental plane, and the set of feasible combinations of rental rates (and rental income) is
convex.
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43  The Product and Rent Transformation Frontiers
On the basis of these results, the nature of the rent transformation frontier can be 
illustrated geometrically. Figure 4.1 shows the rental and product transformation 
frontiers for given world price, endowment of sector specific factors, and the economy 
wide supply of the mobile factor.
Good 1
Product Transformation
Rent Transformation
Good 2
The rent and product transformation frontiers 
Figure 4.1
In this four quadrant figure, quadrants II and IV show the production functions 
of sector 1 and sector 2 respectively. The total endowment of labour in the economy is 
OL(=OL'). The x-axis in quadrant I measures the output of commodity 2, and the y-axis 
measures the output of commodity 1. The curve AB represents the usual product 
transformation frontier - it shows the combination of maximum attainable output of one 
sector given the output level of the other sector. For example, if all labour is employed 
in sector 2, OB units of commodity 2 will be produced. Alternately, if all labour is 
employed in sector 1, OA units of commodity 1 will be produced, while the output of 
commodity 2 will be zero.5 The curve AB shows the transformation possibilities of 
commodity 2 into commodity 1 and vice versa.
5 Note that if the production functions are not characterized by unitary elasticity of factor 
substitution, then the output of sector 2 will not be zero even if all of the mobile factor is employed in 
sector 1. Similarly, the output of sector 1 will not be zero even if all of the mobile factor is employed in 
sector 2. Each sector can produce a minimum quantity of its output by employing the sector specific
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The product transformations in equilibrium, under the maintained hypothesis 
that production sectors are profit maximizers, can always be induced by exogenous 
changes in domestic relative price of commodities. The mechanism behind this 
transformation is that changes in the relative price of the commodities alter the 
equilibrium wage rate, which will induce a reallocation of the mobile factor - labour, 
between the sectors. Thus each point on the curve AB is a point of production 
equilibrium that corresponds to a particular domestic relative price of commodities.
Since the mobile factor (labour) is paid its marginal product, AC represents the 
wage bill of sector 1 and OC represents the rent to the specific factor in sector 1 when 
all labour is employed by sector 1. Rent to the specific factor in sector 1 is zero (see 
quadrant II). Similarly, when all labour is employed by sector 2, DB represents the 
wage bill and OD represents the rent to the specific factor in sector 2, while the rent to 
the specific factor in sector 2 is zero (see quadrant IV). The curve CD traces out the 
combination of the real rents to the two sector-specific factors through reallocation of 
labour between the two sectors induced by exogenous change in the domestic relative 
price of commodities.
The product transformation frontier and domestic price ratios are well known 
tools of economists that help to locate the equilibrium product mix. It is natural to 
enquire about the location of equilibrium rents for given commodity prices.
We know from equations (3.11) and (3.12) that the specific factors, in 
equilibrium, are paid their corresponding value of marginal product. Therefore, using 
equation (3.6) and noting that commodity 2 is the numeraire, we can write
( a ,c \ ff, /*,)'*»
A  ßi(X/ K2)'*fl‘
Hence, by expressing the rents in units of own output the equation (4.15) can be 
rewritten as
(4.16) M l - M l  (  Y ' * P '
k 2r2 AC UC
Given the parameters of the production functions and the stock of the specific 
factors, equation (4.16) provides the translation from output levels to the ratio of
factor only. In this case both the product and the rent transformation frontiers will have some linear 
segments on both ends. However, the above properties of the frontiers will remain unchanged. In what 
follows we will ignore this possibility until chapter 7, since at this level of aggregation comer solutions 
are rare possibilities.
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sectoral rental incomes. In general, it can be seen from equation (4.16) that the relation 
between rental mix and output mix is non-linear.
In particular, if the production function in both the sectors are Cobb-Douglas, 
then both px and p2 tend to zero and the equation (4.16) reduces to
(4.17) M l
k ,r2
A
A
V  
U /
Now it is easy to see that the rental mix (ratio of rental incomes) is proportional 
to the output mix (ratio of sectoral outputs). This relationship can be illustrated 
graphically.
Good 1
^  Good 2
Location of equilibrium rental incomes 
Figure 4.2
As in Figure 4.1, AB and CD represent the product transformation frontier 
represents the rent transformation frontier respectively. Given that the relative price of 
commodity 1 is FJ, the optimal output mix is determined by the point E where the 
absolute value of the slope of the product transformation frontier is \/Pv Sectoral 
outputs of the two sectors are respectively Yx and Y2. The slope of the ray OE shows the 
equilibrium output mix.
If the shares of capital in the two sectors are equal (that is, if they have identical 
Cobb-Douglas production functions), then it follows from equation (4.17) that the rental
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mix will also be given by the slope of the same ray OE. The rental equilibrium will be 
at the point F on the rental transformation frontier.6 If the share of capital in sector 1 is 
greater than the share of capital in sector 2, (that is, if ßx > ß2) the equilibrium rental 
mix will be given by the slope of the ray, such as OG, which lies above the ray OE. If 
ßx < ß2 then the rental mix will be given by the slope of the ray such as OH which lies 
below the ray OE. But the relation between the two rays that show the output mix and 
the rental mix is stable in the sense that the slopes of the two rays always remain in 
constant proportion. In general, there is no reason to assume that the production 
technologies of the two sectors are identical and Cobb-Douglas, and therefore, the value 
of the rent transformation frontier in locating distributive equilibrium geometrically is 
quite limited. Nevertheless, with sufficient structure imposed, it can be a useful 
illustrative device.
4.4 Comparative Static Properties of the RTF
This section identifies the variables that bring shifts and movements along the 
rent transformation frontier. It then describes the nature of the effects of changes in the 
exogenous variables on the RTF.
(a) Changes in endowment
Changes in the endowments of the factors in the economy bring about changes 
in the capacity of the economy to produce. In general, these changes are responsible for 
the shifts in the RTF. For example, an increase in the stock of capital in sector 1 will 
increase the level of output that it can produce in specialization through the resulting 
increase in the productivity of labour. If the consequent increase in the marginal product 
of labour is not very high, so as not to raise wage rates prohibitively high, then the 
rental income of sector 1 will also increase. However, the rental income of sector 2 
under specialization will be unaffected by change in the stock of capital in sector 1. 
Therefore, the RTF will shift in favour of sector 1. A similar argument applies to the 
case with an increase in the stock of capital in sector 2. It will induce a shift in the RTF 
in favour of sector 2.
6 In fact, using the definition of cost share of labour from the equation (3.28), employment share 
from (3.30), and noting that rental mix is given by equation (4.17), it can be seen from equation (4.8), by 
normalizing the sectoral stock of capital to unity, that the slope of the rental transformation function 
under Cobb-Douglas technologies is given by
äRL = _ ß L 1
dRt f t  Pt '
Therefore, if the share of capital in the two sectors are equal then in equilibrium the slope of the 
rental transformation frontier will be equal to the slope of the product transformation frontier. That is, the 
product transformation frontier is a proportionate blow out of the rent transformation frontier.
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Similarly, an increase in the stock of labour in the economy, ceteris paribus, 
lowers the wage rate which, in turn, contributes to an increase in the rental income of 
either sector. The extent of shift in the rental income under specialization, as will be 
indicated below, depends on the distributive shares of labour and the elasticities of 
factor substitution in the two sectors. The intuitive mechanism can be tracked from 
equation (3.42) which yields the response of the wage rate as labour supply changes, 
and from equation (3.39), which yields the response of rental rate as wage rate changes.
Analytically, the effects of the endowment changes in the sectoral rental rate can 
be observed from the equations (3.46) and (3.47). The extreme points of the RTF can be 
observed be creating situations of specialization in the employment of the mobile 
factor, which can be ensured by setting Xl = 1 and A2 = 1 respectively.
When Aj = 1, the effect of an endowment change in the rental rate of sector 1, at 
constant commodity prices, can be obtained from equation (3.46) and is rewritten as
(4.18) n - / ) .
G \
Therefore, ceteris paribus, for kx > 0, the percentage change in the maximal rental 
income of sector 1 can be written as ^  + rx = (1 -  SLX / Gx )kx that is positive for g x > 1 
and; for / > 0, we have rx = (SLX / Gx)l  which is always positive. That is, the rental 
income of sector 1 will increase under specialization as the national endowment of 
labour and/or the stock of capital in sector 1 increases, and the elasticities of factor 
substitution are not very small.
Similarly, by setting A2 = 1 we can obtain the effect of endowment changes on 
the rental income of sector 2. For k2 > 0, ceteris paribus, we can obtain from the 
equation (3.47) that + r2 = (1 -  SL2 / cr2)^  which is positive for cr2 > 1, and for / > 0, 
we get r2 = (SL2 /  g2)1 which is always positive. These results show that the maximal 
rental income of sector 2 will increase with an increase in the endowment of labour 
and/or with an increase in the stock of capital in sector 2, provided the elasticity of 
factor substitution is not very small.
Figure 4.3 shows typical patterns of shifts on the RTF as endowments change. 
Panel (a) shows the effect of an increase in the stock of capital in sector 1, panel (b) 
shows the effect of an increase in the stock of capital in sector 2, and panel (c) shows 
the effect of an increase in the endowment of the mobile factor on the RTF. The axes 
measure the rental incomes in units of own output. Numbers on the axis represent the 
respective sectors or the owners of the specific factors.
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Good 1 Good 1 Good 1
Good 2Good 2 Good 2
(c): /> o
Effects of endowment change on the RTF 
Figure 4.3
(b) Changes in price variables:
Any change in the domestic relative price, by definition of RTF, causes a 
movement along the RTF. Changes in the domestic relative price can be caused by a 
change in the tariff rate and or by a change in the international relative price. Therefore, 
changes in the world price and the tariff rate cause a movement along the frontier.
Good 1
Price changes: movements along the RTF 
Figure 4.4
To illustrate, let P* be the initial world price ratio and Tx be the tariff rate. The 
figure illustrates that the imposition of tariff rate raises the rental income of sector 1 and
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lowers the rental income of sector 2. Suppose the world relative price of commodity 1 
falls, and the world relative price becomes P*. Then, at an unchanged tariff rate the 
domestic relative price of commodity 1 also falls and consequently, the combination of 
equilibrium rental incomes of the sectors is given by the point + Tx)). If the tariff
rate is increased to compensate for the fall in world price then the rental income will 
again be represented by the point marked R(P*(l + T{)) but with a different value for the 
tariff rate variable, 7J.
Thus, if the source of the shock is the tariff rate or the international relative 
price, then the effect will be a movement along the RTF. If the source of the shock is a 
change in one of the factor endowments, then the effect will be a shift on the RTF.
4.5 Summary
Basing on a simple general equilibrium model of a small open economy 
described in the previous chapter a rent transformation function has been derived in this 
chapter. The corresponding rent transformation frontier traces the equilibrium 
combinations of the sectoral rental incomes as the tariff rate changes. Along a frontier 
an increase in the rental income of one sector necessarily reduces the rental income of 
the other sector. The mechanism behind this transfer is the induced difference in the 
real wages faced by the two sectors, which further induces a reallocation of labour 
between the two sectors and hence the outputs and the rents.
It has been shown that if the long run elasticity of factor substitution is at least 
unity in both sectors and rents are measured in units of own output, then the rental 
transformation frontier is concave to the origin and lies inside the product 
transformation frontier. This shows that the sectoral rental functions, that yield rental 
income at each relative price, are bounded, and the real-rent possibility set is convex.
Any change in the endowment of factors will cause a shift on the frontier and a 
change in the tariff rate or the international price ratio will cause a movement along the 
frontier. Since, the tariff rates are such powerful instruments of income redistribution an 
obvious question that follows is how the tariff rates are determined. An attempt to 
answer this question using a political economy approach will be made in the next 
chapter.
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CHAPTER 5
EXISTENCE OF A NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN THE TARIFF GAME 
Introduction
Coggins, et al. (1991) showed the existence of a noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium in a general equilibrium framework of a lobbying 2-person exchange 
economy. Their proof involved a restriction on individual preferences, namely own 
good bias as they have called it. Other assumptions in their model are mainly directed 
to the nature of the pricing function, which are similar to that of previous authors (for 
example, Findlay and Wellisz, 1982).
Coggins, et al.'s model had two persons each endowed with a single commodity. 
Both commodities were internationally traded. The government's role was to announce 
the domestic price of the two goods and take the responsibility of clearing the markets 
by trading in the world market at internationally given prices. In setting domestic prices 
the government responded to the lobbing expenditures of the two agents and satisfied 
its budget constraint (government feasibility). Such a responsive behaviour on the part 
of the government created an incentive to each of the agents to spend resources in 
lobbying for higher relative price for their commodity. In all previous studies with 
noncooperative lobbying behaviour, a stable pricing (or tariff) function that possesses 
certain properties is assumed. It has not been shown anywhere, however, what kind of 
government behaviour would produce such a pricing function.
The purpose of this chapter is to extend the existence result obtained in Coggins, 
et al. (1991), on to a productive economy and also demonstrate that the properties of the 
pricing function commonly assumed in the literature is consistent with Peltzman-type 
political support maximizing behaviour of the government. This result demonstrates 
that the authors who studied the behaviour of the tariff rate from the supply side of the 
political market by simply maximizing a political support function, and the authors who 
studied the tariff formation process from the demand side of the political market by 
assuming a tariff (or pricing) function are mutually consistent. The conclusions of the 
two approaches would be the same if the lobbying game admits a unique Nash 
equilibrium.
This chapter is divided into six sections. The first section provides a general 
description of the economy. Its purpose is to recall what are relevant from the previous 
chapters and to provide the motivation for the construction of a tariff setting game. The 
second section specifies the properties of the government's pricing function as in 
previous studies.
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Given a pricing function of the government, the problem of the lobbies (or the 
interest groups) has been specified in section three. Here, we differ from Coggins, et al. 
in (the form of) one assumption. Coggins, et al. have assumed that the players are utility 
maximizers, whereas we followed Findlay and Wellisz (1982) and assumed that the 
players, the owners of sector specific factors, are payoff - real rental income less 
lobbying expenditure - maximizers.
In section four, the tariff game is specified in strategic form. The existence 
theorem and related Lemmas are proved in section five. In addition to the existence 
results, this section also shows that in all Nash equilibria of the tariff game each player 
spends a nonzero amount of its real rental income in predatory lobbying. Moreover, it is 
also shown that under a reasonable assumption, the conjecture of Findlay and Wellisz 
(1982) that a positive tariff rate will result in the Nash equilibrium of the game is 
correct. Section six concludes the chapter. Finally, Appendix-5A demonstrates that the 
properties of the pricing function assumed in section 2 are, in fact, consistent with the 
support maximizing behaviour of the government. As far as the author is aware, all of 
these results are new additions to the literature.
5.1 The Economy
As described in Chapter 3, the economy produces 2 tradeable goods, good 1 
and good 2; good 1 is import competing, and good 2 is exportable under free trade. The 
two goods are produced by two different sectors using intersectorally mobile and 
homogenous labour, and sector specific capital. Factor endowments are given. The 
economy is assumed to be small and open, so changes in the economy are assumed to 
be incapable of influencing international relative prices.
We have also assumed that all consuming units have identical and homothetic 
utility functions. This assumption is not of much significance for our study, which is 
mainly concerned with the supply side behaviour. The supply side of the economy is 
independent of the demand side by virtue of small and open economy assumption. This 
assumption greatly simplifies the algebra. It is further assumed that the owners of the 
sector specific factors receive quasi-rent - the residual income after wage payments, 
labour gets its wage at the market clearing rate, production sectors are competitive, and 
while making production and consumption decisions the agents take all prices as given.
Clearly, under this structure, movements of the domestic relative price caused 
by changes in the government's policy variable (tariff rate) will have different impacts 
on the real incomes received by the owners of different factors. This has been 
extensively discussed in chapters 3 and 4. It is natural for the factor owners to pursue all 
possible ways of influencing the government's decision in their favour.
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As in previous studies, we further assume that the government and the owners of 
the specific factors are the only agents who behave strategically. The owners of the 
specific factors want to maximize the real rental income net of lobbying contribution, 
and the government wants to maximize political support by offering a lobby-sensitive 
tariff (or pricing) function. The owners of the mobile factor, however, are assumed to 
be nonstrategic due to the chronic free rider problem and rational ignorance.
Intuitively, the nature of the lobbing game to be studied in this chapter can be 
described as follows. Given a free trade situation and a responsive behaviour of the 
government to the lobby efforts, there is an incentive to the import competing sector to 
spend some resources in lobbying the government for an imposition of a tariff on the 
imports of good 1. This will raise domestic prices of the import competing good and 
hence the rents to the specific factors in the import competing sector. But, a tariff on the 
imports of good 1 also means a lower relative price of the export good and a higher 
price of the mobile factor, which, in turn, means a lower rent to the specific factor in the 
exporting sector. Thus, the owners of the specific factor in the exporting sector will also 
have some incentive to lobby the government not to raise the price of import competing 
good, that is not to impose tariffs on imports.
Conversely, if the economy is in a high tariff regime, the exporting sector has an 
incentive to spend resources in lobbying the government to lower the tariff rates, which 
will raise the relative price of the exportable, and consequently raise the rents to the 
specific factor in the exporting sector. This means that there will be an incentive to the 
import competing sector to spend resources on counter-lobbying to maintain the tariff 
level and the level of its rents.
Since the tariff policy (or the pricing policy) of the government responds to the 
lobbying efforts of the two sectors, the extent of increase in the rent in each sector 
depends also on how the other sector behaves. As one sector increases its lobbying 
effort if the other sector also increases its effort in counter-lobbying, then it is possible 
that the equilibrium tariff rate may not change at all and hence, the relative price and 
the rents may remain unchanged.
Thus, in the end what a sector will obtain depends not only on how it behaves 
but also on how the other sector(s) behaves as well. While taking decisions on whether 
to lobby or not to lobby the government, each sector has to consider the possible 
reaction from the other sector(s). Therefore, the lobbying contest between the two 
sectors can be viewed as a 2-person game with lobby expenditures as their strategies. 
The objective of the game is to obtain a favourable tariff policy which, in turn, means a 
favourable domestic price ratio.
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Since for each price ratio there is a unique equilibrium in the economic sphere 
of the political economy (which has been described by a CGE model), we will obtain a 
full equilibrium of the political economy if there is also an equilibrium in the tariff 
game, which represents its political side. Therefore, the immediate question is whether 
there exists any equilibrium in such a game? This question will be answered formally in 
the following sections.
5.2 The Pricing Function
Let the strategic response of the government to the lobbying efforts of the 
interest groups be summarized by a pricing function
(5.1) /> = />( t?,,77_,); i = 1,2.
where, r\i and r;_t are non-negative real numbers that represent the lobby expenditures1 
of sector i and sector(s) -i (all other sectors but not i) respectively;2 and/) is the 
normalized relative price of good i in terms of the other good.3 It is assumed that the 
pricing function of the government is common knowledge.
As in previous studies (in particular, Findlay and Wellisz, 1982; Wellisz and 
Wilson, 1986; and Coggins, et al., 1991), we assume that the pricing function satisfies 
the following properties:
(Al) The function Pi = Pt(Tjt, 77_ ■) is continuous and differentiable in 
Vi and Tj-i'
(A2) />(0,0) = />\
Assumption (A2) guarantees that if no one chooses to lobby then the world price 
prevails. This assumption presupposes that the government has no reason of its own to 
deviate from the world price, and if we observe a deviation it is because at least one 
agent in the economy wants the domestic price to be different from the world price.
1 Lobbying activities may take different forms - for example, mobilizing public support to the 
government or organization of a street demonstration against the government, or an outright tribe. This 
activity may also involve the use of factors. However, in this study the lobbying effort of each sector has 
been measured in equivalent units of output spent or lost in lobbying activities.
2 Note that -i is the complementary set o f i with respect to the player set, which is defined in 
section 5.4. However, in a 2-player game i =1, if and only if -i = 2 and vice versa.
3 Here, we do not fix the numeraire, but assume that for each sector the commodity produced by 
the other sector is the numeraire. Therefore, the relative prices of the two commodities satisfy P_t = P~l. 
In other words, the relative price of good 1 is the inverse of the relative price of good 2.
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(A3) {Productive Lobbying)Pi = Pi(rii, tj^ )  is strictly increasing and concave in Tjt and 
strictly decreasing and convex in t j _ . .
Satisfaction of assumption (A3) guarantees that for a given lobbying effort of 
player 2, if player 1 increases its lobbying effort, then the domestic price of good 1 will 
increase relative to the price of good 2 (monotonicity). But successive increases in 
lobbying efforts will bring increasingly smaller increase in the relative price of good 1 
(concavity).
(A4) {Bounded Pricing) There exist two finite and positive real numbers P- and Pfi 
such that for all r\i and r/_., P{rjt, rj_i) e [P- ,Pt").
Assumption (A4) means that the government will choose tariffs in such a way 
that, for each /, the induced domestic relative price of good i will be within the bounds 
regardless of the level of lobbying expenditure of the private agents. The bounds 
include world relative prices in the feasible set by assumption (A2).
The rationale behind such limiting prices is that if the domestic relative price is 
too far from off the world price and/or autarky price the overall dead weight loss may 
be sufficiently high to invite a successful political opposition.4
Let X = {Pt:R2+ —> [PL'.PJ’ ]\ Pt(Tjt, T]^) satisfies (Al) through (A4) }. Then 
elements of x are admissible pricing functions.
An example of the pricing function
We can construct an example of such pricing functions to illustrate the main 
features. Since it is easier to construct examples of pricing functions that map lobbying 
expenditures into the unit interval (simplex), for the sake of this example, let us assume 
that prices of the two commodities satisfy Px +  P2 = 1. Then, the price ratio can be 
identified from the two normalized prices. For nonzero lobby expenditures let us 
specify a pricing function as follows:
(5.2) m n V - i ^ P W - P i ) nrn° + r£i
where 0 < a  < 1 and 0 < ß < 1 are constants. If we take normalized free trade and 
autarky prices as the bounds, then equation (5.2) can display a family of price - lobby 
expenditure relationship satisfying the assumptions (Al) through (A4).5 The parameters
4 For deadweight loss consideration see Becker (1983).
5 Note that this particular pricing function is not defined at the origin of the lobbying space. When 
no one lobbies domestic normalized prices are defined by assumption (A2). As mentioned before this
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a , and ß  reflect the asymmetric costs to the two players of obtaining a given change in 
the relative price.
It is clear that, in a 2-sector case, when sector 2 spends infinitely large amount 
of resources in lobbying for a given lobby expenditure of sector 1 then P{(riv r\2) = Px' ,
assumption implies that the government has no interest in maintaining a domestic price ratio that is 
different from the world price ratio, and any distorted price can only be maintained by a constant flow of 
lobbying activities by the players.
An alternate assumption could be that the government is not committed to maintain any price 
ratio. It is simply interested in maximizing its political support. A more general pricing function could be 
specified as follows:
(4.2* 1) P,(n,,ri_t ) =  P° +  - (P° -
where 0 < /?, ,/?_, < 1. Clearly, this pricing function satisfies assumptions (Al), and (A4). Instead of 
assumption (A2) it will now satisfy
(A2r) Pi ( 7]°, 7J0,. ) =  P° G [/* ,Pi ], where ( 77°, TJ°_i) is some minimum amount of lobbying 
expenditures set by the government
Instead of (A3), the productive lobbying assumption, which states that the productivity of 
lobbying increases at decreasing rate, it will now allow to have increasing returns at very low levels of 
lobbying expenditure. However, the pricing function will remain increasing and quasiconvcave in the 
lobbying expenditure of player i, and decreasing and quasiconvex in the lobbying expenditure of player 
-/. This assumption is certainly weaker than (A3).
Furthermore, given expenditure of player -/, the productivity of lobbying expenditure of player i
will increase at a decreasing rate for all7]- > T}° + 1 . Similarly (A4) is modified as follows:
(A4’) If P° *  Pi , then we require Pi G [F*, Pi! ]. In other words, the bounds should include world 
price.
With this pricing function (5.2') offered by the government one can identify various motives of 
the government For example,
(i) if the government has chosen ß i = ß_i =  0 , then it means that the government does not care 
about lobbying expenditures of the private players. For all levels of lobbying expenditures we will have 
Pt (77,, 7J_.) =  P ° . Which further means that when setting domestic prices the government is interested 
in something else, for example in maximizing a genuine social welfare function;
(ii) if the government has set P° — Pt , and r\° — 7j*. =  0 , then this implies that the government
as such has no interest in deviating from free trade if no private players lobbies for a different domestic 
price;
(iii) if (i) and (ii) hold, then it follows that the government is committed to free trade;
(iv) if P° =  Pi", then this means that the government is determined to protect the interest of player
i, but is unable to ignore the political power of player -i. Similarly, if/*0 =  Pi , then this means that the
government is willing to serve the interest of player -i, by setting the lower bound price, but it is unable to 
ignore the political power of player i. In either case it will be a game between one of the players and the 
government. The other player does not have to spend on lobbying the government, the player is already 
in a favourable position;
(v) if the government is a genuine welfare maximizer but the self-interested players are also so 
powerful that it can not ignore their lobbying activity, then the pricing function offered by the 
government may contain elements that reflect the government's mixed preferences. Such a case was
studied by Feenstra and Bhagwati (1982). If this is the case, then P° would be the welfare maximizing
price with nonzero values for both ß t and /?_■, and so on.
Moreover, the pricing function /*(77-, 7]_i) given by equation (5.2’) is well defined, continuous,
differentiable, and bounded for all nonnegative values of lobbying expenditures. It is increasing and 
quasiconcave in the lobbying expenditure of player i, decreasing and quasiconvex in that of player -/.
Another example of the pricing function can be found in Coggins (1989). To maintain 
comparability with previous works we will continue assuming that the pricing function satisfies (Al) 
through (A4). Support maximizing behaviour of the government will be considered in the Appendix.
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that is the relative price of good 1 takes its lower bound, and when sector 1 spends such 
a large amount of resource in lobbying for a given lobby expenditure of sector 2 then 
= > ^ at distorted price of good 1 will take its upper bound.
The pricing function (5.2) is very sensitive to small lobby expenditures around 
the origin in the lobby space. For example, if player 2 does not lobby at all, then player 
1 can obtain its upper bound price just by spending a cent in lobbying. Will the 
government announce such a pricing function? Herein lies the strategic behaviour of the 
government. Because, when no one is lobbying, it costs less to obtain a large favour 
from the government every player will be lured to spend some resources in lobbying. 
When one player starts lobbying with a very small sum and is able to obtain a good deal 
in price changes then it becomes almost a necessity to the other player to spend 
resources in counter lobbying. The dynamics of competitive lobbying will be set into 
motion. The government then can rely on the pricing function to induce competitive 
lobbying involving larger sums. So, a government may offer such a very sensitive 
pricing function if it wants to induce more competitive lobbying from the interest 
groups.
Assumptions (A1)-(A3) may be found in Coggins, et al. (1991). In addition to 
these three assumptions they have one more assumption, which they call as Bounded 
Lobbying. This means that, given the lobbying expenditure(s) of the other agent(s), 
there exists a finite maximum lobbying expenditure for each agent that exhausts all of 
his resources. This implies that the agent is incapable of increasing lobby expenditure 
beyond that bound. Evaluation of the bound for agent i when others are not lobbying at 
all gives the greatest upper bound for agent f s lobby expenditure. The price that is 
obtained with this greatest upper bound lobby expenditure yields the ceiling for the 
price that agent i can ever obtain. Thus Bounded Lobbying implies Bounded Pricing. As 
will be argued below, while describing the nature (compactness) of the strategy set of 
players, that bounded pricing assumption implies bounded lobbying if the agents are 
payoff maximizers.
Instead of taking this indirect route the bounded lobbying assumption has been 
replaced by its equivalent form - the bounded pricing assumption which does not 
impose any extra restriction, for it has been maintained that the agents are payoff 
maximizers. As will be seen below, this shift in the assumption has been very helpful in 
proving the existence of an equilibrium in the lobbying economy.
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53 The Problem of the Lobbies
Let us denote the stock of sector-specific capital in sector i by Ki and the 
equilibrium real rental rate6 (measured in units of own output) at given price q_.) 
be ^(^(77-, 77_t)). The payoff to player /, when players are behaving strategically, at any 
strategy combination (77x, T7_x) can be written as
(5.3) n , ( 7 7 , ,  7 7 _ . )  =  KlRi(Pi(rfi,r\_i))-  Tji .
Given the pricing rule of the government and lobby expenditure 7]_-, of the other 
player(s), the problem of sector / is to choose a level of lobby expenditure Tji such that 
the problem
(5.4) m a x I l t (rfi, tj_l) =  max[(KtRt(/^ ( ,  77^ ) )  -  7 7 .]; / = 1,2
rti
is solved.
It is already known that Ri is bounded, and strictly increasing in Pi. In addition, 
we have also assumed that Ri is concave in Pt (Assumption 3.1).7 Since Pi is increasing 
in lobby expenditure of sector / and decreasing in lobby expenditure of the other sector, 
sector -/, each sector can raise its rental income by increasing expenditure on lobbying. 
Concavity of the pricing function implies that each player needs to spend an increasing 
amount on lobbying to obtain constant increases in the relative price of their 
commodity.
Under the assumption that each player shows Nash behaviour with respect to the 
other player, the optimization problem of each player, represented by (5.3), is to 
determine the level of lobby expenditure that maximizes their respective payoff (the 
total rent net of lobby expenditure). The constraints to these problems are implicit in the 
nature of the equilibrium rental functions and in the nature of the pricing function.
5.4 The Game in Strategic Form
With these preliminaries we can proceed to describe the tariff game in a 
strategic form. For each agent /, and for given T]_t of other player(s), let us define
6  For simplicity, we will change the notation for the real rental rates. In chapter 2, R was used to 
denote the nominal rental rate, and R was defined in chapter 3 to denote the real rental rate measured in
units of own output. In this chapter we will be discussing in terms of real rents and to avoid confusion R 
has been replaced by R with appropriate subscript to denote the player or the sector, which have been 
used interchangeably.
7  Note that, in chapter 3 we have shown that this assumption is true for Cobb-Douglas production 
functions, but whether it is generally true is not known. Here, we have assumed it to be true generally.
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(5.5)
(5.6)
fli(T1-i) = KiRi(P.{fjitTi_i)) , and 
% =  m a x ^  77t(77_t)
then, 77, represents the maximum lobbying expenditure that agent i can incur if it is a 
payoff maximizer, when player -i is spending 7]_.; and r\t represents the level of
lobbying expenditure which will never be exceeded by the payoff maximizing agent i, 
whatever be the lobbying expenditure of the other player. Thus, Hi = [0,77-] defines the
strategy set of player i.
From the defining equations (5.5) and (5.6) it is clear that 77, < rji for each player 
i. This implies that for any given r\_i the choice set of player i is limited to a subset of 
the strategy set //,. Let be a correspondence defined on the strategy space such that 
(pf7/_t ) = [0,7J-], then <p.(77_i) c  Hi and <p,(77_,) represents player fs constraint 
correspondence - a mapping - that determines the choice set of player i given the 
strategy choice of other players.
Let I={ 1,2} be the player set, then H = x,€/ Hi is the set of ordered pairs that 
describes all possible strategy combinations of the two players, and 11, is the associated 
payoff function for each player i.
Definition 5.1. Any T = {(//,., II,., <p,),e/} is a collection of tariff games in 
strategic form.
Definition 5.2. A pair (77*, 77*, ) is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium of the 
tariff game if 77* solves
5.5 The Existence Results
The sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium of a game in T are 
listed in the following theorem.
Theorem 5.1 (Debreu, 1982: 702-3). If, for every i e I , the set Hi is a non-empty, 
compact, convex subset o f a Euclidean Space, n , is a continuous real-valued function 
on H -  x,€/ Hi that is quasiconcave in its ith variable, and (pt is a continuous, convex­
valued correspondence from H to Hi , then the social system (//,,!!,, <p,)1€/ has an 
equilibrium.
The immediate problem is to check whether all of the conditions mentioned in 
the theorem are satisfied in the tariff game. We will check these conditions for the 
arbitrary player i. If the conditions of the theorem are satisfied for player /, then it will
V,eVi(Tl'i)
max. n,(7/,,r/V); i € /
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be valid for all players, and the theorem will be applicable to our problem. We will 
accomplish that by a series of Lemmas.
Lemma 5.1 (Coggins, et al., 1991). Let X c R ,  Y c R, and let g: X —> Y be 
differentiable, then g is quasiconcave if and only if for every pair of elements x, x' of X 
[ g’(x) < 0  and x' > x] together imply g'(x') < 0 .
Lemma 5.2. If the pricing function satisfies (Al) through (A4), and /?,(/>) is 
differentiable, strictly increasing and concave in Pt , then for given 7]_, the payoff 
function
(5.8) n i(T)I,r\_i) = KlR,(Pl{ri„Ti_i) ) -r ii 
is quasiconcave in 77,. r\i e R+.
Proof: First note that 11,(0, rj_i) > 0 for, the price has a lower bound, and the rental rate 
is positive at this price. Even though the rental rate increases with PL, and P{ increases 
with the lobby expenditure, the payoff II,(77,, 77_,) eventually becomes negative as r\i 
increases. To see this, since the pricing function satisfies (A4), Pi has its upper bound 
Pt . Now, let 77,'= KiRl(Pt"), then for all 77, > 77/ , it follows from equation (5.8) that we 
must have IT , (77, , 77_,) < 0.
That the payoff becomes negative from positive also suggests that there must be 
a 77,"g [0 , 77/]  such that (9LI, / <977, < 0 for 77, = 77,".
Differentiation of equation (5.8) partially with respect to r\i yields
(5.9) d n,- / ^77,. = X.(dRt / dPt)(<9/> / (977,) -1.
Since (911, / <977, < 0 for 77. = 77,” and /?,(/>) is strictly increasing in Pi implies 
(<?/>/*?.)!,,, /<#>)].
Assumption (A3), the concavity of Pi implies that the slope of Pl falls as 77, 
increases. Therefore, for all 77, > 77," we must have
(5.10) ( dP,/ dn,) < (dP, / c t y , ) | < 1
which follows from concavity of /?■ in Pt, and monotonicity of in 77,. Therefore, that 
for all 77, > 77,", we have <9n, / drji < 0. Hence by Lemma 5.1 the payoff function 
11,(77,, V-i) is quasiconcave in r\t. Q. E. D.
The argument used in the proof of Lemma 5.2 asserts that if the payoff function 
becomes negative for some level of lobby expenditure then it remains negative for all 
higher levels of lobby expenditures. This effectively precludes nonconvexities in the
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choice set and the constraint correspondence remains convex valued which is shown in 
the following Lemma.
Lemma 5.3. If the pricing function satisfies assumptions (Al) through (A4) and the 
rental function Rt is strictly increasing, concave and differentiable in Pi , then the 
strategy set of player /, //., is nonempty, compact and convex subset of R, the real line, 
and further, the constraint correspondence <p, (7]_, ) is convex-valued and continuous.
Proof. By defmition the strategy set of player i is Hi = [0,/£■]. The player can always 
choose not to lobby, implying that 0 e therefore, Hi * 0 .  The set is obviously 
closed for it also includes boundary points. Compactness requires that the set be 
bounded.
Since Pt is bounded from above by P" [Assumption (A4)], and /?, is increasing 
in Pt, implies8 that/?,(/*") < +°°. It follows from equations (5.5), (5.6) and 0 < Ki < +«> 
that for all non-negative values of Tj_i we must have r\i < Kfi^P"). Therefore, Ht is 
compact. Convexity of //■ is automatically satisfied because it is a closed interval of a 
real line.
To show that the choice set is convex or the constraint correspondence is convex 
valued, let us consider the defmition of <p-(T7_4). Since (pi(r}_i) is a collection of 
strategies (lobby levels) available to player i when player-/ has chosen to lobby rj_i 
amount of resources, <p4(77_.) can also be defined by
(5.11) <Pi(n-i) = [Vi e H; |n j(rj„r)_1)>0)
But this means (p^Tj_.) is a better set for the payoff function, which is quasiconcave by 
Lemma 5.2 implies that <p-(77_,) is a convex set.
Lastly, it remains to be shown that the constraint correspondence ( p t ( T ] _•) is 
continuous. Continuity of (p^rf_.) has been shown in Coggins, et al. (1991), which is 
restated here for the sake of completeness.
It suffices to show that (pi(TJ_i) is upper and lower hemicontinuous9. Since/* is 
continuous in //•, and Rt is continuous in /*, it follows from equation (5.5) that (77_t)
8 Note that the nature of the rental functions depend on the economic system and the rental rates 
are defined for all prices, whereas the bounds of the pricing function are in the domain of the
government. For any Pi > Pi it follows from the monotonicity of the real rent that Ri(Pi)> Ri(Pi ).
9 A correspondence 9 from a subset S of a Euclidean space to a subset T of a Euclidean space is 
upper hemicontinuous (u. h. c.) at a point x° of S if there is a neighbourhood of x° in which cp is 
bounded, and few every sequence x4 in S converging to x° in S, and every sequence yQ in T converging to 
y° in T such that for every q, one has yQ in (p(x4), then y° is in <p(x0). Upper hemicontinuity of <p on S is 
defined as upper hemicontinuity at every point of S.
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is continuous in [0, 7}_.]. Thus the graph of < p . ( 7 i s  closed. As (pfq'_.) is also
compact valued by the above argument, it is upper hemicontinuous. To show lower 
hemicontinuity, consider a sequence {r/"(} converging to 77 ,^ and take any arbitrary 
7j] € <50(77!-). If r\° < 77.(77!.), then for N large we may set 77! = 77° for n > N. Then 
clearly 77* 77°, and the conditions for lower hemicontinuity are satisfied. If
77° = 77,(77!.), then let 77! = 77.(77!.). As 77.(77,.) is continuous, the conditions for lower 
hemicontinuity are again satisfied. It is concluded that <50,(77_.) is lower hemicontinuous. 
Thus, it is continuous. Q. E. D.
Theorem  5.2. (Existence o f an equilibrium in a tariff game). Given a Tariff Game in 
T = (//.,!! ,, <p.)i€/ as defined above, if the rental function Rt is real-valued, strictly 
increasing, concave and differentiable in P , and the pricing function Pl (77,, 77_.) 
satisfies assumptions (Al) to (A4), then there exists at least one noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium.
Proof: Under the assumptions of the Theorem 5.2, Lemma 5.2 and Lemma 5.3 hold. 
Since, by assumption, the pricing function is continuous in lobby expenditures 77. and 
77_i. By the assumption of the theorem the rental rate Rt is continuous and real valued in 
f j . This implies that the payoff function of any arbitrary player i defmed by the 
equation (5.3) is continuous and real valued in H and quasiconcave in its ith variable. 
Hence, the conditions of Theorem 5.1 are satisfied, and the theorem is proved.
Q. E. D.
Theorem 5.2 has guaranteed that at least a Nash equilibrium will exist in an 
economy where tariff policy responds to the lobby efforts of the interest groups. Since 
0 e H , no lobbying is always a feasible strategy to both the players, it is a candidate for 
an equilibrium. It is natural to ask, at this point, whether (77,., 77,.) = (0,0) can be a Nash
equilibrium of the game. The following Lemma answers this question.
Lem m a 5.4. In addition to the conditions of Theorem 5.2, if the pricing function is 
such that the partial elasticities of price with respect to the lobbying expenditures are 
locally constant, then (77., 77..) = (0,0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium.
Similarly, A correspondence 9  from a subset S of a Euclidean space to a subset T of a Euclidean 
space is lower hemicontinuous (1. h. c.) at a point x° of S if, for every sequence (x9) in S converging to 
x° in S, and every y° converging to <p(x°), there is a sequence (y9) in T converging to y° such that for 
every q, one has y9 in (p(x^). Lower hemicontinuity on S is defined as lower hemicontinuity at every 
point of S.
Continuity of a Correspondence at a point or on a set is defined as the conjunction of upper and 
lower hemicontinuity. (Debreu, 1982: 698-701).
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Proof: Let us consider the behaviour of player i when player -i chooses not to spend on 
lobbying, that is r\_i = 0. The payoff to player i is given by
n i(T)„0) = «,(/>(TJ .^O))- rjf, 77i £ <p,(0).
The first order condition for the maximum requires that player i choose lobby 
expenditure satisfying
0 dRi /  dPiKdPi /  d Vi) ^ 1 , and 77, (d n , / 9 rtf = 0.
The conditions will yield a solution of 77, = 0 if and only if (dRt /  dPi){dPl / d 77.) < 1 
for all 7ji e <p,(0). But
^  ^  A <9 77,
g  dRj  Y V  
y /?, dPi <9 rji J K 77, y
Since, under the conditions of the Lemma, the first two terms on the right (elasticities) 
are always positive, and locally constant around the origin of the lobbying space; and 
the real rental income is positive10 at all prices therefore, in the neighbour of the origin, 
we have
lim
Vi-* 0
f d R ,  Y  A
i / V 1
( \ f
lim
Vi~* 0
> L i5 .
^  3  Vi
V Ä.N
a 1 .;
= + 0 0 .
That is, (^/?, /  dPi)(dPi /  <9 77.) > 1 in the neighbourhood of 77, = 0, and the first order 
necessary condition for a maximum is not satisfied. Therefore, 77, = 0 cannot be a best 
reply of player i to the strategy 77_. = 0 of player Since choice of i is arbitrary, we 
find that ( 77,., 77_,) = (0,0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium (see Definition 5.2) in the tariff 
game. Q. E. D.
Thus, under the assumed behaviour of the pricing function and the behaviour of 
the rental functions, Lemma 5.4 guaranteed that in any Nash equilibrium we will 
observe that the players will be spending positive amounts on lobbying. It is tempting to 
conclude that all prices corresponding to Nash equilibrium are necessarily different 
from free trade prices. This is not always the case, however. In fact, as Coggins, et al. 
(1991) also have shown, if the lobby expenditure of one player is matched appropriately 
by another player in equilibrium then the free trade price may result. The arguments are 
as follows:
10 If there are increasing returns to scale, then at very low price the rental income may be negative 
even if the slope of the rental function with respect to price is positive. In that case, not spending on 
lobbying might be the best reply for the player and hence Lemma 5.4 may not hold. However, this study 
is based on the assumption of constant returns to scale in both sectors.
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Let and ry_. be any feasible level of lobby expenditures of the two players. 
Then by the assumption of productive lobbying (A3) we have
pi(rii,o)>pim ) = p ; > p l(o,Ti_i).
By the mean value theorem, there exist feasible expenditures fji e (0,77.) and 
f)-i e (0, tj.,. ) such that Pt (77., ) = P*.
Thus, the result that non-zero lobby levels may generate a free trade price ratio 
is still possible provided the government has no interest of its own in deviating from 
free trade. It is not yet known whether such combination of lobby expenditures can 
constitute an equilibrium of the game. What has been shown so far is insufficient to rule 
out the possibility that at least one Nash equilibrium outcome of the game will yield the 
free trade price ratio.
Definition 5.3. Given a description of a small open Walrasian economy a 
domestic relative price, induced by a tariff policy, is self-financing if the total 
collection of tariff revenue net of subsidies is non-negative.
It is evident that not all relative prices are self-financing. For example, if the 
government wishes to make the domestic relative price of exportable higher than that in 
the world market [that is, free trade price] then it would require an import subsidy 
and/or export subsidy. In total, the policy would be one of net trade subsidy.
Similarly, if the government wished to make the domestic relative price of the 
import competing good higher than the relative price that would prevail in autarky, then 
the export of an otherwise import competing good has to be subsidized as would the 
import of an otherwise exportable good. In both cases the collection of tariff revenue 
would be negative.
It is possible, however, to finance such a tariff policy either by resorting to 
external borrowing or by imposing some form of domestic tax. Financing a trade 
subsidy through the imposition of a domestic tax means a reduction in the domestic 
living standard to a level below that could be attained otherwise. A government would 
require one or more complementary policies that can generate surplus revenues in order 
to sustain a tariff policy belonging to this class. If so, then the effects of such 
complimentary policies on the payoffs of different agents need to be analysed together 
with the impact of tariff rates.
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This means that tariff policy cannot be studied in isolation. Inclusion of tariff 
policies that imply a net subsidy immediately leads outside the scope of this study.11 
This study assumes that the rationalized tariff rate is the only instrument available to a 
government for income redistribution.
In most real world situations, the collection of tariff revenue net of subsidy is 
nonnegative. It is, therefore, safe to assume that the government, as far as tariff policy is 
concerned, never adopts a net subsidy policy.12 This means that the government will 
choose tariff/subsidy rates in such a way that the domestic price ratio will be within the 
bounds set by free trade and autarky price ratios. Formally, we state the following 
property of the pricing function, which is implicit in Findlay and Wellisz (1982):
(A5) (5elf-financing). P ^ T j ^ T f ^ )  e [P*, P“] for all Tj i and r/_., where P* is the relative
price of good i in autarky.
Assumption (A5) does not exclude the possibility of simultaneous existence of 
export subsidy and import tax in the announcement of government policies. This is 
perfectly consistent with assumption (A5). What it rules out are the combinations of 
those subsidy and tax rates that lead to higher subsidy payments than the tariff revenue 
collections. In other words, this assumption requires that the rationalized tariff rate be 
nonnegative.
Note that assumption (A5) by itself is not sufficient to preclude the possibility of 
free trade. Players may choose not to lobby at all or what they spend may counteract 
each other so that free trade prices are maintained. Now we will show that Findlay and 
Wellisz's (1982) conjecture is correct.
Corollary 5.1. Suppose the conditions of Theorem 5.2 are satisfied with the 
pricing function satisfying (Al) - (A3) and (A5). If (fj.,f)_() is a Nash equilibrium of 
the Tariff Game, then Pt( f)., Pt *.
11 In Coggins, et al (1991), the government directly sets the prices o f commodities in response to 
private lobby expenditures. They have overcome the problem of complimentary financing policy by 
stating a government feasibility condition. The condition required that the sum of lobby income of the 
government and trade balance be non-negative. That is, all prices that can not induce lobby expenditures 
sufficient to finance the consequent trade deficit are considered unfeasible. This assumption is reasonable 
in their two person exchange economy but may not be so in a productive economy with many agents 
some of whom are non strategic. Government, for example, may use other taxes to get a transfer from 
nonstrategic agents.
12 It is not easy to judge the validity of this assumption on the basis of published figures. It 
involves an evaluation of effects of nontariff barriers as well and it is not always possible to estimate 
figures for the payments of subsidies in different forms, hence the statement at best is a conjecture. 
However, as far as developing countries are concerned published figures show that tariff revenue has 
remained one of the major source of government revenue. Motivated by this fact Feehan (1992) has 
derived efficiency rules for public input provision when the tariff is the sole source of revenue. For 
economies, whose government depends on tariff revenues, this assumption should be directly relevant.
I l l
Proof: Suppose not, and assume that Pi(f]i,f]_i) = PL*. Since P* is the lower bound of 
Pi we must have />((), tj^ )  >PL* for all 77_x e //_•. That is, Pt will not fall below P* 
whatever be the lobby expenditure of the other player(s). So,
n.(o,f)_.) >*,/?.(/>*)
> KtRt (P*) -  fji
Hence T]i -  0 yields a higher payoff than r\i = f]i for r \ = f]_i. This implies that fji is 
not a best response to fj_i, which further implies that (0,0) is not a Nash
equilibrium of the game. A contradiction to the hypothesis. Q. E. D.
Thus the corollary shows that a Nash equilibrium of a Tariff Game will lead to a 
domestic price ratio that will always be different from the free trade price ratio. This 
completes the answer to the question of existence of an equilibrium in a productive 
economy that allows agents to behave strategically at least with respect to the issues 
related to the choice of tariff policies.
So far nothing has been said about the uniqueness of equilibrium of the game. 
The sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of equilibrium can be found in Friedman 
(1986). It suffices to note that the condition requires, together with other conditions, 
that the payoff function of each player be concave in their respective strategy set. 
Lemma 5.2 has shown it to be quasiconcave. Unless further restrictions are imposed on 
the rental function it cannot be guaranteed that the condition will be satisfied generally.
5.6 Conclusion
This chapter has extended the existence result obtained by Coggins, et al. for a 
productive economy that allows agents to behave strategically. It has shown that if the 
government is responsive to the lobby pressures of the interest groups, then there exists 
at least one non-trivial Nash equilibrium in a tariff game. Moreover, if the government 
is constrained to choose a tariff policy that is self-financing then all of the Nash 
equilibria will imply a positive rationalized tariff rate. That is, the domestic price ratio 
in a Nash equilibrium will be different from the free trade price ratio.
In order to show the existence of an equilibrium in a lobbying exchange 
economy Coggins, et al. had to impose one restriction, which they called ‘own good 
bias’, on preferences. The proof outlined in this chapter did not require that assumption 
for a productive economy. This result occurred partly because in the Coggins, et al.'s 
model the endowment of good for each player was fixed but in our case sectoral output
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levels, and hence the rental incomes are variable, and partly because Coggins, et al. 
measured player's payoffs in indirect utilities whereas this study used real net rental 
income as the payoffs to the players. It was thus possible to obtain much stronger 
results compared to previous studies with less severe assumptions. In fact, we obtained 
the existence results with the set of assumptions that were in Findlay and Wellisz 
(1982).
One of the limitations of the noncooperative Nash solution is that if there are 
multiple equilibria (see Magee, Brock and Young, 1989 for such cases) it cannot 
specify the mechanism through which one of the equilibria will be selected. It is also 
frequently the case that the Nash process may lead to a suboptimal solution of the 
game.13 To resolve this problem some mechanism of refining the Nash equilibria, such 
as subgame perfectness, are required.
One of the fundamental assumptions of the noncooperative game is that the 
players make decisions in isolation. If there is a distinct possibility of increasing their 
payoff through communication, negotiation and adoption of a joint maximizing strategy 
then the assumption that rational players in a competitive environment always play a 
noncooperative game does not seem plausible. In the tariff game, for example, each 
player may spend resources in competitive lobbying just to protect himself against the 
predatory lobbying of the other. It is possible that they both might have been receiving 
lower payoffs than they would receive if they had agreed not to compete against each 
other.
In the next chapter we change the rules of the game, and allow the players to 
discuss, negotiate, and make binding agreements that are payoff (welfare) improving. 
This takes us to the study of the game in a cooperative form. However, as Kreps (1990: 
505) has remarked ‘this is not the cooperation borne of altruism or fondness of one’s 
fellow player. This is cooperation arising from a self-interested calculation of the 
benefits and losses that may accrue from “polite” behaviour’.
13 We noted in the review that Magee, Brock and Young (1989) have found several Prisoner's 
Dilemma equilibria in their simulations of the noncooperative game with Leontief production functions.
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Appendix-5 A: Derivation of the Properties of the Pricing Function of a Support 
Maximizing Government in a Lobbying Economy
The purpose of this Appendix is to demonstrate that the properties of the pricing 
function assumed in section 2 of the text are consistent with the support maximizing 
behaviour of the government. In other words, we will show that the properties of the 
pricing function are sufficient for the maximum of the government's political support 
function.
We assume that in the political market the government exchanges policies for 
political support. In particular, this means that, besides policies that benefit everyone, if 
a policy change benefits one person or group and harms the other, and the beneficiary is 
able and prepared to offer increased support to the government that exceeds the loss in 
support from the losing person or group, then both the government and the winning 
player will be better off from this deal. Policy will thus be adjusted accordingly. This 
assumption denies any benevolence on the part of the government. It implies that policy 
changes are solely guided by the self-interest of the government driven by its desire to 
remain in power and are thus politically motivated.14
We further assume that with respect to each policy change involving a 
distributional issue the population can be divided into three groups according to their 
interest on the proposed policy change: the group that anticipates direct benefits and 
supports it; the group that anticipates a loss and therefore opposes it; and the third group 
that is uncertain about the effects of policy change on its welfare, and therefore is in a 
state of confusion as to whether or not to support the proposed policy change.
To be more specific, let us consider the case of an increase in the tariff rate on 
the imports of good 1. Clearly, the owners of the specific factor in sector 1 benefit from 
this change and therefore they form the first group - people who support the tariff 
increase. The owners of the specific factor in sector 2 lose from this change and 
therefore they form the second group - people who oppose the tariff change. The 
owners of the mobile factor, labour, may lose or gain from this change depending on 
their consumption pattern (tastes) known only to them, and the sizes of their income 
and commodity price change. If the workers are well informed, then they would, of
14 This assumption on the motivation of the government follows the tradition of the public choice 
literature. “The central feature of that tradition is”, as Brennan (1992: 13) describes, “the searching out of 
invisible hand institutions, arrangements that achieve benign results without undue reliance on 
benevolent motivations. To test out whether such institutions are present or not, one must assume non- 
benevolent motivations: one does not test whether a plate is oven-proof by placing it in the cupboard.”
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course, either individually support or oppose the change, but there are information costs 
in being well informed.
We further assume that ownership of the specific factors is concentrated among 
a few and their gains or losses are relatively large compared with the information cost. 
Therefore they are fully aware of the likely consequences to them of the tariff changes. 
The owners of the mobile factor, workers in particular, are numerous. For anyone in 
this group the cost of information exceeds the benefit. Therefore, they remain rationally 
ignorant (Downs, 1957; Magee, Brock and Young, 1989). However, they make use of 
the ‘free’ information - voters' education - provided by the two ‘interest groups’ or the 
players. Each player can obtain more workers' support for the government by spending 
more resources on ‘voters' education’. Hence the two interests will be contending in the 
political market in mobilizing workers' support to the government that will implement 
policies beneficial to them.
As Peltzman (1976: 213) has aptly summarized -
It is not enough for the successful group to recognize its interests; it must 
organize to translate this interest into support for the politician who will 
implement it. This means not only mobilizing its own vote, but contributing 
resources to the support of the appropriate political party or policy: to finance 
campaigns, to persuade the voters to support or at least not oppose the policy 
or candidate, perhaps occasionally to bribe those in office.
With this stylization of the political process, the problem of the two players and 
the government being resolved in the political market can be described as follows.
Given the responsiveness of the government's pricing policy to increased 
mobilization of political support, each player / chooses its lobbying expenditure, 7]-, to
maximize
(5A.1) n t = /?t(/>(7j))-7fc; 1 = 1,2
where, the variables Ü; and /?, , as defined in the text, are the payoff and real rental 
income of player i respectively, measured in units of own output, and Pi is the 
normalized price of good i. Note that once Px is determined, P2 will be determined since 
it is the inverse of Px. Therefore, we will focus on the government's choice of Px only 
and express the functions accordingly.
The government, on the other hand, is fully aware of the self-interested 
behaviour of the players. It understands that each player will spend resources in 
mobilizing political support for it only if the price policy it supplies is going to yield 
them a higher payoff than otherwise. The government also understands that if a policy 
change hurts a player, then the player will divert his or her lobbying effort to oppose the
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policy changes and possibly finance the political campaign of the opposition. Therefore, 
the government, taking into account the reactions of the players, chooses Px to 
maximize the Peltzman-type political support function
(5A.2) S = S( n i(i’ (ti)),n2(/JI(rj)))
where, the support function S is strictly increasing and concave in its arguments.15
The act of maximizing support by the government and the act of maximizing 
payoffs by the private players interlock the three in a political process in which each of 
the private players holds an opportunity to trade fruitfully with the government by 
mobilizing political support for a favourable price (or trade) policy and vice versa. For 
example, player 1 can mobilize increased support for the government by spending more 
on ‘voters' education’, if the government is prepared to provide enough protection to it 
by raising the tariff rate (or lowering the export subsidy). Similarly, player 2 can also 
mobilize additional political support for the government if it returns with lower 
protection to the import competing sector or with increased export subsidy. The 
government can provide favourable tariff protection to any of the players if he or she is 
prepared to spend resources sufficient to mobilize more political support than it would 
lose by implementing the policy.
The problems of the government and of the two players can be viewed as a 
Stackelberg game in which the government is the leader, and the two private players are 
Nash followers. The government, assumed to conjecture the reactions of the Nash 
players correctly, and takes into account all the reactions of the private players (subject 
to the general equilibrium of the economy) while maximizing its support function. It 
then obtains a solution function Pl(Tfx,ri2) to offer to the private players. This function 
will extract maximum support for it from the society whenever the players are in a Nash 
equilibrium. Our purpose in this Appendix is to uncover the properties of this pricing 
function.
Before we go onto analyse the nature of the pricing function in detail, let us 
clarify the scope of the appendix first. As a Stackelberg leader it may be possible for the 
government to choose a pricing function maximizing (5A.2) such that, given this 
pricing function, each player finds no-lobbying as his best strategy, then the price that 
maximizes (5A.2) with r\x = r\2 -  0 also solves (5A.1) and (5A.2) simultaneously.
15 This is an indirect political support function that is based on the assumption that, besides 
players’ own voting decisions, the political support/opposition of the ‘ignorant’ voter group depends on 
the lobbying efforts of the players which, in turn, are determined by the respective payoffs of the players 
(or the price function offered by the government) follows from the first-order condition (5A.3). See also 
Peltzman (1976).
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Alternately, a government may induce no lobbying on the part of private players if it
A A
offers a constant pricing function, say Pl(ril,ri2) = Px for all rj{ and r]2, where Px could 
be a price that emerges at some Nash equilibrium and also maximizes its political 
support. In the later case, no lobbying certainly increases the payoffs of both players 
from what they would obtain at the corresponding Nash equilibrium with positive 
lobbying. In both cases no player is dissatisfied, and no player will spend in lobbying 
against the government or financing the political campaign of the opposition. Such a 
pricing mechanism would also raise the level of political support for the government. If 
such possibilities exist, then such a price corresponds to the (self-enforcing) cooperative 
outcome, which we shall study in the next chapter. However, if any one of the players 
aspires for a higher or lower price than Px, that is he is not satisfied with the ‘fixed- 
price’ offered by the government, then he may still spend resources in opposing the 
government, and supporting the opposition. The player can behave strategically to 
‘educate’ the voters that will penalize the incumbent in the next election. To mitigate 
this opposition, the government has to offer a pricing function that induces a positive 
lobbying effort from the beneficiary. It is this situation that we analyze in this appendix.
The first order condition of the maximum to the Nash player i is:
(5A.3) f£L _ dRiiJx _ j _ o
dtli dPx <??7,
The condition (5A.3) implies that each player will spend on lobbying as long as a unit 
of output spent on lobbying yields one extra unit of output in rental income. This 
condition can be rewritten as
(5A.4) dRi ldPl = \l{d P Jd r\i)
The necessary condition for the maximization of the government's support 
function can be written as
(5A.5) cLS _ d S dRi d Tji o
This condition states that the government will choose the level of relative price so that 
at the margin the gain in support is exactly balanced by the loss in support that arises 
due to the pricing policy. It follows that (5A.5) is satisfied whenever (5A.4) is satisfied 
and that the ‘lobbying derivatives’ (Baldwin, 1987) exist such that
(5A.6) drit / dPx= \!  (dP{ / drji) for each i.
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The condition (5A.6) will follow automatically if the pricing function satisfies 
assumption (Al) of the text - that it is continuous in and rj2, and that d Px / d rfl * 0
for each i.
We know that dRx / dPx> 0 and dR2 / dPx < 0. Satisfaction of the first order 
condition of support maximization follows from the satisfaction of the first order 
condition (5A.3) if the government announces a pricing function satisfying (5A.6), and
r) P  r) P
(5A.7) - ^ > 0  a n d - ^ - < 0 .
5 tj, dr)2
at all nonzero values of and r\2. This means that the pricing function should be such 
that the relative price of commodity 1 increases with increased lobbying effort of player 
1 and decreases with increased lobbying effort of player 2.
Second Order Conditions:
For each i, differentiating the first order condition (5A.3) with respect to T]i we 
get
(5A.8) d2R; is.
dP?
dR, d 2P, 
+ dP,drif
We know that (<?P, / c?7),)2 > 0, dPl / dPt >0, and we get the following 
conditions:
(i) If d2Ri / dP2 < 0, then the sufficient (but not necessary) conditions for 
d2Y\ J  drj2 < 0 are that
d2P J d r f  < 0 and d 2 Px / d T[2 > 0.
(ii) If d 1Ri / dP2 > 0, then the conditions that d2 Px / d Tjf < 0 and <92 / d J]\ > 0
are necessary but not sufficient for d2Yli / dr\2 < 0. A sufficient condition would require 
sufficiently large magnitude of d2 P J d T]2.
This means that if the government supplies a pricing function such that the 
conditions
(5A.9) d2 P J d r f  < 0, and d2 P^ / d T}\ > 0
hold with sufficiently large magnitudes of the second order derivatives of the pricing 
function at the point where the first order conditions are satisfied, then the second order
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conditions of the maximization of the payoff functions of the two players are always 
satisfied.16 The pricing function, however, will met this requirement, by Lemma 5.2, if 
it is bounded, assumption (A4) in the text, and satisfies the condition (5A.6) and (5A.9). 
But the conditions (5A.6) and (5A.9) are the same as assumption (A3) of the text.
We now check whether the second order condition holds for the government's 
support maximization whenever it is satisfied for the private players. Differentiating 
equation (5A.5) with respect to P{ yields
(5A.10) 7  dR, ] d 2S d s-j- (  d*R,
\ d P t dp, J d p , d  n, ' dn, 1 dP,2 dP? )_
When the first order conditions are satisfied for the Nash players we have 
dRi / dPx = dr\i / dPx, therefore, it follows that
(5A.11) d2S
dP2
< 0 if and only if ^ ' dS d 1Ri d2r1 1
1 dP,2 dP2 [
<0
Since ——  > 0, a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for
" dS d2R, Y
a n , <  dP2 [
< o is that
(5A.12) f d %  _ d \  ' 
dP2 dP2
<0 for each player i.
Now it will be shown that the condition (5A.12) is satisfied whenever 
d1Y\i / dTj2 < 0, and the first order condition (5A.5) is satisfied. In other words, the
second order condition for the maximization of the government's support function is 
satisfied whenever the payoff functions of the two players are simultaneously 
maximized.
Clearly, for d2RX / dP2 < 0 the condition (5A. 12) is immediately satisfied, since 
by differentiating equation (5A.6) we can see that
(5A.13) d2T]i = f d Px\  d2Px
3P\ Dijj dnf
which is positive by condition (5A.9).
16 This condition is noted in Willisz and Wilson (1986: footnote 2) as a requirement for the 
existence of a Nash equilibrium.
119
In general, it follows from equations (5A.8) and (5A.4) that
(5A.14) d2R, (dP, V3 d 1Pl 
dP2<  l <977. J dri2 '
Thus, equations (5A.13) and (5 A. 14) together imply that
d% d \
dP2
for each player /, and therefore, the condition (5A.12) holds.
Hence, if the government supplies a pricing function Pl(ril,ri2) such that (i) for 
all feasible {TJv rf2) * (0,0), it is continuous, and differentiable - ie., (Al) is satisfied;
(ii) it is strictly increasing and concave in the lobbying expenditure, fy, of player 1 and 
decreasing and convex in the lobbying expenditure, ry2, of player 2 - ie., (A3) is 
satisfied; and (iii) it is bounded - ie., (A4) is satisfied, then the support function of the 
government is maximized whenever the payoffs of the Nash players are maximized 
simultaneously. If there are more than one pricing functions that meet the above 
conditions but yield different levels of total political support, then the government 
would offer that pricing function which yields the maximum political support for it.
It has been shown in the text that at least one noncooperative Nash equilibrium 
exists in the lobbying game between the private players if the pricing function offered 
by the government satisfies assumptions (A1)-(A4). Note that maximization of the 
government's support does not preclude the possibility of multiple equilibria in the 
associated lobbying game. The players may be using their resources in different 
combinations to mobilize support for the government at different Nash equilibria so that 
the total support induced by the pricing function is constant. Therefore, the relative 
price obtained at the Nash equilibrium of the lobbying game subject to a given pricing 
function on the one hand, and the relative price obtained from maximizing the political 
support function on the other hand are identical if and only if the Nash equilibrium in 
the associated lobbying game is unique.
Since, the assumption of self-finance (A5) is a special case of the bounded 
pricing assumption (A4), the government will be maximizing its support within the self­
financing constraint if it offers a pricing function that satisfies (A1)-(A3), and (A5). 
Therefore, a government offering a pricing function that satisfies assumptions (Al)- 
(A4) or (A1)-(A3) and (A5)will henceforth be called a ‘popular’ or ‘support 
maximizing’ government.
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CHAPTER 6
BARGAINING IN THE TARIFF GAME
Introduction
In the previous chapter, it was assumed that the government offers a pricing 
function that responds to the lobbying efforts of the private players. Each player, 
therefore, had an opportunity to obtain a favourable price by spending resources in 
lobbying the government. Players were assumed to maximize rental payoffs - their 
sectoral rental income net of lobbying expenditure. Nash behaviour was assumed on the 
part of each player while choosing their optimal lobbying expenditures. In other words, 
given the pricing function of the government, it was assumed that each player takes the 
lobbying expenditure of the other player as given, and chooses his own lobbying 
expenditure to maximize his rental payoff. It was shown that at least one 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium exists in a lobbying economy of this type.
However, the assumptions of a noncooperative game also imply that players do 
not communicate and cooperate with each other in adopting joint strategies even if it 
may yield strictly higher payoffs to both the players. Recognizing the restrictiveness of 
this approach we are changing the rules of the game in this chapter. Here, we will allow 
players to communicate, negotiate and enter into a binding agreement if it is 
individually rational to do so.
Each player is now free to choose between noncooperation and cooperation with 
the opponent. This possibility has expanded the strategy set of each player. Not 
spending on lobbying the government and demanding a particular tariff rate with the 
opponent are new additions to the noncooperative strategy sets. Now, a player may 
choose to lobby the government, may unilaterally decide not to lobby the government, 
or may demand a binding agreement from the opponent on a particular tariff rate for not 
spending on lobbying the government for tariff changes.
These changes in the rules of the game transform the tariff game into a 
bargaining problem - where players bargain over the tariff rate (or domestic relative 
price). Player 1, the import competing sector, prefers a higher tariff rate and player 2, 
the exporting sector, prefers a lower tariff rate (prefers an export subsidy!). The main 
purpose of this chapter is to obtain the tariff rate that solves the bargaining problem in 
the tariff game.
We attain the objective in a sequence of steps. Nash's original solution to 
bargaining problems in which players hold unequal bargaining powers yields payoff
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distributions that depend on the way players are ordered in the vector space. We show 
this well-known result, having specified the process of tariff determination as a standard 
fixed-threat Nash bargaining problem. We then provide a more precise definition of the 
bargaining power of a player, and argue that the distribution of bargaining power has to 
be included in the mathematical description of the game. We call it a generalized 
bargaining game, which is defined by the bargaining set, the disagreement payoffs, and 
the distribution of the bargaining powers of the players. We then show that the so-called 
asymmetric Nash solution to a bargaining problem is in fact symmetric. We provide this 
result as a corollary to Roth's theorem that characterizes the Nash solution to an 
arbitrary bargaining game with asymmetric bargaining powers. Since the solution is 
symmetric, we have called it the generalized Nash solution rather than calling the 
‘asymmetric Nash solution’.
We ask, then, why players reach an agreement in a bargaining game. Binmore, 
Rubinstein, and Wolinsky (1986) have argued that players reach agreement because (a) 
they have a high time-preference rate (so that they value current above future gain), this 
induces an agreement and/or (b) they fear a third party may intervene; the opportunity 
of gain would then be entirely lost and a disagreement would result This increases their 
temptation to conclude the deal. They have further shown that the difference in players' 
fear of disagreement, and the difference in players' time-preference rates can be 
captured by the difference in the player's bargaining powers.
Aumann and Kurz (1977a) have employed the concept of ‘fear of ruin’ resulting 
from possible disagreement. At the Nash equilibrium, they show, players hold identical 
fear of ruin.
We have argued that Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky's ‘fear of 
disagreement’ and that addressed by Aumann and Kurz are different, and that each one 
can provide a separate motivation for the players to reach agreement. We have further 
argued that Aumann and Kurz's concept of ‘fear of ruin’ can not be captured by 
differences in players' bargaining powers, because it is not a constant number. It 
changes during the bargaining process as the players attain different levels of gains. 
Since, Aumann, and Kurz's concept of ‘fear of ruin’ was defined for bargaining games 
with equal bargaining powers, we have attempted to generalize this concept for an 
arbitrary distribution of the bargaining power among the players so that all sources of 
the ‘fear of ruin’ could be addressed simultaneously.
We have proved that the equality of the generalized fear of ruin constitutes a 
separate characterization of the generalized Nash solution to an arbitrary Nash 
bargaining problem, including the tariff game. This result is new, and more importantly, 
it holds the key to the results of our subsequent chapters. We have also shown that if the
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fear functions are well-behaved, then the generalized Nash solution to the tariff game is 
stable.
Our result is different from that obtained by Svejnar (1986), who showed that 
the generalized Nash solution also implies equality of generalized fear of ruin, and that 
equality of generalized fear of ruin together with usual axioms implies the generalized 
Nash solution. We have shown that equality of generalized fear of ruin, when each 
player holds a strictly positive fear of ruin, yields the generalized Nash solution without 
any reference to the other axioms. The advantage of this result is that we can now 
obtain the generalized Nash bargaining solution in a different way - using players' fear 
of ruin and the distribution of bargaining power. This result seems to be useful in 
simple and intuitive demonstration of the bargaining process and the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution.
Finally, with a summary of the bargaining problem, we have stated the 
necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to the bargaining problem of 
the tariff game. We have also attempted to identify the fear of ruin with the concept of 
endogenous bargaining power of the players.
This chapter is organised into five sections. The first section describes the 
setting of the game in the form of a standard bargaining problem. The second section 
describes the Nash solution to the bargaining problem. It is argued that the generalized 
Nash solution to a bargaining problem that allows unequal bargaining power is not 
asymmetric as is commonly believed. In the third section, the bargaining process is 
described in terms the concept of fear of ruin, where we argue that the fear of 
disagreement referred to by Aumann and Kurz and the fear of disagreement referred by 
Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky are different, and a generalization of the concept of 
fear of ruin has been proposed. In the fourth section, the main result that the equality of 
generalized fear of ruin constitutes a separate characterization of the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution, is proved. Finally, in the fifth section the basic contention of the 
chapter has been summarized.
The contribution this chapter makes to the thesis is that it examines the tariff 
game in a bargain-theoretic framework thoroughly. It obtains the necessary and 
sufficient condition that characterizes the generalized Nash solution to the bargaining 
problem in the tariff game. The next chapter will take up this condition and embed it 
into the policy-exogenous general equilibrium model (described in chapter 3) to obtain 
a tariff-endogenous general equilibrium model of the economy.
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6.1 Rules of the Game and the Bargaining Problem
We continue to assume that the government is a support maximizer.1 So, if the 
two players - owners of the specific factors in the two sectors - agree on some issue, the 
best policy for the government is to implement the agreement. This will guarantee the 
maximum support to the government. If they disagree, then the game will be played as 
described in the previous chapter: the government will choose a policy that maximizes 
its political support subject to the reaction functions of the two coalitions (players). The 
government behaves as a Stackelberg leader vis-a-vis the private players - it announces 
its policy function. The two players behave as Nash players against each other taking 
the government's policy function as given.
Noncooperative equilibrium
disagreement
payoffs
Payoffs in cooperation 
Figure 6.1
Thus, in the tariff game, the new rules of the game would mean the following to 
the players: If the two players agree on a particular tariff rate, then the government will 
announce and implement that rate. Otherwise, (if they fail to agree on any rate) the 
government's pricing function will be in effect and the two players will play a non 
cooperative game. The tariff rate that arises at the Nash equilibrium of the game will be 
implemented. Therefore, if the two parties cooperate with each other - that is, they 
agree on a tariff rate, and agree not to lobby the government, then they receive the 
resulting rental income as their payoffs. If they cannot cooperate, then they receive the
1 For analytical similarity between the choices of a support maximizing government and a welfare 
maximizing government see Baldwin (1987).
resulting rents less the lobbying expenditures as their payoffs. This situation is 
illustrated in Figure 6.1.
For simplicity, in figure 6.1, identical Cobb-Douglas production technologies 
are assumed. The curve CD represents the rent transformation frontier (RTF) for given 
endowment of factors, and international prices (see chapter 4). Suppose that the parties 
could not agree on any tariff rate, and chose to play a noncooperative game. Suppose 
further that a unique noncooperative Nash equilibrium is obtained with lobbying 
expenditures and f}2 yielding a domestic price ratio ^ . Then the sectoral payoffs, 
which are rental incomes net of lobbying expenditures, are given by 1% and f l2 for 
sector 1 and sector 2 respectively.
Recall that sectoral rental incomes are measured in units of own output Let the 
point E (in figure 6.1) denote the payoff combination and the point R denote the 
combination of sectoral rental incomes at the noncooperative Nash equilibrium. Then E 
defines the disagreement payoffs - the payoff to each player if they can not reach an 
agreement.
However, if the two players cooperate, then they need not spend resources in 
competitive lobbying, and they can stay on the rent transformation frontier CD. For 
example, if the players had accepted the price Px and agreed not to participate in 
competitive lobbying, both would have received payoffs corresponding to the point R, 
which represents a combination of higher payoffs than that corresponding to the point 
E.
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Thus, given that E would be the outcome of disagreement, the shaded area EFG 
represents the set of payoff combinations that the two players can improve upon by 
choosing cooperation rather than noncooperation. The arc FG represents the set of 
feasible and Pareto efficient payoffs. Any point on it is strictly better than point E, and 
any movement along it hurts one player or the other.
As indicated in the previous chapter, a noncooperative Nash equilibrium may 
not be unique. In the case where there are multiple equilibria it is not possible to 
identify the disagreement payoffs of the game with a particular noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium of the game. Since all the Nash equilibria are characterized by non-zero 
lobbying by all players (Lemma 5.4), the resulting equilibrium payoffs in each of the 
noncooperative Nash equilibria are not on the curve CD, but lie inside it. Therefore, the 
above argument is equally applicable irrespective of which of the noncooperative Nash 
equilibria is attained.
In general, all payoff combinations represented by points in the area OCD can 
be regarded as the set of feasible outcomes and that the set of noncooperative Nash
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equilibria, which is a subset of feasible outcomes, can serve as potential disagreement 
payoffs. The sets of points in the areas like EFG are always non-empty and contain 
points that, in terms of payoffs, strictly dominate points like E. Therefore, there is 
always an incentive to the players to get involved in a bargaining process and search for 
a mutually agreeable tariff rate.
There are three reasons to believe that all agreements reached in a tariff game 
will be enforceable. First, playing a noncooperative Nash equilibrium strategy is always 
a credible threat that can be issued by any player against the other player, and that 
works as a deterrent against possible deviant behaviour of either player. Therefore, 
when the players agree not to spend on lobbying the government and agree on a tariff 
rate, they will most likely find it not rational to deviate from it. Second, as Subik (1982) 
argued, constitutional arrangements and the presence of government as the enforcing 
agency makes players almost incapable of deviating from the agreement. Moreover, if 
the government is a support maximizer, as we have assumed, then it will have an 
incentive to implement such cooperative agreements. Third, the tariff game is a periodic 
game. It is played repeatedly. Cooperative outcomes of repeated games are, in general, 
self-enforcing (Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Friedman, 1986).
Definition 6.1 (Bargaining Set). For given FI* = (Ilf ,11*) let
9? = {(n1,n2)|nI < kx
Then, 9t is a collection of all payoff combinations that are individually rational, and 
over which the players may bargain. 9i is defined as the bargaining set.
Note that the Pareto efficient boundary of the bargaining set is the segment of 
the rent transformation frontier ( see equation 4.6') that has individually rational points. 
It has already been shown that if the elasticities of factor substitution in both the sectors 
are at least unity then the boundary of the bargaining set is concave to the origin 
(Proposition 4.2, chapter 4). Therefore, the points in OCD form a convex set. Since the 
maximum output that a sector can produce in the event of specialization is finite 
(because of finite endowment of mobile factors) and concave production function), and 
since also the rental income is always less than the level of output, the set 9^  is also 
bounded. The set includes its boundary points, hence it is closed. The set 9f is also a 
subset of a 2-dimensional Euclidean space, therefore it is compact and convex.
If the elasticities of factor substitution are sufficiently low to undermine the 
convexity of the bargaining set defined over certain outcomes, then as in the standard
case (for example Nash, 1950) we can invoke the expected payoff approach that will 
guarantee the convexity of the corresponding bargaining set. Any concave function 
defined over 9$ will have its maximum in it.
If the disagreement payoff n* is assumed to be predetermined and fixed, then 
the underlying bargaining problem of the tariff game satisfies the conditions of the 
existence theorem proved by Nash (1953). In the case that the disagreement payoff is 
not known a priori, then the bargaining problem in a tariff game satisfies the conditions 
of the existence theorem proved in Harsanyi (1963).
Thus, whether the disagreement payoffs are assumed to be predetermined or not 
(variable), the tariff game in cooperative form can be viewed2 as a standard bargaining 
problem. However, in this chapter we will assume that the disagreement payoff is 
predetermined3 and therefore, the bargaining problem is defined by the pair(SK,n‘i).
Let B be the class of such 2-person bargaining games for which the underlying 
noncooperative game is given by T (see Chapter 5).
6.2 Nash Solution to the Bargaining Problem in a Tariff Game
Several solution concepts have been proposed in the literature. The Nash 
solution is one of them. A short review of these solution concepts can be found in Datt 
(1989). He has also convincingly argued that Nash solution has a degree of generality 
not shared by other solution concepts. Several other studies that attempted to solve 
standard bargaining problems by introducing various frictions into it have concluded 
that Nash solution is robust (see, Binmore, Rubinstein and Wolinsky, 1986; van 
Damme, 1986; Chun, 1988b; Chun and Thomson, 1990; Carlson, 1991).
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2 It is very important to note that this study assumes that players are interested in maximization of 
the sectoral rents. How they use the rental income - whether they spend all in the consumption of the two 
goods, or save and invest - is not analysed. It is, in turn, assumed that the owners of the specific factors 
would behave nonstrategically as consumers.
This stylization implies that the two players bargain in terms of rental payoffs, or in terms of 
relative price or in terms of tariff rate but not in terms of utilities as the standard Nash bargaining process 
is formulated. In this sense the bargaining game that is studied here is an adapted version of the standard 
Nash bargaining game. Binmore (1987c) has studied such an adapted game for an exchange economy, 
and he preferred to call it a bartering game. In his bartering game players communicate not in terms of 
utilities but in terms of real quantities of commodities that are to be traded. We follow Binmore in this 
respect because it is more sensible to assume that players have perfect information on each other's rental 
prospects at different prices than to assume that they know each other’s rental prospects and the utilities 
of the rental incomes at various prices as well. Furthermore, the assumption that production sectors strive 
for maximization of profit is fairly standard, and is quite common in studies of labour market that use 
bargain theoretic approach (for example, Datt, 1989).
3 The problem of identifying the disagreement payoffs will be dealt in the next chapter.
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Nash (1950, 1953), who studied 2-person bargaining games, defined a solution 
of a bargaining game in B as a function /i:B —» R2 such that for any (9S,IT*) e B we 
have ß(yi,Tld) e SR. In other words, a solution of the game is a rule for assigning a 
feasible payoff to each game. Roth (1979) has argued that this rule can also be 
interpreted as an arbitration procedure.
Nash (1953), in his seminal paper, used both strategic and axiomatic approaches 
to analyse the bargaining problem. In the strategic approach, he constructed a 
negotiation model, so-called "demand game", in which each player (in a 2-person 
game) demands a particular utility payoff. If the demands of both the players are jointly 
compatible, then each one gets what is demanded; otherwise each receives the 
predetermined disagreement payoff.4 Nash has shown that rational bargainers will 
agree on the payoff division that maximizes the Nash product over the feasible set.
In the axiomatic approach, Nash (1953) listed a set of eight general properties 
that any reasonable solution to the bargaining problem should possess. A deduction of 
logical solutions that satisfy the "desirable" properties led Nash to the same solution 
that he obtained from the negotiation model - that the solution should maximize the 
Nash product! Nash, therefore, wrote,
It is rather significant that this quite different approach yields the same 
solution. This indicates that the solution is appropriate for a wider variety of 
situations than those which satisfy the assumptions we made in the approach 
via the model (p. 136).
Subsequent authors have improved upon Nash's work and have neatly 
summarized his works. For example, Binmore (1987a) has listed "somewhat freely 
adapted versions of Nash's axioms" as follows:
Axiom 1 (feasibility and strong individual rationality).
nd <ii(%nd)eX.
That is, a solution to the bargaining problem should be feasible, and that it must be 
strongly individually rational. The second characteristic requires that each player should 
receive more in bargaining "equilibrium" than that can be obtained in disagreement.
4 In fact, Harsanyi (1963) has shown quite generally that there exists an optimal threat strategy 
combination such that if the cooperation breaks down each of the player will find it best to play against 
the other player(s)
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Axiom 2 (invariance).
For any increasing affine5 transformation a:R2 —> R2y
l i { a % a U d) = IT*).
In other words, if the units of measurement and the origins of payoffs of the players 
were changed6 by any affine transformation, then the outcome of the new bargaining 
game will be equal to the conformable transformation of the original bargaining 
solution. This requires that the "real" solution should not depend on the chosen units of 
measurement It should always be recoverable by inverse transformation on the 
solution. This axiom is also called Independence of Equivalent Utility (Payoffs) 
Representation.
Axiom 3 (independence of irrelevant alternatives).
//(SK,^) M£MT*) = fi(%Yld).
This axiom states that if p  is a subset of the original bargaining set and contains the 
original solution point fj.(9 ,^11*), then fj.(%Hd) should also be the solution to the 
bargaining game {pyY\d). The intuition is that since the set p  was available when the 
bargaining set was and the players nevertheless chose should mean that
they will choose /J.(^i,Yld) when it is available in the game ( p yYld). This is a stipulation 
that the players be consistent.
Axiom 4 (efficiency).
M > n (% Yld)= > M *(R.
In other words, the axiom of efficiency requires that the solution picked by the ß  rule 
should not be dominated by any other payoff combinations in the bargaining set. This 
axiom requires that the solution be Pareto optimal. There should be no possibility of 
increasing the payoff of one player without reducing the payoff of the other player.
5 Ct is called an increasing affine transformation if GC(y) = ay+ b with a > 0, and any real 
number b .
6 Note that the numerical value of rental income can be changed by changing the unit of output 
measurement, and a change in the origin can be brought by effecting a lump sum income transfer to and 
from a sector. We know that a lump sum tax, for example, does not affect the output decision of a 
production sector, whereas it affects the break even point, where a sector obtains a zero rental income. It 
is implicitly assumed that the lump sum taxes are never greater than the disagreement payoffs. This 
assumption is necessary to ensure that specialization will not be induced by the imposition of lump sum 
taxes or by the presence of some fixed costs. This requirement slightly restricts the nature of affine 
transformation that can be applied when we are dealing with rental income rather than "utilities". So long 
as the proofs of the theorems are concerned it is of no consequence.
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Axiom 5 (symmetry).
If TiCnpIlj) - » (FI2,r ij), then 
ß ( r % r U d)= rß(%Yld).
This axiom means that whoever is called the first player is immaterial. Each player will 
get the same payoff whether she is called player 1 or player 2 - measured along the x- 
axis or measured along the y-axis. This axiom has strong implications and needs some 
scrutiny.
Definition 6.2 A bargaining set 91 is called symmetric if
(n lfn 2)e9i<=> ( n 2>n ,) e  9t.
A bargaining game (91,11*) is called a symmetric game if 91 is symmetric and
n f  = n f .
If (9^,ü*) is a symmetric game, then axiom 5 requires that 
/it (SR,IT*) = ß 2(%I ld). The argument is as follows: Since the game is symmetric, 
nothing will be changed by a permutation of the players. In particular,
( r %  r l l d) = (9i,rr*), therefore, ß ( r %  r l l d) = ß ( % U d). That is,
/i-Cr^Tn*) = /X;(9t,n*). But ß l( r % r U d) = r/j.^%n*) = /z2(9R,n*) imply that 
/ q ^ n * )  = /i2(SR,n*). Both players will gain equally over the disagreement payoffs. 
Therefore, in a symmetric game with n* = 0 if the bargaining solution rule \1 satisfies 
the axiom of symmetry then the solution always lies on the ray of 45 degrees.
Theorem 6.1 (Nash's theorem). There is a unique solution possessing axioms 1-5. It is 
the function fj. defined by ^z(9^,n*) = n  such that n  > n* and
(f^ -  n f  x n 2 -  n f ) > ( n t -  n f  x n 2 -  n f ) for ail n  e 9iand n  * n .
Proof: See Nash (1950, 1953), and Roth (1979).
Roth (1979) also showed, however, that a solution that satisfies axioms 1-3 also 
satisfies the axiom 4. Therefore, in the presence of axioms 1-3 and axiom 5, axiom 4 - 
that the solution is required to be Pareto optimal - is redundant. The beauty of Nash's 
solution, nevertheless, lies in the result that the bargaining problem can be solved by 
maximizing the Nash product over the bargaining set.
Nash's bargaining solution is highly restrictive. It is based on the assumption 
that all "significant differences between the players are those which are included in the 
mathematical description of the game" (Nash, 1953: p. 137). This implies that when the
game is converted into the symmetric form, all differences between the players 
disappear. Nash (1953: p. 138) further argued that
With people who are sufficiently intelligent and rational there should not be 
any question of "bargaining ability", a term which suggests something like 
skill in duping the other fellow. The usual haggling process is based on 
imperfect information, the hagglers trying to propagandize each other into 
misconceptions of the utilities involved. Our assumption of complete 
information makes such an attempt meaningless.
Precisely because of this interpretation of the bargaining situation, a permutation 
of the players in a symmetric bargaining game brought no change in the bargaining set 
as well as the position of level curves of the Nash product. Therefore, identical payoffs 
were obtained by the players at the Nash equilibrium of a symmetric game. This 
argument clearly dismisses all possibilities but the bargaining set as that which 
differentiates the players. In view of recent developments in cooperative game theory, 
Nash's argument maintains, in particular, that the players have equal bargaining power^ 
or ability.
Recent studies on the bargaining problem have not only raised questions 
concerning the completeness of information about each other's utility functions, but also 
have shown that there may exist factors influencing the outcome of bargaining that are 
not accounted by the bargaining set and the disagreement point - the constituents of a 
mathematical description of a bargaining problem. In particular, they contend, players 
may well be endowed with uneven bargaining powers or weights.
For example, Kalai (1977a) has shown that if an n-person bargaining game is 
played by two coalitions of size p and q with p+q=n such that within each coalition 
players have identical utility functions, then a non-symmetric Nash solution may arise 
even if the n-person game yields a symmetric Nash solution. In this case the source of 
apparent ‘bargaining power’ of the coalition is its membership. This was not envisaged 
by Nash. Similarly, the other sources of asymmetry are7 8: players having different 
degrees of risk aversion (Roth, 1979), difference in the time preference rate 
(Rubinstein, 1982), different probability attached to the risk of breakdown of the 
negotiation (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986), bargaining skill (Ohyama, 
1989) and players possessing imperfect knowledge about each other (Harsanyi and 
Selton, 1972).
130
7 Nash, in his 1950 paper, expressed this assumption explicitly, which he rejected in the 1953 
paper.
8 Further references of the works that have independently obtained asymmetric Nash bargaining 
solutions can be found in Binmore (1987d: p.94).
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In the case that players have unequal ‘bargaining power’, for whatever the 
reason, Nash's solution payoff to each player depends on the order in which the players 
are represented. In other words, Nash's solution, as characterized by maximization of 
the ‘Nash product’, may not satisfy the axiom of symmetry.
To see this consider a symmetric bargaining game (9 ,^11^). Let the ordered pair 
( n i,I l2) such that rij * n 2 be the Nash product maximizing solution of the game. Let 
T be any player permutation. Since (SK, IT )^ is a symmetric game, we must have 
(91, IT*) = (f  91, r l l d). The Nash product maximizing solution vector of the permuted 
game (t^ t IT*) should also be equal to ( n ifII2). But this means that player 2 will 
receive nif and player 1 will receive n2. Hence, the solution depends on order in which 
the players are represented in the game.
Therefore, Nash's solution to the bargaining problem required an extension so 
that a solution can be obtained even in the presence of unequal bargaining powers.
In theories of bargaining the concept of ‘bargaining power’ is imprecisely 
defined (Binmore, Rubinstein, and Wolinsky, 1986: 186). To make the term more 
precise we state the following definition.
Consider a controlled bargaining situation (A,0), where 
A = j x  g R2 |x, > 0,£X,. < l | .  In this game the players have identical prospects in
agreement and in disagreement. If their payoffs at the solution of the game differ 
consistently every time they play the game (A,0), then the result can be attributed to 
some unaccounted rule of the game that creates a difference between otherwise 
identical players.
Definition 6.3 (Bargaining Power). Suppose that, in agreement, player 1
always gets 8 times what player 2 gets in the controlled bargaining game (A,0), where 
8 is some positive number. Then, the number 8 measures some kind of power of 
player 1 over player 2, and therefore, the number 8 is defined as the relative bargaining 
power of player 1.
This definition of bargaining power accords well with that of Chamberlain and 
Kuhn (1965: p.170), who defined ‘bargaining power as the ability to secure another's 
agreement on one's own terms.’
Let Z be a vector of all variables, such as the time preference rate of the players, 
the players' belief that the opportunity of gain will evaporate or be snatched by a third 
party, the difference in players' skill of negotiation or coalitional strength of members, 
the difference between the degrees of free rider problem within each coalition and other 
unaccounted factors in the political environment etc., that influence the bargaining
outcome but do not belong to the choice set of the bargainers. Then, we can infer, on 
the basis of previous studies referred above, that
8 = 8{Z).
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The functional dependence of relative bargaining power of player 1 on Z 
acknowledges that the relative bargaining power of a player is essentially a dynamic 
concept. It may change as the exogenous environment changes.
In a given environment Z, a value of 8 equal to unity implies that the two 
players are equally powerful, neither is favoured against the other, and 8 > 1 implies 
that player 1 possesses more bargaining power than player 2, and vice versa.
We normalize the measure of bargaining power by defining
© 1
8
1 + 8
, and 0 2 1
1 + 8 '
Then, the parameter 0,(Z) satisfies 0 < 0,(Z) < 1, and ^ .0 -(Z )  = 1; and therefore, it 
can be called the normalized bargaining power of player i.
With this definition of bargaining power, we can proceed on to the extension of 
Nash's bargaining solution in the presence of unequal bargaining power of the players. 
The following important theorem in this direction was proved by Roth (1979).9
Theorem 6.2 (Roth, 1979: Theorem 3). For each strictly positive vector 0 ,  such that 
^ . 0 ,  = 1, there is a unique solution /j. satisfying the axioms of feasibility, invariance
and independence, such that /i(A,0) = 0  where A = jx  e R2 Xi > 0 ,^ X , < l j. For any
bargaining game (91,IT*), n{%Yld) = II e K^, such that T1 > fl^ and
(n, - nfr(n2 - nj) ! > (n, - nf f  (n2 - n'J
for all n  e SK such that fl > IT* and IT * IT*.
Proof: See Roth (1979: 16-17), Binmore (1987a: 34-37), and Appendix-6B.
The first part of the theorem states that if the players possess different weights 
given by the vector 0 ,  and bargain over a ‘pie’ of size unity, represented by the 
symmetric bargaining set A with disagreement payoff equal to zero, then player f s 
share in the unit pie is just 0 ,. This explains why 0- has been defined as the bargaining
9 In a 2-person case the theorem was first proved by Kalai (1977a).
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power of player i (see also Binmore, 1987a and 1987b). If all players have equal 
bargaining power, then the theorem implies that each of the players will get an equal 
share of the pie. In particular, if the set A is defined for a ‘pie’ of size n, that is
A = j x  g R2 Xi > 0 ,£ X 4. < , and 0,'s are suitably normalized so that 0 . = n, then
each player will get one "pie". This is the standard Nash bargaining solution for a 
symmetric game, which is also called the symmetric Nash bargaining solution. Thus, 
the theorem 6.1 (Nash's theorem) is a special case of Theorem 6.2 in which the players 
hold equal bargaining power.10
The second part of the theorem shows that in any bargaining game with 
predetermined disagreement payoffs, and a compact and convex bargaining set the 
solution to the bargaining problem that satisfies axiom 1-3 is the one that maximizes the 
asymmetric Nash product over the bargaining set. The strict inequality implies that the 
solution is unique. That is, the payoff distribution that maximizes the asymmetric Nash 
product and the solution that satisfies the "desirable" properties are one and the same. 
One implies the other.
A note of clarification is warranted here. It may appear that the solution to the 
bargaining game (SR, n*) that satisfies axioms 1-3 does not necessarily satisfy axiom 5 - 
the axiom of symmetry. Binmore (1987a), for example, has explicitly stated that the 
asymmetric Nash solution satisfies axiom 5 if and only if the players have equal 
bargaining powers. But this would mean that the solution depends on the way players 
are represented if players do not have equal bargaining powers. If a player's payoffs are 
now measured along the x-axis, then she will receive a different payoff at the solution 
of the game than she would obtain had her payoffs were measured along the y-axis.
This situation, certainly, is not satisfying.
However, once we isolate the axiom of symmetry from the hangover of identical 
bargaining power of the players and treat them independently it can be easily seen that 
the "asymmetric" Nash solution is in fact symmetric. We will show this result as a 
Corollary to Roth's Theorem. First, to highlight the role of bargaining power in the 
mathematical description of a bargaining game we state the following definition:
Definition 6.4 (Generalized Bargaining game). A triplet (9t,IT*,0) is defined as
a generalized bargaining game, where 5R is a compact and convex bargaining set,
10 Nash’s solution to any arbitrary bargaining problem can be obtained easily using this property of 
the underlying symmetric bargaining problem.
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n* G SR is a predetermined disagreement payoff vector, and 0  is, as defined above, a 
given vector of (normalized) bargaining power of the players.
Definition 6.4 recognizes the independent status of the information regarding 
the bargaining power distribution of the players. Therefore, it is included in the 
mathematical description of the game. Curiously enough, previous writers, who 
recognized the role of the distribution of bargaining power in determining the solution 
of a bargaining game, did not include it in the description of the game. For example, in 
order to specify a solution to any bargaining game (SR, 11**), Roth's theorem (theorem 
6.2) requires a priori information on 0 .  This is essentially equivalent to say that the 
game is defined by a triplet (SR,IT*,0). Clearly, Roth’s theorem holds for the bargaining 
problem (SR,IT*,0) as well as it holds for a bargaining problem (91,IT*) with given 0 .
With this definition of a generalized bargaining game, all of the axioms listed 
above can be restated11 accordingly by simply changing the description of the 
bargaining problem. From now on the description (SR,IT*) will be replaced by 
(SR, IT*,©) to mean a bargaining problem with bargaining set SR, a predetermined 
disagreement point TI4* e SR and an exogenously given allocation of bargaining power 
0 .
Corollary 6.1 For any bargaining game (SR,!"!4*,©), the solution /i(SR,IT*,0) = n  e SR 
such that
(n, - n? f  (n2 - n')0! > (n, - nf f  (n2 - n' f
for all FI g SR, n > IT* and n * Y ld satisfies axiom 5, and therefore is symmetric.
Proof: Let //(ni,n2) = 0 be the Pareto efficient boundary of the bargaining set
SR. Let FI maximize (rij -n j* )01(ri2 - I I* )02 subject to //( I lp llj)  = 0. To visualize
the effect of permutation, assume initially that player l's payoffs are measured along the 
y-axis and player 2's payoffs are measured along the x-axis. Let (112,11!) represent the 
initial solution as shown in the panel (a) of the following figure 6.2.
Axiom 2 requires a different treatment. It should be read as follows: 
For any increasing affine transformation ( X . R 2 —> R 2,
//(aSR,aIT*,0) =  a / j . (  SR,IT*,©).
This is because bargaining power distribution is independent of unit of measurement of rental income. It 
has been normalized separately.
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l's payoffs
2's payoffs
2's payoffs
l's payoffs
Symmetry of Nash solution 
Figure 6.2
Now let us permute the players and measure player l's payoffs along the x-axis 
and player 2's payoffs along the y-axis. The parameters Oj and 0 2 continue to measure 
the bargaining powers of players 1 and 2 respectively (they have been permuted too). 
Compared to panel (a) the appearance of the bargaining set, and the curvature of the 
level curve of the asymmetric Nash product have changed in panel (b). However, the 
problem is still to maximize (FIj - nj*)0'( l l2 -  n 2)0J subject to //(ripF ^) = 0. 
Therefore, the solution vector is (ni,FI2) which is the permutation of the initial solution 
vector (n ^ n j) .
Thus, the unique solution vector that maximizes the "asymmetric" Nash product 
over the bargaining set is simply permuted by a permutation of the players. The payoff 
received by each of the players is unaffected by the permutation. Q. E. D.
Now, in the light of Definition 6.4, we restate Definition 6.2 as follows:
Definition 6.2' A bargaining set 91 is called symmetric if
(n1,n 2) (ri2, rij) e 9C
A generalized bargaining game (^,11^,0) is a symmetric game if and only if SK is 
symmetric, Ilf = f l2 and that 0 t = 0 2.
It is obvious that if a generalized bargaining game is symmetric, then the players 
will receive equal payoffs at the solution of the game. The argument is as follows: The 
game is symmetric implies that for any permutation r  on players we have
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( % n ', 0 )  = ( r % r U d,rQ).  Therefore, p ( % U d ,S) = p ( r % r U d ,rQ).  Since, the 
solution function p  is symmetric, we must have p ( r %  rUd, T0) = TJX (SR, IT*, 0 ). That 
is, (px,p2)= r(pl,p2) = (p2,pl). Therefore, we have/ij = p 2.
We know from theorem 6.2 that a solution to the bargaining problem satisfies 
the axioms 1-3 if and only if it maximizes the "asymmetric" Nash product. The 
Corollary 6.1 shows that the solution also satisfies the axiom of symmetry. This result 
holds as long as the bargaining powers are assigned to the players, not to the axes. Since 
Roth has shown that satisfaction of axiom 1-3 implies satisfaction of the axiom of 
efficiency, it follows that the solution to any arbitrary bargaining game, for given 
distribution of bargaining powers, satisfies all the five axioms as satisfied by the 
original Nash's solution if and only if it maximizes the corresponding asymmetric Nash 
product over the bargaining set. The only difference is that the original Nash solution 
applies in the case when all players have equal bargaining power. In the presence of 
uneven bargaining power it loses its symmetric property. The solution that follows from 
theorem 6.2, however, applies to any arbitrary distribution of bargaining power 
provided that bargaining power of each player is strictly positive.12
For this reason, in what follows the so-called ‘asymmetric’ Nash solution to any 
bargaining game with arbitrary distribution of bargaining power will be called the 
generalized Nash solution. The product (H  -  n f  'p  ( n 2 -  n 2)ÖJ will be called the 
generalized Nash product.
63 The Bargaining Process
Since the bargaining problem in the tariff game is essentially the same as any 
abstract bargaining game studied by game theorists, we can obtain insights into the 
underlying bargaining process from their studies as well. The explanation of the 
bargaining process most frequently referred to is that of Zuthen (1930). He assumed 
that in a bargaining process players offer proposals to each other, and postulated that 
each party will make concessions to his opponent once he finds that his opponent's 
determination is firmer than his own. Harsanyi (1956) has shown that this process of 
negotiation is mathematically equivalent to that of Nash's solution.13
In recent times, game theorists have started to study the bargaining process by 
specifying every move of the players (for example, Rubinstein, 1982). This is often 
called the sequential strategic approach. Rubinstein showed the existence of a unique
12
13
Otherwise the solution will not be unique. See Binmore (1987b). 
Further details can be found in Harsanyi (1956), Roth (1979: 28-31).
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perfect Nash equilibrium in any bargaining game, if players have sufficiently high time- 
preference rates and/or every player has to bear a fixed cost of bargaining for each 
period.
Binmore, Rubinstein and, Wolinsky (1986) not only studied bargaining 
problems using the sequential strategic approach but also studied the relationship 
between the solutions obtained from this approach and that of the axiomatic approach 
or static representation of a bargaining problem. Moreover, they examined the two 
motives behind the bargaining process that may induce the players to agree rather than 
to insist indefinitely on incompatible demands.
One of the motives studied by Binmore, Rubinstein and, Wolinsky (hereafter 
BRW) was the player's "impatience to enjoy the bruits of an agreement", which is 
concerned with the relative time preference of the players, and the other motive was the 
player's relative fear of disagreement.
If the players do not have a high enough time-preference rate, then they may 
keep on insisting on incompatible demands and no agreements may be reached. Making 
use of Rubinstein's seminal study (Rubinstein, 1982) Binmore (1987b) showed that the 
relative difference in the time preference rate of the players can be a source of unequal 
bargaining power of the players in the static representation of the game. Player with 
relatively higher time preference rate will have lower bargaining power. This was also 
obtained by BRW.
In their comprehensive study of the strategic models of bargaining BRW also 
studied a game in which players faced an exogenous risk of breakdown of negotiations. 
They also found the existence of a unique perfect equilibrium in this game. They 
showed that if the players differ in their beliefs concerning the likelihood of a 
breakdown of the negotiation, then the unique perfect equilibrium of the game 
approaches to the ‘asymmetric’ Nash bargaining solution to the static version of the 
game. The correspondence is that if a player’s estimate of the probability of breakdown 
is higher relative to his opponent, his bargaining power will be correspondingly 
lowered.
These results have two important implications. First, if players differ in their 
time-preference rate and/or in the probability of exogenous breakdown of negotiation, 
then the solution to the bargaining problem is given by the generalized Nash bargaining 
solution, whereas if the players do not differ in their beliefs (hold equal probability of 
breakdown, and have identical time preference rates), then the original Nash solution is 
applicable. Second, if each player assigns a constant probability to the breakdown of the 
negotiation, then the fear of breakdown consistent with this probability is captured by
the asymmetric bargaining powers of the players. The player who is relatively more 
fearful will have lower bargaining power.
63.1 Fear of Ruin: Another Fear of Disagreement
To probe the fear of disagreement further, let us assume that the players hold 
identical beliefs about the external environments, have identical time preferences, etc., 
such that the players end with having equal bargaining powers in BRW’s sense. Now let 
us consider a situation as described in figure 6.3.
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Fear of ruin
Figure 6.3
Assume that RF is the rent transformation frontier (the Pareto efficient boundary 
of the bargaining set in an arbitrary bargaining game) and FI0 is a distribution of rents at 
any mutually agreeable14 relative price P°. Without loss of generality, let us take the 
case of player 1. Suppose further that for a small change of [SPX in Px the resulting 
distribution of rent in market equilibrium is given by the point FI0 + ATI. This means 
that player 1 gains by AF^ and player 2 looses by AFI2 (ATI2 < 0) if the price increase 
actually takes place. Therefore, player 1 may insist on such a price increase and player 
2 is likely to oppose (or reject) it. Would player 1 insist on a price increase?
If player 1 insists on an increase in Px, player 2 has two options: accept it, or quit 
the negotiation table and play a noncooperative game. Under this circumstance,
14 To each player we can always take an offer of the other party as mutually agreeable price. 
Because, it will be agreed upon if the player in question accepts it.
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insisting on such a price increase implies a gamble on the part of player 1. If it is 
accepted by player 2, player 1 will get a gain of AF^; if it is rejected by player 2, and 
player 2 quits the table (player 1 is ruined), player 1 will lose the entire gain of 
(111 -  n f ), and end up with the disagreement payoff of I l f .
Suppose that at FT, player 1 believes that if he insists on a small increase in 
price, then the probability that player 2 quits the negotiation and the disagreement 
results is (ft (FT). Let (ft (n j \  AF^) be such that player 1 is indifferent between insisting
on a price increase for a contingent gain of AF^ with probability (1 -  qx) and accepting 
FI" with certainty. That is, let
Then, qx provides the threshold probability at FI0 such that qx > qx implies that player 1 
will insist on a price increase; qx < (ft implies that player 1 will prefer the certain 
outcome n j’ and will not insist on a higher price for his commodities. This means that 
(ft measures the ‘boldness’ of player 1 in an environment defined by (FT, FT*).
Certainly, player 1, as can be seen from equation (6.3), will not risk the same 
amount of gain (FI, -  n f ) for smaller amounts of contingent gains with identical 
probability distribution. To induce him to risk (FI" -  n f ) for a gain that is smaller than 
Arij and remain indifferent ex ante, the probability of ‘ruin’ - that player 2 quits and 
disagreement results - has to be smaller than that corresponds to AFIj. Therefore, for 
given (FI" - H x), the threshold probability t ATlj) declines as Aft; gets smaller and
smaller, and needs to be standardized to make a measure of player l's boldness. 
Symmetric arguments can be made for player 2. Hence the following definition due to 
Aumann and Kurz (1977a).
Definition 6.5 (fear of ruin). Let
Then, q*(P°) is a measure of boldness of player i at FI0 or at price P° and, 
fi -  ((ft*(/T))-1 is defined as a measure of player V s fear of ruin.15
The measure of boldness thus defined is ‘the maximum probability of ruin per 
dollar of additional gains which player i is prepared to tolerate, for very small potential 
gains’ (Roth, 1979: p. 50).
(6.3) n f  = ( i - g i x n r  + A n 1) + ^ 1n f .
(6.4)
15 See also Roth (1979) for similar arguments and definitions in terms of utilities.
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Moreover, it can be inferred directly from equation (6.3) that for a given 
contingent gain and his disagreement payoff, the maximum probability of ruin that 
player i is ready to accept declines as his payoff, IT,, increases. Hence qL (FI®; ATI .) is a 
decreasing function of fli , and so, the fear of ruin is an increasing function of IT..
Solving equation (6.3) for <7-(fI- »ATI,) we get
(6.5) ^.(n^ATi,.) (n; + An,.)-n; (n; + An,)-n? ‘
Now, using equation (6.1) in equation (6.5) and substituting the resulting 
expression for ^1(nj’;A ni) into the equation (6.4) we get
(6.6) q' (P°)= ^
Kn,»* An, )-n,»]/^ 
(nj+An,)-nf
That is, player fs boldness at FT is given by
(6.7)
d n jd P ,
n‘ -n?
Therefore, player i's fear of ruin16, which is the inverse of the measure of player f s 
boldness, is given by
(6.8) A (*T)
n ’ - n '
dYl J d P x
Thus, equation (6.8) defines the adapted version of Aumann and Kurz's concept 
of the fear of ruin. In general, at any relative price Px of commodity 1 such that n  e SR, 
we can write the fear functions, corrected for sign effects in case of player 2, as follows.
(6.9a)
(6.9b)
AW n?d n .W /d P , and
m )
n,(^)-nsf
dn^/cu»'
16 In Aumann and Kurz (1977a) and Roth (1979) an equation similar to the equation (6.8) is 
directly used to define the fear of ruin that is latex on shown to be related with the probabilistic measure 
of boldness. The order has been reversed in the present study because the concept of fear of ruin or 
boldness is best expressed in the belief system of the player. In any case the implication to the overall 
analysis is unchanged.
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The derivative dWi / dPx measures the marginal ability of player i to obtain rents 
through price changes. It shows the change in the total rents obtained in sector i when 
the relative price of commodity 1 changes by one unit. Therefore, the magnitude of 
dn.t / dPx is determined completely by the economic system.
Definition 6.6 The fear functions fx(Px) and f2{Px) are said to be well behaved if
for all Px that are relevant to bargaining (that is, such that n ^ )  e SR) if fx(Px)> 0 and
//(/> ) < 0 .
Note that the fear functions are well behaved under Assumption 3.1 - that the 
real rental functions are concave in the relative price of own commodity. The conditions 
which are sufficient in general for fx(Px) > 0 and / 2/(/^) < 0, are derived in Appendix 
-5A.
The derivative properties of the fear functions indicate that player l's fear of 
ruin increases as Px increases and player 2's fear of ruin increases as Px falls (or the 
relative price of commodity 2 increases).
fear of ruin
Bargained price: equality of fear of ruin 
Figure 6.4
Aumann and Kurz (1977a, 1977b) discovered an important property of the Nash 
solution to a bargaining game. They showed that in a bargaining game "the Nash 
solution calls for that compromise which makes the two players equally fearful of ruin, 
where ruin is here taken to mean disagreement" (Aumann, 1977a: 1149). This 
condition, equality of fear of ruin, turns out to be identical to the first order condition of 
maximizing’the Nash product over the bargaining set. The intuitive reason behind the 
equilibrating process is that the player who fears the most will concede. This 
explanation is similar to that of Zuthen’s referred above.
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The Nash bargaining equilibrium is illustrated in figure 6.4. Px is the bargained 
price where both the players are equally fearful of ruin. For all prices that are less than 
Px, player 2's fear of ruin exceeds player l ’s fear of ruin. Hence player 2 concedes and 
prices are allowed to rise. For all prices greater than Px player l's fear of ruin exceeds 
the player 2's fear of ruin; therefore player 1 concedes. The price moves in favour of 
player 2.
It is important to distinguish between the fear of disagreement created by a 
positive probability of breakdown of the negotiation in BRW and the fear of ruin in 
Aumann and Kurz. In BRW the implied fear to each player is constant until the 
agreement is reached, whereas in Aumann and Kurz a player's fear increases as he 
receives an increasing gain from the bargain. Along the Pareto efficient frontier as the 
fear of one player increases the fear of the other player necessarily decreases. This is 
not the case with the concept of fear in BRW.
The types of fear of disagreement in these two studies are intrinsically different. 
This is because the sources of fear are different. In BRW players fear because they 
think that if an agreement can not be reached quickly, then the opportunity might be 
snatched by a third party, or may vanish by itself. For both players the source of fear, 
therefore, is the third party or a time factor. In the case of Aumann and Kurz, however, 
each player fears because the other player may refuse to agree. That is why the measure 
of the fear of ruin, as defined by Aumann and Kurz, increases with the gain of the 
player relative to the disagreement payoff. The source of the fear of ruin for each player 
is the other player (opponent). The fear of ruin exists even in the absence of threat of a 
third party snatching the opportunity.
The implication of this discussion is that although the difference in players’ 
perception of the risk of breakdown or the fear of disagreement as viewed by BRW is 
captured by the difference in bargaining power of the players, the fear of ruin as defined 
by Aumann and Kurz is not. Therefore, the fear of ruin constitutes a separate, 
independent motive that not only affects the outcome of the game but also induces the 
players to reach an agreement through constant revisions of their incompatible 
demands.
63.2 Generalized Fear of Ruin
However, the property of the Nash bargaining solution, as discovered by 
Aumann and Kurz, that in equilibrium the players should be equally fearful of ruin 
holds, as in the case of the original Nash solution, only with equal bargaining powers. It 
is because the above deduction is based on the assumption that the players hold equal 
bargaining powers. An immediate problem is to explore whether or not a similar
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condition holds when there are reasons to believe that players hold unequal bargaining 
powers.
For example, one of the reasons that players have unequal bargaining power is 
that they have unequal time preference rates. We know that (px <  (p2 implies Oj > 0 2, 
where <p, is the time preference rate of player i (Rubinstein 1982; Binmore 1987b: 71).
Other things being equal, a player with higher time preference rate will be ready to 
reduce his demand by more than a player with lower time preference rate. This means 
that the player with higher time preference rate will have a greater fear of ruin than the 
player with a lower rate.
Similarly, let us consider the case of unequal fear of disagreement in BRW's 
sense - the fear that the bargaining opportunity will be snatched by a third party. Now, 
the fear of ruin held by each player should take account of fears from two sources: (1) 
the fear that a third party will intervene; and (2) the fear that the opponent will quit the 
bargaining table and disagreement will result. The measure of boldness as defined by 
the equation (6.4) and given by the equation (6.7) has to be understood in a broader 
context than it was defmed for. In the case that there are many sources of fear, a 
measure of boldness (and a measure of fear of ruin) should represent the maximum 
tolerable probability of occurrence of either of the events - for example, a third party 
intervenes and seizes the bargaining opportunity, or the opponent disagrees.
Therefore, it is now necessary to differentiate between a player's total boldness 
and a player’s boldness vis a vis her bargaining opponent. We argue (on the basis of 
player's indifference) that, in any situation, a player has a fixed capacity to risk already 
attained gain. That measures her total boldness and is given by the equation (6.7). In 
order that a player insist on a favourable price (tariff) change and assume the risk of 
breakdown of negotiation the capacity to risk the gain should exceed the sum of risks 
that arise from all sources. A higher risk from a third party, therefore, reduces the 
capacity to risk the conflict with the bargaining opponent. That is, the higher a player's 
BRW type fear of disagreement (relative to the other player) the lower the player's 
boldness vis a vis his opponent and therefore the higher is the player's Aumann and 
Kurz type fear of ruin. Other things being equal, if the players have equal capacity to 
risk the conflict, the player who fears more than his opponent that a third party will 
snatch the opportunity will also display a greater fear of ruin vis a vis her opponent.
Let us consider again the situation described in figure 6.3 If player 1 demands a 
price increase it will induce a bargaining process during which player 2 may disagree or 
a third party may intervene. If any of the events occur the disagreement payoff will 
result. The higher the demand the more it is likely that either of the events will occur.
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As in BRW, let a.CAfJ) be defined as follows:
f i _
(6.10a) al(APl) = \
f l  _
(6.10b) a2(APl) = \
[0 ;
where, a* > 0 and is independent of the current price. Then ^.(A/J) denotes17 player fs
subjective probability that a third party intervention occurs and that players have to 
receive the disagreement payoffs if she insists on a price change of A/ .^
Similarly we can define Aumann and Kurz type fear of ruin as follows. Let,
(6.11a)
h w>.
&,(*/>;/>*)= o APj > 0; ,and,
A^ <0
(6.11b)
APx < 0; 
AfJ > 0.
where, b* > 0 for each i such thatb* increases and b*2 decreases with Pv
Then, bx(APx;P°) denotes player l's subjective probability that player 2 will 
declare disagreement if she demands a price increase of AfJ and b2(APl;P°) denotes 
player 2's subjective probability that player 1 will declare disagreement if he demands a 
price fall of A/^  given that P° is a mutually acceptable price.
Afj > 0; 
APx <0
APX <  0; 
A/>>0,
It is clear from these definitions that
(6. 12) lim (a- / AP,) and, b*(P,°)= lim (b. / AfJ),
A/>, —»0 A/j —»0 '
where, we take right-hand limit for player 1 and left-hand limit for player 2. It is clear 
from equation (6.12) that a* and b* yield player fs subjective valuation of the
17 It is implicitly assumed that the length of a bargaining period depends cm the size of price 
increase demanded. Insistence on larger price increases increase the likelihood that the opponent will 
reject it and disagreement results. If the opponent does not disagree, he will certainly take longer time in 
haggling before he accepts it. But this increases the chance that a third party will intervene and the 
outcome will be the disagreement
A slight abuse of notation may require some clarification. The relevant value of APx is positive 
for player 1 and negative for player 2. That is, player 1 is interested in price increases and player 2 is 
interested in decreases of the relative price of commodity 1. By considering only the absolute value of 
APx we can reduce unnecessary repetition of analogous equations. This is what is done here.
likelihood of the two types of risks per unit of price change when the proposed price 
changes are small.
Given this environment, we can search for the threshold probability of conflict 
with the opponent that player i can accept for small gains. At price P°, at most, player i 
will demand a price change of size A/^  such that the following equality holds:
(6.13) n* = [a, (A/>) + bi (A/>) -  at (A/> )bt (A/> )]nf
+[1 -  Ö,. (A/> )][1 -  bt (A/> )](n; + ati, ).
Note that [a, (A/J) + bL (APx) -  a, (APl )bi(AP{)] measures the probability that either 
of the events occurs and disagreement results, and [1 -  fl,(AfJ)][l -  b^AP^)] measures the 
probability that agreement results and player i will obtain the contingent gain of An, 
when he demands a price change of APj.
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From equation (6.13) we get
(6.14) [a,. (A/> ) + bi(APl)~  at (A/> )bt (APj)] = qL (AfJ),
where
(6.15) 3 i(AJ?)
(n r+ A n ,.) -n r  
(n r + An,.)- n f ‘
For small price changes, taking limits to both sides of (6.14) and (6.15) yields 
(6.16) a*+b*=q*
where q\ is as defined in equation (6.7). Thus, equation (6.16) shows that the maximum
probability of conflict with the opponent that player i is prepared to tolerate is the 
difference between the measure of her total boldness, q,*, and her subjective probability 
that a third party intervenes a*. That is, given a*, while negotiating for gains, b* 
measures player f s boldness at n" vis a vis her opponent.
Definition 6.7 (Total Boldness). The maximum probability of conflict with
the external world that a player is prepared to accept for a small current gain is a 
measure of the player's total boldness in a given environment. The inverse of this 
measure is the player's total fear of ruin.
Definition 6.8 (Residual Boldness). Given other exogenous risks, the maximum
probability of conflict with the opponent that a player is prepared to accept for small 
gains is defined as a measure of the player's residual boldness. The inverse of this 
measure is the player’s residual fear of ruin.
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In the absence of a third party risk, as can be seen from equation (6.16), residual 
boldness of a player coincides with her total boldness that is equal to the Aumann and 
Kurz’s measure of boldness as defined above.
A difference in players' perception of a third party risk has effects in two 
directions. On the one hand, it affects players' bargaining power, as shown by BRW; on 
the other hand, as shown above, it also affects player's boldness vis a vis her opponent.
A player assigns a higher probability to a third party intervention than his opponent 
means that he will have lower bargaining power relative to his opponent. For given total 
boldness of each player (not necessarily equal), he assigns higher probability to a third 
party intervention also implies that he will be less bolder vis a vis his opponent.
This argument leads us to the conclusion that either we should consider residual 
boldness (or residual fear of ruin) in characterizing the bargaining solution or we should 
allow, in one way of the other, for the difference in players' perception of a third party 
risk to play a role with a measure of player's total boldness in determining the 
bargaining outcome or characterizing the bargaining solution.
The case of a third party risk also suggests that if there are other sources of 
difference in bargaining power between the players besides third party risk, then those 
factors may also affect a player's fear of ruin vis a vis her opponent in a bargaining 
process. If a player has relatively more bargaining power than her opponent, then the 
reason behind the bargaining power differential should also work to dampen the fear of 
the player vis a vis her opponent. Since there can be several sources of fears or the 
characteristics that differentiate the players, and Aumann and Kurz's measure of fear of 
ruin is a total measure, the following generalization is proposed.
Definition 6.9 (Generalized Fear of Ruin). Let f* s  fx / 0-, then f* is defined as
player f s generalized fear of ruin.
Thus the generalized fear of ruin will be equal to Aumann and Kurz's concept of 
fear of ruin if and only if players have equal bargaining power, that is, if the players are 
identical except the bargaining set.
Now, we state the following axiom18 initially proposed by Svejnar (1986): 
Axiom 6 (Equality of Generalized Fear of Ruin).
A solution to a bargaining game satisfies f* = f- for i * j .
18 In Svejnar (1986) this axiom has been called "equality of fear of disagreement relative to 
bargaining power".
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6.4 Generalized Nash Bargaining Solution in a Tariff Game 
and the Generalized Fear of Ruin
In an n-person bargaining problem in which the object of bargaining is a 
division of a fixed ‘pie’; the players endowed with unequal bargaining power have 
concave utility functions, Ui for each player i, defined on the size of their share in the
‘pie’; the zero normalized (disagreement payoff transformed into zero by change of 
origin) bargaining set, denoted by S, is compact and convex in utility space; Svejnar 
proved quite generally that:
Theorem 6.3 (Svejnar). There is a unique solution which satisfies Axioms 1-3, and 
Axiom 6. It is the solution that maximizes C/®‘ for allt/ e S .
Proof See Svejnar (1986).
The proof of theorem 6.3 outlined by Svejnar is quite general. So long as the 
bargaining set is compact and convex, and contains at least one point that strictly 
dominates the disagreement payoff, then the proof of the equivalence between (a) the 
bargaining solution satisfying the four axioms, and (b) the solution that maximizes the 
generalized Nash product over the bargaining set, remains valid.
However, theorem 6.2 (Roth's theorem) shows that the solution to the 
bargaining problem can be characterized without referring to axiom 6. This implies that 
the axiom 6 is redundant in the presence of axioms 1-3. This axiom will be more useful 
if it could characterize the generalized Nash bargaining solution in the absence of at 
least some of the axioms 1-3. The following theorem shows that this is in fact the case.
Recall that if the international price ratio P*, and the domestic factor 
endowments KltK2 and L are exogenously given, and the elasticities of factor 
substitution in both the sectors are at least unity, then the bargaining problem 
(SK,n*,0) is well defined for exogenously given disagreement payoff 11*, and 
bargaining power distribution 0 .
Theorem 6.4 If the fear functions are well defined - that is, the derivatives of the rental 
functions with respect to the relative price do not vanish at all prices, then there exists a 
unique solution ß ( % H d,S)  = IT(/>1) e SR to any bargaining problem (9t,IT*,0) in a 
tariff game, which can be characterized by any of the following equivalent statements:
(i) Px = ar^max [n^ Pj)-nf]01[n2(/ )^-n^]02. That is, n(P1) maximizes the 
generalized Nash product over the bargaining set.
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(ii) /x(^R,IT*,0) satisfies axioms 1-3. That is, the solution to the bargaining problem 
(9t,n*,0) satisfying the axioms 1-3 selects H(PX) as the outcome of the bargaining.
(iii) f*{P|) > 0 for each i, and f*(Px) = fj (P}[), i * j  such that H(PX) e 91. That is, at 
Px each player i has a positive fear of ruin, and that players' generalized fears of ruin are 
equalized.
Proof: (i) holds, if and only if (ii) holds follows from Theorem 6.2. Therefore, it
suffices to show that (i) holds if and only if (iii) holds.19
(a) First we will show that (i) implies (iii).
Suppose (i) holds. This implies that at P=PX the level curve of generalized Nash 
product is tangent to the boundary of the bargaining set. Their slopes are equal.
The slope of any level curve of Nash product is given by
(in. - _ © 2 r n , ( / > ) - n f ]
d n 2
N P  0 1l n 2( / j ) - n j J
and since RTF is the boundary of the bargaining set, its slope is given by
(6.18) dUx ^ d n x(Px)/dPx 
^^2 RTF äYl2(Pl) / dPx
Therefore, at the solution point we must have
(6.19) dn2(p,)/dpt
which means that
(6.20) 1 f n , ( /> ) -n f  ] 1
n 2( / > ) - n M
{ d n ^ i d p j 0 21 d n ^ P O /d P j
Therefore, it follows from equation (6.9) that fi(Px) = / 2*(P[)• Moreover, 
n.(fj) > n f  implies that f*(Px) > 0 for each i. Thus, at the solution point of the game
each player holds strictly positive fear of ruin and the generalized fears of ruin are 
equalized across the players.
(b) Conversely, we will show that (i) follows from (iii).
19 See Appendix-6C for (ii) implies (i).
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Suppose that (iii) holds. First note that ft\ P x) > 0 implies that Yl(Px) lies on the 
boundary of the bargaining set. If 11(Px) does not lie on the boundary of the bargaining
set, then players can increase their payoffs without affecting the relative price simply by 
cutting down their lobbying expenditure. This means that \dMi(Px) l  dPx| = «> in the
neighbourhood of Px. As a consequence, each player's fear of ruin of at Px is zero. This 
contradicts with the hypothesis that ^(/^) > 0. Therefore, f*(Px) > 0 for each i imply 
that Yl(P{) lies on the boundary of the bargaining set.
By reversing the above steps it can be seen that f*(Px) = fi(P\) implies the 
satisfaction of the condition for tangency of a level curve of generalized Nash product 
to the boundary of the bargaining set at FI(/J). Concavity of the generalised Nash 
product and convexity of the bargaining set guarantee that the point of tangency is 
unique, and that second order condition of maximization of the generalized Nash 
product is satisfied. Therefore, (iii) holds implies that (i) holds. Hence the theorem.
Q. E. D.
Corollary 6.2 (Bargained Tariff Rate). A tariff rate T is a unique outcome of 
bargaining in a tariff game if T satisfies
7> = p;a+f).
Proof: Since Px is unique by Theorem 6.4, the proof follows from the
assumption that tariff is the only wedge between the world and the domestic relative 
prices. Q. E. D.
Corollary 6.3 If the fear functions are well behaved, then the bargaining solution 
obtained under the conditions of Theorem 6.4 is stable.
Proof: This corollary will be proved by way of a graphic illustration.
That fear functions are well behaved implies, by definition, that player l's fear of ruin 
increases and player 2's fear of ruin decreases as Px increases.
Let RF in figure 6.5 represent the part of the RTF that forms the boundary of the 
bargaining set, and a level curve of generalized Nash product labelled NN be tangent to 
the curve RF at the point C. Let Px be the domestic price ratio that corresponds to the 
point C, and H(PX), be the payoff combination at price Px. It follows from Theorem 6.4 
that at point C the generalized fears of ruin are equalized across the players.
Now, suppose that, for some reason, the equilibrium is disturbed and the 
economy is at the point B. Given unchanged values of the exogenous variables, the
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relative price should rise and the economy should move to the point C if the equilibrium 
at the point C is a stable one.
Equality of players' generalized fear of ruin 
and the solution to a bargaining problem
Figure 6.5
At the point B the generalized Nash product is not maximized. Obviously, B is 
not an equilibrium point. The two players will continue bargaining. Player 1 would like 
the price to rise and player 2 would not like the price to rise. Since the absolute slope of 
the RTF is greater than the absolute slope of the Nash product curve at B, we can write
(6.21) r e2rn,(/p-nfN dn^/dp,  0 ,lji2(/})-n'/
But this means that
(6.22) -1 n 2( / ; ) - n '  1 1■>__ r n ,( /» ) -n f  ^
®2 {dn^/dPj © , [dn^/dp)
That is, at the point B, by definition, we have / 2* > f*. This means that player 2 will 
concede and the domestic relative price will rise. The process will continue until we 
reach the point C, where both players are equally fearful of each other quitting the 
negotiation.
Similarly, it can be seen that if the economy moves to points like A, then player 
l ’s fear of ruin will exceed player 2's fear of ruin. Player 1 will concede and the price 
will fall.
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6.5 Summary
It is clear from the above results that the Nash bargained solution in a tariff 
game can be obtained as a solution to the following maximizing problem:
(6.23) max[ni-nf]e,[ni-n2f\
subject to the RTF,
_ _ s _
(6.24)
and that rTf > n f , for each player /=1, 2.
The equation (6.24) is obtained from the equation (4.6) by replacing by fl, . 
This substitution is allowed by the rule that in a cooperative game players need not 
spend resources in lobbying the government. The real-rent combinations along the RTF 
also are available to the players. Therefore, the boundary of the feasible set is the RTF. 
The inequality in (6.24) indicates that players may choose inefficient outcomes - either 
by inefficient allocation of resources or by playing noncooperation. The above 
bargaining problem is illustrated in figure 6.6.
P'-* -  a?a2 1-02 \ - ß ? rn .
\  1Y2 J
1 - f f i
Feasible
'Set
Level Curve of Nash 
Product
Pareto Efficient 
Frontier
An illustration of a Nash bargaining solution 
Figure 6.6
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The level curves of the generalized Nash product defined by the function (6.23) 
are rectangular hyperbolas with asymptotes Flj* and FI2. The presence of these 
asymptotes effectively restricts the solution payoffs to lie above the disagreement 
payoffs. The effective bargaining set is which lies to the north east of the 
disagreement point, (Il2,nf). The tilt of the curve is determined by the magnitude of 
0 .. Higher value of 0- produces more tilt towards the ith axis. The magnitude of0, is
an institutionally given datum and represents the ‘bargaining power’ of player i.
The maximand is concave and continuous; the constraint set is compact and 
convex; therefore there exists a unique maximum of the generalized Nash product in 9C 
The first order condition of maximization problem, which is also sufficient, is that the 
Nash product (NP) curve be tangent to the Pareto efficient boundary of the feasible set - 
that is, the northeast boundary of the feasible set described by the equation (6.24). 
Replacing the sign of inequality by equality in (6.24) we can obtain the expression for 
the boundary of the feasible set, which is the rental transformation frontier (RTF).
The necessary and sufficient condition for the Nash solution to the bargaining 
problem is given by
(6.25)
n^ ,-n f"|_ e, rfn, 
,n2-n ' J ©2
The payoff combination n = (Il1,ri2), that satisfies the condition given by the 
equation (6.25) is the solution to the bargaining problem. The relative price, and hence 
the tariff rate, that corresponds to this solution payoff is the outcome of the bargaining 
in a tariff game. More formally, the rationalized tariff rate T that satisfies
(6.26) f  = argmax{[n,(/>•(! + T))- n f f  [n2 (/>•(! + T ))- n'f'|n € 9?}
is the unique Nash bargained solution to the tariff game.
Theorem 6.2 (Roth's theorem) has shown that the generalized Nash bargained 
solution is unique. It is also individually rational, independent of scale of measurement, 
and independent of irrelevant alternatives. Corollary 6.1 has shown that the solution is 
also symmetric. Roth's result also guarantees that the solution is efficient.
Aumann and Kurz have shown that at the Nash bargaining solution players' fear 
of ruin are equalized. Theorem 6.4 took it a step forward and has shown that equality of 
fear of ruin can constitute a separate characterization of the Nash bargaining solution. 
Aumann and Kurz's result holds when players have equal bargaining power. But the 
characterization of the generalized Nash bargaining solution in terms of generalized 
fear of ruin provided by the theorem 6.4 holds for any arbitrary distribution of
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bargaining power among the players. It is shown that at the generalized Nash 
bargaining solution players' generalized fears of ruin are equalized. Clearly, Aumann 
and Kurz's result is a special case of this result.
Furthermore, it also shown in corollary 6.3 that the generalized Nash bargaining 
solution is stable when the fear functions are well behaved. The appendix provides a 
generally sufficient condition for fear functions to be well behaved.
This chapter has differentiated the concept of fear of disagreement as suggested 
by BRW and that suggested by Aumann and Kurz. It is argued here that they have 
addressed two different sources of fear. In BRW the source of fear is either the external 
world or time, whereas in Aumann and Kurz the source of fear is the opponent. The 
proposed generalization of fear of ruin not only allows these two types of fear concepts 
but also it can accommodate any other difference between the players that are capable 
of affecting the bargaining powers of the players.
Now, it can be seen from the equation (6.25) that at the bargained outcome, the 
gain of player 1 relative to the gain of player 2 over the disagreement payoff depends on 
two terms: the ratio of the institutionally given bargaining power of the players,
Oj / 0 2, and the slope of the rental transformation frontier. Begin and Karp (1991) have 
named the second term as the ‘endogenous’ bargaining power and the first term as 
‘exogenous’ bargaining power of the players.
The role of these two terms in determining the outcome can best be viewed with 
the help of the following figure.
Is i n?1 n?3 = r'
2's
n* n2 n 2 D payoffs Yld
(a)
D  payoffs
(b)
Effects of changes in endogenous and exogenous bargaining powers 
on the bargaining outcome 
Figure 6.7
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The two panels in the above figure reflect the effect of the difference in the two 
types of bargaining powers of the players. In panel (a) two generalized Nash product 
curves that correspond to different exogenous bargaining power distribution, holding 
the endogenous bargaining power constant, are drawn. The curves were drawn on the 
assumption that 0j < 0 j . The result is that under unchanged economic circumstances, 
increased exogenous bargaining power of player 1 has the effect of increasing payoff to 
player 1.
In panel (b) two rental possibility frontiers are drawn to reflect an exogenous 
expansion in sector 1. The exogenous bargaining power distribution has been held 
fixed The new rent possibility set defined by the transformation frontier CD contains 
the rent possibility set defined by the rent transformation frontier CD. Hence in 
equilibrium, they are able to attain a higher Nash product with the rental possibility 
curve C'D than with CD. The figure has been so drawn that the gain goes to player 1 
only. Thus the relative difference in the gain over the disagreement payoff can be 
attributed to change in the ‘endogenous’ bargaining power of the players.
Thus the ‘endogenous’ bargaining power can be viewed as being determined by 
the technologies of production, and distribution of the players' market powers. This 
study assumes that all markets are competitive, therefore, possession of a meaningful 
market power by any one of the players has been ruled out. However, some advantages 
due to technological and installed capacity differences are still there.
If the slope of the RTF is defined to measure the distribution of endogenous 
bargaining powers among players, then a movement along a rental transformation 
frontier implies a change in the slope of the frontier and therefore, in turn, implies a 
change in the endogenous bargaining power of the players. However, given a 
disagreement payoff, the RTF, and a distribution of exogenous bargaining power, one 
and only one point of the frontier will constitute a solution and other points of the 
frontier will be irrelevant. The endogenous bargaining power will be determined by the 
solution of the game, not the other way round. If endogenous bargaining power is to 
determine the solution of the game then such a movement along a given RTF should not 
be regarded as change in the endogenous bargaining power of the players. It follows 
that a frontier defines a particular configuration of ‘endogenous’ bargaining power of 
the players. A change in ‘endogenous’ bargaining power can arise only if the location 
of the RTF is changed.
In fact, the slopes of a given RTF show the economic limitation of the political 
system in transferring rents from one sector to the other sector. A shift in the frontier 
changes the constraint faced by the political system. For example, at each rental income 
of sector 1, the rent transformation frontier CD has a greater absolute slope than the
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rental transformation frontier CD. This means that player 1 can obtain more rents per 
unit loss in the rental income of player 2 along the frontier CD than along the frontier 
CD. Therefore, it can be argued20 that the frontier CD implies a greater ‘endogenous’ 
bargaining power of player 1 than implied by the frontier CD.
It can be seen from equation (6.9) that the slope of the RTF plays a crucial role 
in determining each player's total fear of ruin. For given disagreement payoffs, at each 
payoff level of player 1 the steeper the RTF the less fearful is player 1. Therefore, a 
biased outward shift of the RTF favouring player 1 has the effect of making player 1 
bolder (that is, less fearful of ruin), and making player 2 less bold (that is more fearful 
of ruin). Thus an increase in the ‘endogenous’ bargaining power of a player can also be 
viewed as an increase in the total boldness of the player and vice versa. The 
interpretation of the generalized Nash bargaining solution in terms of generalized fear 
of ruin is, therefore, consistent with endogenous and exogenous dichotomy of 
bargaining power of the players.
If the exogenous bargaining power coefficients, O's, are known, then inclusion 
of the equation (6.25), with appropriate definitional equations, into the policy 
exogenous general equilibrium model described in chapter 2 would be sufficient to 
solve for the bargained tariff rate. However, in the absence of reliable information on 
the exogenous bargaining power of the players we can study the comparative static 
properties of the equilibrium tariff rate under the assumption that the distribution of the 
exogenous bargaining powers of the players are not affected by changes in the 
exogenous variables.
In the next chapter, we will combine the generalized Nash bargaining game with 
the policy exogenous general equilibrium model of an open economy to obtain tariff 
endogenous general equilibrium model of the economy. A combination of the condition 
(6.25) that identifies the generalized Nash bargaining solution with the equilibrium 
conditions of a policy exogenous general equilibrium model developed in chapter 2 will 
yield the set of conditions that characterize a full equilibrium of the economy. The 
conditions will then be used to evaluate the comparative static properties of the 
bargained tariff rate.
20 This interpretation of endogenous bargaining power is consistent with Beghin and Karp’s 
explanation endogenous bargaining power. See Beghin and Karp (1991), footnote 4.
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Appendix-6A: Derivative Properties of the Fear Functions
Let us consider Aumann and Kurz's fear of ruin at price Px. Player l's fear of 
ruin is defined by
(6A.1) / i W  =
n ^ - n f  
dnjdP, ’
and player 2's fear of ruin is defined by
(6A.2) f 2W
n 2(Px) - n d2 
dll2 / dPx
Differentiating equation (6A.1) with respect to the relative price yields
(6A.3) (noMrij-nf)
V
<j2n,
dP2
\
/
Therefore, the sufficient condition for > 0 is that d2 n,
dP2
< 0 .
Satisfaction of the condition means that player l's fear of ruin increases with Pv 
Given the differentiability of the rental function, the necessary and sufficient condition
for a m  
dP,
> 0 is that the term in the parentheses on the right be positive.
Similarly, differentiating (6A.2) with respect to Px yields
(6 A.4) dA(P>) 1
dPt <n')2
i2rr \
(n’2)2-(n2-n d2)— ±
O/j
4T2(/j) d2 n.A sufficient condition for — < 0 is that---- t2- < 0. If the condition is satisfied then
dPx dP2
an increase in Px implies a fall in player 2's fear of ruin. That is, at a higher relative 
price of commodity 1, player 1 becomes more fearful of ruin and player 2 becomes 
bolder. At a lower relative price of commodity 1, player 1 becomes bolder and player 2 
becomes more fearful of ruin.
If the second order derivative of the payoff function with respect to Px is 
nonpositive, we are done. If this is not the case, that is if d2^  / dP2 > 0 , then the 
information is not sufficient to determine the sign of the derivative of the fear of ruin as 
relative price changes.
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The purpose of this Appendix is to obtain conditions under which >0
and < o when the second order derivatives of the payoff functions are positive.
If the underlying production functions are continuously differentiable and the 
elasticities o f factor substitution are finite then the sectoral payoff functions are 
continuously differentiable in Px. Therefore, under these standard conditions, we can 
use Taylor series to approximate the sectoral rental functions. The series can, then, be 
used to evaluate the slope of fear of ruin functions of the players.
First, consider the case of player 1. Since Taylor series can be constructed 
around any arbitrary value of P{ provided the derivatives exist, we can choose P* such 
that IIj (P*) = nf. Then, for all P{ such that n e  SR we have P{ > P*. The second order 
Taylor series expansion of the payoff function around P* can be written as
(6A.5) n , (/>) =  nf + a(/> -  P‘) + ft(f> -  />* f .
where, a = > 0; b = (1 /  2)Yl"(P") > 0 .
and the derivative of the payoff function is given by
(6A.6) dTll / dPx = a + 2 b(P{ -  P*)
Therefore, the fear function can be written as
(6A.7) A W - P j )  + b(Pt - P ‘)2 a + 2b(,Pi - P ‘)
Differentiating the fear function with respect to Px yields after simplification
(6 A. 8) 4 f iW  _  a2 +  2[b{Px -  P /)]2 + 2ab(P -  / Q  .  Q
Similarly, we can obtain a Taylor series approximation of the rental income 
function for player 2 by expanding around P* where n 2( / f ) = I I2. Then for all Px such 
that ne/*) e SR we must have Px < P*.
For player 2, we can write
(6A.9) n2(/>) = Ud2 + c(/> -  P?) + d(Px -  P‘ f
where, c = YV2{Pxa) < 0 and d = r i ' '( />/*)/ 2
If d<0 , then we are done. So suppose that d>0.
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Following similar steps we can obtain
(6A.10)
where,
d A W ._ c1 + 2{d(P,-P;)]2 + 2cd(Pl - P : )  
dP> [c +  2rf(/>  - /> “)]2
[c + 2d(Pt -
c t f - P n  + d t f - P ' )1
Sl( 1 c + 2 d ( /> - /f )
These results remain valid if we use Taylor series of third order, provided that 
the third order derivative of the rental function remain nonnegative for player 1 and 
nonpositive for player 2 at the point of expansion. As we increase the order of 
expansion, the signs of the derivatives of the fear functions become ambiguous.
Therefore, the sufficient conditions for fear functions to be well behaved are that
(i) the elasticities of factor substitution be fmite; and
(ii) either of the following two conditions holds:
(a) the second order derivatives of the rental functions with respective to Px are 
negative everywhere;
(b) all third and higher order derivatives of the rental functions with respect to the 
relative price vanish at the point of expansion.
The first condition assures that there are no comer solutions. This condition 
together with the continuous differentiablity of the output supply functions with respect 
to price, then, guarantees the differentiablity of the rental functions21 at each price.
The second condition is related to the higher order derivatives of the rental 
functions. This condition is satisfied if the rental functions, in the relevant range for 
bargaining, are approximately quadratic (concave or convex) in relative price of either 
commodity. The presence of nonlinearities makes it is difficult to assess whether the 
condition (ii) is satisfied or not.
However, the rental functions are bounded and strictly increasing in relative 
price of own commodity, eventually at higher prices, the second order derivatives of the
21 Recall that rental income, measured in units of own output, at each {rice is equal to output 
supply less the cost of mobile factor.
rental functions with respect to the relative price of own commodity have to be 
nonpositive.
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Condition (i) is normally satisfied. We do not normally expect factors of 
production to be perfectly substitutable. Condition (ii) may be violated in some cases. 
Particularly this condition may be violated if the rental functions are wavy, though 
strictly increasing in relative price of own commodity. If this is so, then the bargaining 
solution that equalizes generalized fear may not be stable. Player l ’s generalized fear or 
ruin may fall as the relative price of commodity 1 rises and player 2's generalized fear 
of ruin may fall as the relative price of commodity 2 rises. Thus, each player may like 
to put demands that are likely to be incompatible. Hence, we regard condition (ii) as a 
condition for stability of the bargaining solution. However, in this study, we assume 
that the conditions (i) and (ii) are satisfied.
Appendix -6B: Proof of Roth's Theorem
We will prove Roth's theorem by way of the following lemma. The proof 
basically follows Binmore (1987a).
Lemma 6.1 Consider a bargaining problem (A,0) where,
If fi(A,0) = (**,*2 ) is a solution to the bargaining problem (A,0) that satisfies axioms 
of feasibility, invariance and independence, then
(i) M(A,0) = (x[,x*2) is efficient;
(ii) there exists a r e  (0,1) such that x\ = f  and x\ = 1 -  t; and
(iii) (**,*2 )=  max xfx2~r).
Conversely, for any given t € (0,1), if {x\,x2) = max x*x2 T), then x* = 1 and
* 2  = 1 -  T, and the solution x satisfies axioms of feasibility, invariance, and 
independence. Moreover, the solution x is unique.
(x,,*2)eA
(X , ,X 2)€ A
Proof: (i) Let us consider the following figure:
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Let the area OBC represent the symmetric bargaining set A, of which the line 
BC represents the Pareto efficient boundary of the set A. Let /i(A,0) = x* be a solution 
of the bargaining problem that satisfies the three axioms.
Since x * satisfies the axiom of feasibility and it is individually rational, x* > 0. 
Suppose that the solution x \  which satisfies the three axioms, does not lie on BC. Let 
BD be the line passing through the point B and x*. Then the area OBD forms a subset 
of the area OBC. Let us call it the set A'. The set A' contains both the disagreement 
point 0, and the solution point x*, and is a subset of the set A. Therefore, by the axiom 
of independence,//(A’,0) = x \
Let a  be an affine transformation which maps 0 —> 0,B —> B, and D —> C. Then 
by similarity, a x  lies on BC and so a x  * x*. By invariance, 
fj.(aA',0) = a fi(A \0) = ax*. But, since aA'= A , therefore, /J.(aA\0) = fJ.(A,0) = x*. 
But this is a contradiction and therefore, x* lies on BC, and so it is efficient.
(ii) Let E be the point on BC which represents the solution vector x *. 
Choose T so that
BE
T = -----.
BC
Since BC is a 45 degree line, it follows that jc* = T and x\ = 1 -  T.
(iii) For r  given by (ii), a straightforward solution of the following 
maxmization problem
maxx fx (2 ~x)subject to xx + x2 = 1
is that xx =  T and x2 = 1 -  T.
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To show the converse we will reverse the steps. For given T, x solves
maxx*x2~z) subject to xx + x2 = 1
implies that x[ = x and x\ -  1 -  x.
Since the Pareto efficient boundary of the bargaining set A is a subset of the 
points satisfying xl +x2 = \, and x * satisfies this equation, it is efficient. Obviously, 
x > 0 for x e (0,1), therefore it is individually rational and feasible.
Since the first order condition of the maximization problem remains unaltered 
by any positive affine transformation of the set A, and the maximand, therefore x 
satisfies the axiom of invariance.
Since, x is also the maximizer of xfx2~x) over any subset of the feasible set A 
that also contains x * and 0, therefore, it satisfies the axiom of independence.
Moreover, the maximand is concave and the feasible set is compact and convex, 
the solution x * is unique. Q. E. D.
The major point of the lemma is that every solution to a bargaining game (A,0) 
that satisfies the three axioms induces a distribution parameter x e (0,1), and every 
distribution parameter induces a solution to the bargaining problem (A,0) that satisfies 
the three axioms. For a given x e (0,1), the induced solution to the bargaining problem 
is unique, whereas there can be many solutions that satisfy the three axioms and induce 
many values of x such that x e (0,1). In fact, all points on the boundary of the feasible 
set satisfy the three axioms and are potential solutions to the bargaining problem (A,0).
The minimum information, in addition to (A,0), required to obtain a unique 
solution is the ratio at which the players will receive their payoffs at the solution to the 
bargaining problem (A,0). If this ratio, say xx / x2 = 8 , is institutionally provided, then 
those points in the set A that lie on the ray of slope equal to 8 become potential 
solution points. It is useful to note that if other axioms are not satisfied, then the 
condition that payoffs be divided according to 8 alone is not sufficient to yield a unique 
outcome of the bargaining. For each 8 > 0, we can define a unique 
r = 5 / ( l  + 5 )e(0 ,l) .
Since all solutions satisfying the three axiom lie on the efficient frontier, the 
intersection of the ray with the efficient boundary of the set A constitutes the unique 
solution to the bargaining problem (A,0) with given 5. Note that, 5=1 yields the 
original Nash solution.
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Appendix-6C: Proof of Theorem 6.4
Theorem 6.4 For any bargaining problem (91, n*,©) in a tariff game, if the fear 
functions are well defined, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) Px = ar^maxfrij (Pj) -  n f  ]9’ [fl2 (Pj) -  f l2 ]02. That is, Px maximizes the 
generalized Nash product over the bargaining set.
(ii) n (9^,IT*,©) = nCPj), that is Pj is the price at the generalized Nash solution to 
the bargaining game (9t,IT*,0) with bargaining power distribution 0  that satisfies the 
axioms 1-3.
Proof: We have to show that (i) holds if and only if (ii) holds. Since the
implication of (ii) by (i) is straightforward, we will show that (ii) implies (i).
Let us assume that FI = n(FJ) is the payoff combination that maximizes the 
generalized Nash product over the bargaining set 9L Assume that /x(9t,n*,0) is the 
solution of the bargaining problem that satisfies axioms 1-3. We have to show that 
ß(%nd,Q) = n(l>).
Let us define a set 91 such that
*H(ftlfn2) n,=0, ^rv-nf ^  n, -  nf ; n  g 9^
It can be seen that 91 is obtained from 91 by a positive affine transformation. The point 
n  € 91 is transformed into 0 e S ,  and IX* g 9f is transformed into O g ^ .  We know 
that the payoff that maximizes the generalized Nash product is invariant under such 
transformations, therefore 0  solves the problem
m axrif’fl?2.
fie*
We are done, if we can show that
/i(9*,O,0) = 0 .
Since better -than -0  set and the set 9f are both convex, 0  is in both the sets, 
hence by the separating hyper plane theorem, there is a unique hyper plane passing 
through 0  that is tangent to both the sets at 0 .  AB is that line (hyper plane).
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The slope of the generalized Nash product curve passing through 0  is given by
dil2 0! n2
Therefore, the slope of the tangent AB that passes through the point (npfl2) = (0 P0 2) 
is -1.
Now, construct a set H of all points from the area OAB. Then the set H is 
symmetric. Therefore, by Lemma 6.1 /x(//,O,0) = 0 .
But, since 0 e S c / / ,  and the solution /J. is independent of irrelevant 
alternatives, therefore, 0,0) = 0 .  Now by applying inverse positive affine 
transformation, using the invariance property of n , we can see that
//('R,n‘i,0)=n( )^.
Hence the condition (ii) implies the condition (i). Q. E. D.
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CHAPTER 7
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF A POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND COMPARATIVE STATIC RESULTS
Introduction
In chapter 2, we reviewed a selection of the existing theories of tariff 
determination to examine the current state-of-the-art in modelling the tariff formation 
process. It was clear from the review that there seems a general consensus among the 
economists in that a tariff can consistently be viewed as an equilibrium outcome of the 
political market. The political process can be described by a noncooperative game in 
which the policy maker as well as the private interest groups behave strategically to 
further their own self-interests.
In chapter 3 a stylized 2-sector, 3-factor policy exogenous general equilibrium 
model was obtained to describe an economic equilibrium. Using the solutions of this 
model for different tariff rates, a rent transformation frontier was derived in chapter 4. 
This frontier describes a locus of the equilibrium combinations of rental incomes at 
different tariff rates. It showed that the owners of specific factors have conflicting 
interest on government’s tariff policy.
Following previous work, we studied the strategic interaction between the 
government and private interest groups in Chapter 5. We argued that the government, as 
a Stackelberg leader, offers a lobbying-sensitive pricing function to the interest groups 
in order to extract the maximum political support for it. The owners of specific factors 
(the interest groups) play a noncooperative tariff game by choosing the amount of their 
predatory lobbying expenditure, affecting the political support for the government, to 
maximize their rental income. It was shown that for such political economies at least 
one noncooperative Nash equilibrium exists.
By recognizing the fact that a cooperative solution would dominate 
noncooperative solutions, we studied the problem of tariff determination as a Nash 
bargaining problem in chapter 6. This framework views all political activities as 
integral parts of the bargaining process. There, we derived the necessary and sufficient 
condition for a generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem of the underlying 
tariff game.
The purpose of this chapter is to combine the results obtained in the previous 
chapters and derive a set of conditions that characterizes the equilibrium in a tariff 
(policy)-endogenous general equilibrium model (PEGEM) of a small open economy. In
165
particular, the conditions describing the bargaining equilibrium in the tariff game, 
which is the condition for an equilibrium in the political market, is combined with the 
conditions of general economic equilibrium in the policy-exogenous model (PXGEM) 
developed in chapter 3. A simultaneous satisfaction of these conditions implies a 
general (politico-economic) equilibrium of the stylized political economy. The political 
economy in a general equilibrium is then subjected to comparative static experiments to 
analyze the (comparative static) responses of the bargained tariff rate to exogenous 
shocks.
The chapter is organised into seven sections. The first section describes the full 
model by collecting all the equilibrium conditions. The second section discusses the 
problems concerned with the identification of the disagreement payoffs in a bargaining 
problem in the tariff game. We argue that the concept of minimum expectation, 
suggested by Roth (1977), can be employed as a reference point in bargaining to 
operationalize the concept of disagreement.
In section three we obtain the players’ minimum expectation in the tariff game 
under two different political environments. First, we consider a coercive type of 
government, which rules by force, and derive players' minimum expectation under this 
regime. It is shown that the minimum expectation of each player, in this case, is zero. 
Then, we consider the case with a support maximizing government, which offers a 
pricing function that satisfies assumptions (Al) -(A3), and (A5). We argue that, with a 
popular government, the minimum expectation of the exporting sector (player 2) is the 
payoff at the autarkic equilibrium, and the minimum expectation of the import- 
competing sector (player 1) is the payoff at the free trade equilibrium. This completes 
the ground work to operationalize the PEGEM.
The comparative static responses of the bargained tariff rate are derived in 
section four. Two separate subsections are devoted to the two types of government 
behaviour.
In the first subsection, we derive and explain the comparative static results 
under the assumption that the government is coercive. In particular, it is shown that, 
ceteris paribus, (i) any change in the international terms of trade will induce a tariff 
change that will exactly offset the effect of the international terms of trade change on 
the domestic relative prices, (ii) an exogenous increase in the stock of specific factor in 
either sector will induce a fall in the rate of protection awarded to the expanding sector 
and a rise in the rate of protection awarded to the other sector, (iii) the effect of an 
increase in the supply of the mobile factor on the rate of protection, however, is 
ambiguous. It depends on the relative labour intensities and relative ease of factor
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substitution in the two sectors. Intuitive explanations of these results are provided with 
geometric illustrations.
In the second subsection, we have attempted to examine the comparative static 
behaviour of the bargained tariff rate under a support-maximizing government. More 
specifically, we required that the government choose tariff rates within the range so that 
the domestic relative price falls between the closed interval defined by the relative 
prices at the free trade and the autarkic equilibrium. This made the payoffs at the 
minimum expectation sensitive to changes in all of the exogenous variables. Analytical 
results under CES production functions thus became quite complex. We assumed Cobb- 
Douglas production functions to simplify the algebra. Though it was possible to show 
the validity of Hillman's result that the domestic relative price moves with the world 
price, we could not determine the direction of the response of the bargained tariff rate 
with respect to each of the exogenous variables.
Section five summarizes the chapter. The difficulties in obtaining clear-cut 
analytical results highlight the importance of simulation exercises. Under the specific 
conditions of the economy in question, it also highlights the importance of a 
computable PEGEM in understanding the behaviour of the bargained tariff rate. This 
exercise is deferred until the next chapter.
7.1 The PEGEM: A Tariff-endogenous General Equilibrium Model
We know that the necessary and sufficient condition for the generalized Nash 
solution to the bargaining problem in the tariff game is given by equation (6.25) as
(6.25')
n,-nf
n2-n '
e, di1,
© 2  ^ 2 RTF
Recall that = K{RV is the rental income of sector 1 in units of commodity 1, 
where Rx= Rx / P{, and I l2 = is the rental income of sector 2 in units of commodity 
2. Commodity 2 is the numeraire. Unless the sectoral capital stocks change we can 
normalize capital stocks by setting Kx- K 2 = 1. With this normalization the rental rate 
equals the rental income for each sector.
We can obtain from equation (4.8) that the slope of the RTF is given by
(7.10) d n x
K ,R , ^ 2 ^ 2 ^ LI _ n i ^ 2 ^ 2 ^ LI
d n 2 KTF * 2  dR 2 K 2R2 <JXS L2 J n 2 k Aj(j\S L2 j
The right hand side of equation (7.10) can be simplified by noting that \ i =Li l L is 
the share of sector i in the total employment of labour, and the distributive share of
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labour Su = WLt / P?i where P2 = 1 by the choice of numeraire. Using these definitions, 
equation (7.10) can be rewritten as
(7.11a) dUx = _ I L a2Y2
dn2 RTF ^ 2 y
Alternately, we can also write
(7.11b)
dnl
RTF
2^^K\
^SK2P{
where, Sa = fl- / Yi is the distributive share of capital in sectoral output in each sector i.
Now substituting the expression for the slope of the RTF from equation (7.11a) 
into equation (6.25') we get
(7.12) n,-nf n2-nf
e, n, )
02 n2
Alternately, the equation (7.12) can also be written as
(7.13) n,-nf _e,r j a , \
^ 2  ~  ^ 2  ® 2  J
This condition can be explained as follows. We know that is a strictly 
increasing function of Px and I"I2 is a strictly decreasing function of Px, the left-hand 
side of equation (7.13) is a strictly increasing function of Px for given a value of n * . 
Given that ctj > 1 and o2 > 1, we also know that SKX is a nonincreasing function of Px, 
and SK2 is a nondecreasing (constant in the Cobb-Douglas case) function of Px. 
Therefore, for a given distribution of bargaining power, the right-hand side of equation 
(7.13) is a strictly decreasing function of Px. Thus, a unique domestic relative price 
satisfies, as discussed in the previous chapter, the necessary and sufficient condition for 
the solution to the bargaining problem. A non unique situation may arise if ox is close 
to zero and <J2 is very large.
Now we can combine equation (7.12) with the policy-exogenous general 
equilibrium model developed in chapter 3. Recalling equations from Table 3.2, the 
system of equations that describes the full equilibrium of the economy can be written as 
in the following Table 7.1.
Table 7.1
A stylized tariff (policy) endogenous general equilibrium model
(PEGEM)
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The Political Market (or Sphere): 
Condition for bargaining equilibrium:
n.-nf _e, n,(7.12')
\d  /" \ t t  f  _  \ r  "N 
° 2*2
n2-n 2 ©2 n2
Definition:
(7.14) Ui = KiRl /Pl, i=1,2.
The Economic Markets (or Sphere)
(a) The Goods Market:
The supply functions of domestic production sectors: 
(3.11') Yj = K)ß ~'"’i [l - /  P.
Consumer demand functions:
(3.19')
Equilibrium in the market of good 1. 
(3.21') Cj = yj + A/j.
(b) The Foreign Exchange Market: 
Trade balance constraint:
(3.23') P'M1 + P;M2 = 0.
j  = U
7 = 1,2.
(c) The Labour Market:
Sectoral labour demand:
(3.14') L] = Kja u; ,,')ß -Up\(P I / w f m*P->- a ) n' ^
Labour market equilibrium:
(3.15') L = j^ L r
>=i
Domestic price determination:
(3.26') Pt = P1*(l + 7;',).
Virtual rental rates:
(3.12') P = ß -u p i^p P iW + p ,)_
I
Total number of equations 15.
■ i  iPj
7=1,2.
7 = 1,2.
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Table 7.1 (continued)
List of Endogenous Variables:
n / j  = I 2 : 2 Sectoral rental incomes
Yj 7 = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral outputs
c, 7 = 1,2. : 2 Domestic demands
M, 7 = 12 : 2 Net Import quantities
L i 7 = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral employment of labour
Ri 7 = 1,2. : 2 Sectoral rental rates in units of commodity 2
W : 1 Wage rate in units of commodity 2
: 1 Price of commodity 1 in units of commodity 2
rr > R 
M : 1 Rationalized tariff rate
Total number of endogenous variables: 15.
List of exogenous variables:
Kj j  = 1,2. : 2 Endowments of sector specific capital stocks
L : 1 Endowment of Labour in the economy
P* : 1 International relative price of commodity 1
Y\dj j - 1,2 : 2 Disagreement payoffs
P2 : Price of the numeraire commodity (always unity).
Total number of exogenous variables: 7.
Parameters:
Gj = 1 / (1 + Pj) j  = 1,2 : 2 Elasticities of factor substitution
a j,ßj\ j  = 1,2 : 4 Distributive parameters of CES production functions 
Sj j  = 1,2 : 2 Budget share parameter of C-D utility function 
0 j , 0 2 -2 Parameters reflecting the bargaining powers
Total number of parameters: 8.
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Thus Table 7.1 describes a system of 15 equations in 15 endogenous variables, 
including the rationalized tariff rate. For given values of exogenous variables and model 
parameters the system, in principle, can be solved for the 13 endogenous variables. The 
solution vector of endogenous variables describes the full equilibrium of the politico- 
economic system of the stylized economy.
This system demands more information than the conventional policy-exogenous 
CGE models. In addition to the information required by a conventional CGE model, it 
requires information on the distribution of the players’ bargaining powers and 
information on disagreement payoffs, 11*. With respect to the distribution of 
bargaining powers, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 7.1 The distribution of bargaining power between the players is 
exogenously given and it is unaffected by small changes in the values of exogenous 
variables.
In chapter 6, it was argued that bargaining powers are affected by factors such 
as the time-preference rates of the players, their subjective probability that a third party 
will snatch the bargaining opportunity and so on. In this light, assumption 7.1 does not 
seem to be too restrictive. However, it paves a clear way towards the comparative static 
analysis of the PEGEM. We will move to analyse the problem of identifying the 
disagreement payoffs to the players that constitutes the most critical information 
required by the PEGEM.
7.2 Identification of the Disagreement Payoffs
The disagreement payoff is the payoff that players will receive in the event that 
they fail to reach an agreement. A natural candidate for this is the payoffs at a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium of the tariff game. But, there are two problems, which 
make the use of payoffs at a noncooperative Nash equilibrium less attractive. First, the 
possibility of multiple Nash equilibria can not be dismissed a priori, and there seems no 
clear way of identifying which one of them will be attained in the event of a 
disagreement Second, even if there are reasons to believe that a unique Nash 
equilibrium will be attained, the government's pricing function has to be specified 
before any Nash equilibrium can be computed. This would further require a good 
knowledge of the government's political support function.
The solution to the bargaining problem discussed in chapter 6, however, is based 
on given disagreement payoffs. So long as it is known before the bargaining game is 
played, any arbitrary pair of payoffs can be a candidate for the disagreement payoffs.
All results obtained in chapter 6 remain valid, since no result obtained in chapter 6 is
based on the assumption that the disagreement payoff is a noncooperative Nash 
solution.
A particularly interesting alternate candidate for the disagreement payoff is the 
minimum expectation payoff proposed by Roth (1977). Roth's concept of minimum 
expectation can be defined in the following way.
Let 91 be the set of all feasible payoff combinations. For each player /, define
nj“ = maxjn,. |(FI.,n_.) e 9lj; and
n “" = max{n, |(n„n™")e 9?}.
Definition 7.1 (minimum expectation). The payoff combination
n"1“ = (11™, FI™) represents the minimum expectation of the players in cooperation. 
The payoff combination n™* = (n™ \n™ x), which is also called the ideal point, 
represents the aspiration levels1 of the players in cooperation (see figure 7.1).
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The point of minimum expectation 
Figure 7.1
One attractive feature of the point of minimum expectation is that it represents 
the payoff to each player when the bargaining opponent has been able to obtain the best 
feasible outcome for herself, say by forming a coalition with the government or by pre­
emptive lobbying. The payoff combination fl"1“1 therefore represents the worst 
outcome to each player. No rational player will choose a strategy that yields his 
opponent a payoff less than that corresponds to Tl"1“1 because to do so would bring no 
benefit, possibly a reduction, in his own payoff. In other words, for each player, the 
payoff combination fl™” corresponds to the opponent's dictatorial solution.
l See also Friedman (1986) pp. 160-62.
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Roth (1977) has shown that the Nash solution to the class of bargaining 
problems in which the disagreement payoff is given by IT™ satisfies all the axioms as 
satisfied by the original Nash solution. The only difference between the two is that 
Nash's solution is independent of irrelevant alternatives (axiom of independence) other 
than the disagreement point, whereas the new solution will be independent of irrelevant 
alternatives other than the point of minimum expectation.
Thomson (1981) has argued that the disagreement point in a bargaining problem 
simply serves as a reference point to which players find it natural to compare any 
proposed compromise. He has suggested several possible candidates for a reference 
point. However, the list of reference points can be considerably shortened by requiring 
that the point satisfy some desirable properties. One such property, as suggested by 
Thomson, is that the point of reference be sensitive to changes in the set of feasible 
outcomes. In this respect the point of minimum expectation, suggested by Roth, 
displays another attractive feature that is not possessed by other points like the status 
quo - the point of minimum expectation could be changed by changes in the boundary 
of the feasible set.
Furthermore, Thomson also proposed the following two essential2 properties of 
a reference point:
(i) That it be invariant with respect to positive affine transformations; and
(ii) That it be invariant with respect to symmetrization of almost symmetric 
bargaining problems.
Thomson has found (in his Lemma 2) that the point of minimum expectation 
satisfies the two desirable properties of a reference point3.
It is important to keep in mind that the solution to a bargaining problem 
obtained by defining the minimum expectation payoffs as the disagreement payoffs is 
not necessarily equal to the Nash solution if the disagreement payoffs are already well 
defined by some other rule of the game (for example, the status quo or zero). Therefore, 
the solution that is obtained by the rule that disagreement payoffs are the payoffs at the 
player's minimum expectation yields, at best, a Nash-like solution to a bargaining 
problem, which satisfies axioms similar to those as satisfied by the Nash solution.
2 These properties are required in establishing the correspondence between a solution that 
maximizes the Nadi product and a solution that satisfies all the axioms that characterizes a bargaining 
solution.
3 See Thomson (1981) for details and for other candidates for reference points.
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In general, the operational definition of the disagreement payoffs in the theory 
of bargaining has remained unclear. Identification of the disagreement payoffs has, 
therefore, been suggested as a matter of modelling judgement (Binmore, Rubinstein, 
and Wolinsky, 1986). The concept of minimum expectation, nevertheless, is well 
defined, operational and payoffs at minimum expectation possess some desirable 
properties of a reference point in bargaining. Thus the payoffs at the point of minimum 
expectation appear to be natural candidates for the disagreement payoffs.
However, the point of minimum expectation, as pointed out by Thomson, has a 
serious limitation that it is not always continuous in the feasible region. A small change 
in the feasible region, in some cases, may lead to radical changes in the point of 
minimum expectation. For example, consider the following figure:
l's payoffs
2's payoffs
O D B
Discontinuity of the point of minimum expectation 
Figure 7.2
Suppose that the initial set of feasible outcomes is OAEB. Then player l's 
minimum expectation is 0, and player 2's minimum expectation is OD. Now if the set of 
feasible outcomes is expanded to OCEB, (point C very close to point A) then the 
minimum expectation of each player will be zero. Therefore, with a small increase in 
the feasible set the point of minimum expectation will move to the origin from the point 
D. If the payoff at the point of minimum expectation is used as the disagreement payoff, 
the bargaining solution may also change abruptly for small changes in the set of feasible 
outcomes. This situation is also not very satisfactory, particularly for the validity of 
comparative static results. The seriousness of the discontinuity of the point of minimum 
expectation with respect to the feasible set in the tariff game is, therefore, worth 
examining.
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73  Minimum Expectation in the Tariff Game
In this section we derive expressions for the minimum expectation payoffs of 
the players under two different political environments. First, we consider a special case 
in which the government rules by force. We allow for the possibility that any of the 
players may form a coalition with the government and chose a policy that best suits the 
winning player. The government balances its budget, if necessary, by taxing the losing 
player and other nonstrategic agents in the economy. We shall call this type of 
government a coercive government and obtain players' minimum expectations under it.
Next, we consider a support maximizing government, which offers a pricing 
function satisfying assumption (A1)-(A3) and (A5). We shall call this type of 
government a popular government, and obtain players' minimum expectation under it.
73.1 Minimum Expectation under A Coercive Government:
A Special Case
Specifically for illustrative purposes, we consider a special case in which the 
government can completely be captured by one of the players. In other words, we 
consider a case in which the government will form a coalition with the winning player 
and use its coercive power to provide maximum benefit to the winner at the cost of the 
loser. As an extreme case, we can think of a coercive government in terms of Posner's 
classification.4
If a player fails to form a coalition with the ‘coercive’ government, then the 
result is that his rental income can be taxed to sustain the price that benefits the 
winning player most. This means that, in disagreement, the worst outcome to each 
player could be that the player has to surrender all of his rental income to finance the 
government's budget deficit created by the price policy favouring the opponent. This in 
turn implies that the payoff at the minimum expectation of each player with a coercive 
government is zero. It is interesting to note that the point of minimum expectation, in 
this case, has been located without first locating the aspiration level of the players. 
Therefore, we write
FT” = (0,0).
Continuity of the point of minimum expectation in this case is, therefore, not a 
problem at all since the point of minimum expectation, under coercive behaviour of the
4 Posner (1974) distinguished three forms of political system: (i) entrepreneurial - which sells 
favourable legislation to industries that value it most; (ii) coercive - which awards legislation to groups 
that are able to make credible threats to retaliate with violence if society does not give them favourable 
treatment; (iii) democratic - legislation is awarded by the vote of elected representatives of the people.
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government, does not change as the RTF shifts due to changes in the factor 
endowments. However, it loses its sensitivity with respect to changes in the boundary of 
the feasible (or the bargaining) set.
The case with n* = IV™ = (0,0) is interesting for three reasons. First, it greatly 
simplifies the model and analytical results are possible. It can illustrate the mechanism 
of endogenous determination of the tariff rate. Second, it corresponds to a potentially 
dictatorial type of government. The results, therefore, will show the behaviour of 
bargained tariff rates under a particular political environment where the government can 
be captured by one of the bargaining party if no agreement is reached during the 
bargaining process. Third, more interestingly, Tld = 0 corresponds to Brock, Magee, 
and Young's economic black hole5 and could be considered as the worst possible 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium outcome in the tariff game.
Therefore, the disagreement payoffs for the bargaining problem will be 
measured by the payoffs at the minimum expectation of the players. However, 
depending upon the nature of the government the disagreement payoffs or payoffs at the 
minimum expectation of the players may be (0,0) or ( n * ,^ ) .  Both cases will be 
considered in the comparative statics of the model.
73.2 Minimum Expectation under a Support Maximizing Government
It follows from definition 7.1 that location of the point of minimum expectation 
requires a knowledge of the aspiration level (ideal point) of the players. In the tariff 
game, where players are attempting to maximize the rental incomes and the rental 
income of player 1 is a strictly increasing function of the tariff rate, and the rental 
income of player 2 is a strictly decreasing function of the tariff rate, it is natural to think 
that the best outcome for each player is attained when the employment of labour 
(mobile factor) is completely specialized in his favour. In other words, player 1 would 
aspire to a tariff rate that eliminates employment of labour in the exporting sector and 
player 2 would aspire for a tariff rate that eliminates the employment of labour in the 
import competing sector6.
5 Magee, Brock and Young have defined an economic black hole, in the context of a long-run 
model in which both capital and labour are involved in predatory lobbying, as a situation in which all of 
the economy's factor endowment is exhausted in predatory lobbying. See Magee, Brock and Young 
(1989: 223). A short-run analogue of their economic black hole can be defined as a situation in which the 
owners of the specific factors exhaust all of their rental incomes in predatory lobbying. So, if in a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium each player exhausts his rents in predatory lobbying and obtains zero 
payoffs, then the equilibrium tariff thus determined may be defined as the black hole tariff.
6 In such a case one sector will employ all labour and the other sector will be producing outputs 
employing its sector-specific capital stock only. Production of outputs with a single factor is possible 
under CES production function. The worst outcome for each sector is not to be able to employ the mobile 
factor. Therefore, the rental income and the payoff at the point of minimum expectation of each sector
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However, a price (or tariff rate) will require a complementary financing policy if 
it is not self-financing. Rational players will take into account the effects of such 
policies on their payoffs while determining their aspiration levels. For example, player 
1 may not like to push for a domestic relative price that is higher than that at autarky 
even though it implies a higher rental income, if she has to bear all the subsidy cost.
This is equivalent to subsidizing her production out of her own rental income. The 
payoffs at such prices will be correspondingly less than the rental incomes by the 
amount of subsidy cost. Nevertheless, player 1 would certainly prefer to have such a 
higher-than-autarky price if it is financed by taxing someone else in the economy. 
Symmetric arguments can be made for player 2 - the exporting sector.
In the model studied here, tariff revenue is transferred to the national consumer 
(see equation (3.19') in Table 7.1), which encompasses the government, owners of the 
sector-specific factors, and the labourers. The model does not specify the policies and 
mechanisms for the transfer of the tariff revenue to each individual that will be adopted 
in maintaining a balanced budget of the government. This means that even though the 
government's budget constraint is always satisfied (with the aggregate budget 
constraint) the extent of the gain from the tariff revenue or the cost of the subsidy to 
each individual remains unknown. Thus the model can not yield the payoffs to the 
players gross of tariff revenue or net of subsidy costs. As a result, the problem of 
identifying each player's aspiration level, and hence the point of minimum expectation, 
remains unresolved. We have considered this limitation as the price to be paid for the 
simplicity of the present model* 7.
However, even in a model that attempts to address the distributional issues 
explicitly, numerous ways of financing a tariff induced budget or trade deficit can be 
conceived. At least a somewhat arbitrary rule of distribution of the tariff revenue has to 
be spelled out. Therefore, the point of minimum expectation or the aspiration level of 
the players can be identified only after the mode of balancing the government's budget 
is specified.
We get around this problem by invoking the properties of the pricing function 
offered by the government. It has been assumed (see chapter 5) that the pricing function
will be equal to the level of output thus produced. Comparative static results with minimum expectation
thus defined are reported in Appendix 7B.
7 For a clear approach to the problem of distributing the recycled tariff revenue and its impact on
the endogenous tariff rate see Long and Vousden (1991). They have shown that if the players do not 
differ in their risk preferences significantly, then a failure to account for the tariff revenue changes in the 
players' payoffs will have no qualitative consequence on the final result It simply makes the modelling 
aspect more complicated. However, if there are reasons to believe that the players differ in their risk 
preferences significantly, then it follows from their result that the omission may affect the result 
qualitatively. We ignore the tariff revenue changes in accounting players' payoffs by assuming that 
players have almost identical risk preferences.
of the government satisfies assumptions (A5), which states that, in disagreement, the 
government's pricing function yields a domestic relative price that will always fall in 
between the free trade and the autarky relative price.
This means that, given the properties of the government's pricing function, the 
aspiration level of player 1 is the payoff that is obtained when price takes its upper 
bound - that is the autarkic price, and the aspiration level of player 2 is the payoff that 
is obtained when the price takes its lower bound - that is the free trade price. This 
implies that player l's (import competing sector) minimum expectation is the payoff at 
the free trade price and player 2's (exporting sector) minimum expectation is the payoff 
at the autarkic price - at the tariff rate that eliminates all imports (see figure 7.3). 
Therefore, we write
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nmin = (n;,na2),
where, 11* is the rental income of the import competing sector at the free trade price, 
and f l 2 is the rental income o f the exporting sector at the autarky price.
Minimum Expectation under a support maximizing government
Figure 7.3
The following reasons justify 11““ = (ll*,n2) as a reasonable reference point in 
bargaining:
(1) Free trade and autarky equilibria are well defined concepts, and exist for all non­
zero factor endowment configurations;
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(2) For a given factor endowment, payoffs at the free trade price and at the autarky 
price are unique;
(3) It is claimed (without a rigorous proof) that ü 1™ = (ü * ,n^) is a continuous 
function of the feasible set. The argument is: so long as production functions are 
continuously differentiable in factors, and commodity demand functions are 
differentiable in commodity prices, all rental functions and the autarky equilibrium 
price are continuous functions of factor endowments. This implies that the RTF is 
continuous in factor endowments, and therefore, the payoffs at the free trade price and 
at the autarky price are continuous in factor endowments. Therefore, ü "111 = (11*,n ^ ) is 
continuous in the feasible set, since factor endowment changes are the only sources that 
bring change in the feasible s e t ;
(4) Clearly, as the RTF shifts with a change in factor endowments, so do the payoffs 
at these prices. Therefore, TVmn = (II*,FI“) is sensitive to changes in the boundary of the 
feasible set.
(5) Moreover, under the assumption of self-finance, n 1"111 = (II*,f l “) also satisfies 
Thomson's two properties of a reference point as referred above.
Therefore, we will use IT1"1” = (n^T lJ) as the reference point of the players for 
the bargaining problem in the tariff game. It is clear from the above discussion that this 
point of minimum expectation is obtained under the assumed properties of the pricing 
function. As indicated in chapter 5, these properties of the pricing function are 
consistent with the support maximizing behaviour of the government.
7.4 Comparative Static Results
7.4.1 Comparative Static Results I: Coercive Government
If the government does not care about its support because it is coercive or 
dictatorial, then the pricing function offered by the government need not satisfy some of 
these assumptions - especially, the bounded pricing and self-financing assumptions may 
not be satisfied. Minimum expectation of the players in this political environment can 
be quite different from that in a political environment where the government is based on 
popular politics. For this reason we have constructed the following illustrative special 
case.
7.4.1.1 > Modification of the Model
In this section, we derive the version of the PEGEM that is applicable under a 
coercive government. We know that under a coercive government the minimum
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expectation of the players is the origin. Therefore, substituting IT' = 0 into equation 
(7.12) and solving for Pt we obtain
(7.17) P, Q ,g2
02<T, y,
Linearizing equation (7.17) around the ‘observed’ full equilibrium we obtain 
(7.18) +
At unchanged bargaining powers, whatever they may be, equation (7.18) reduces to 
(7.19) fi= y°2 - y l
Table 7.2
Linearized version of PEGEM: coercive government behaviour
The Political Market: 
(7.191) -y°2~ y ° •
Economic Markets: 
The supply functions:
(3.36’) y°j =kj + <y}
f  no \
zJ± (p ;- w ° ) ;
Labour demands functions:
(3.37)
The Labour market equilibrium condition:
2
(3.38’) l = Y , x 7 r
7=1
Sectoral rental rates:
(339) r; = — (p°-s iw°y ,
^Kj
Price equations:
(3.40’) p[ -  p\ + r° t, and 
(3.41’) p°2 = 0
j  = 1, 2.
7 =  1, 2.
7 = 1, 2.
This equation is exactly similar to the autarky rule of price that was obtained in 
Appendix-2B. It shows that if some exogenous shock led the outputs of the two sectors,
in the new equilibrium, to grow at different rates, then the relative price of the 
commodity growing at a faster rate will fall.8
In order to get a more precise meaning out of the equation (7.19) we combine it 
with the linearized version of the PXGEM described in Table 3.3. This yields the 
linearized version of the PEGEM that is listed in Table 7.2. Once again, we have 
ignored the four equations of the demand side, which are of no consequence to our 
analysis.
7.4.12 Responses of the Tariff Rate
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This system contains 9 equations in 9 endogenous variables, including the tariff 
rate. The system can be solved for each of the endogenous variables in terms of changes 
in the exogenous variables to obtain the elasticity formulae.
In fact, part of the job has already been done in chapter 3. Using equations 
(3.50), and (3.51) that yield the responses of sectoral output levels we can obtain the 
expression for the differential of the sectorial output growth as
(7.20) 3 $ - * -  —
A S°
no
1
+ K a2 K ~
X\g2
r °
2
X\g2S[
r °
^K2
+ X°g1 fcj
G2SL2
no no no  no
V 1 ** Kl  2 ^
P\ +
S°K2
where, A0 = X\gx / S°Kl + X°2g2 / S°K2 > 0.
Solving equation (7.19), and (7.20) for p° we get
(7.21) p°x =B -i ^ L + XW l L + X<’a2 2
A
*2“
+  + x > 
no n o  1 1
V 2 2
+ G2^L2 &\SlI
V 2 >Kl )  _
where, B = A0 + no  no  
0 K2 1
no
°AT1
> 0 .
}K2 y
8 Note that equation (7.19) remains independent of the way tariff is distributed. Therefore, as far 
as the results of this section are concerned, the distribution of the tariff revenue does not matter.
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Recalling that the factor creating a wedge between the domestic relative price 
and the world relative price is the tariff rate(see equation (3.40') in Table 7.2) it follows 
from equation (7.21) that
Some interesting results follow from equation (7.22). Before we discuss those 
results, we recall the definitions of the variables and parameters involved in the 
equations.
First, T = 1 /  (1 + 7|Ä), where, T* = (7J -  T2) / (1 + T2) (equations 3.24, and 3.32) 
is the rationalized tariff rate - a single tariff rate that is equivalent to the joint imposition 
of an import tax at rate T{, and an export subsidy (tax if negative) at rate T2, and 
t = 100 x dl\R is the change in the percentage point (not the percentage change in the 
tariff rate) of the rationalized tariff rate.
The term (1 + T*) can be viewed as the rate of protection offered to the import 
competing sector, and therefore, the term x t , which represents the percentage change 
in (1 + 7]*), can also be viewed as the percentage change in the rate of protection 
awarded to the import competing sector. If, in the initial full equilibrium, T*> 0 - that 
is, the economy was taxing trade - then we obtain 0 < f  < 1. Similarly, r  = 1 for T* = 0, 
and r  > 1 for -1 < T* < 0. If we exclude the possibility of subsidizing imports or taxing 
exports at rates greater than 100% as practically implausible, then the parameter t is 
always positive.
Furthermore, the share parameters A2, SKl, SK2, SLl, and SL2 are always 
positive. The elasticities of factor substitution ox and cr2 are also positive.
Now by setting any three of the four exogenous variables - and /, in
turn equal to zero we can obtain the comparative static results as follows:
(7.22)
V *j k i  y
(7.23) ” = - l < 0 ;
Pi
1 ^ 2 tJL2
o
+ AJ<7j <0;
(7.25) —  = fl-'
K
'K°i I IW L— + A°2c 2 > 0; and
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(7.26) 11T B
-i ^ 2 ^ L 2
%
>  n __^ 2 § L 2  — ^l^L l0 ay no
° X 2
These results can be summarized as follows. For small changes, other things 
remaining the same -
Result 7.1 Any change in the relative price of the import competing good in the
world market is exactly compensated by domestic tariff changes leaving the domestic 
relative price of the import competing good unchanged.
Result 7.2 If a sector experiences an exogenous increase in the stock of its specific 
factor, then the rate of protection awarded to this (growing) sector will decline and the 
rate of protection awarded to the other sector will rise.
Result 7.3 An exogenous increase in the supply of the mobile factor (labour) in the 
economy may lead to a fall or a rise in the rate of protection awarded to a sector 
depending on the relative ease of factor substitution and factor intensity between the 
two sectors.
7.4.U  Discussion of the Results
Result 7.1 This result implies that if, say, the price of the domestic exportable rises 
in the world market, ceteris paribus, then either export subsidies will fall or import taxes 
will increase to such an extent that the increase in the rationalized tariff rate will exactly 
offset the effect of the world price change. The domestic economy will be fully 
insulated against terms of trade shocks. No reallocation of resources will take place. 
Why do we get this result?
Suppose that H(P*) represent the distribution of rents at free trade, and I l( /f )  
represent the payoffs at the generalized Nash bargaining equilibrium. Therefore, at the 
domestic relative price P° the players' generalized fears of ruin are equal. Suppose 
further that, other things the same, the price of the home exportable good rises in the 
world market. Let the new world relative price of the import competing good be P* 
such that P* < P*.
At an unchanged tariff rate (policy) the relative price of the import competing 
good in the domestic market will fall at the same proportional rate as it did in the world 
market. Let the new domestic relative price be Px. Consequently, PXGEM predicts that 
the rental income of the import competing sector will fall and that of the exporting 
sector will rise compared to the initial equilibrium. Thus, the players will slide from the 
point n ( />1°) to the point FI(/>1) along the RTF (see figure 7.4). As a result the gain of 
player 1, relative to the reference point (origin), declines, and that of player 2 increases.
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Bargained tariff rate and world price changes 
Figure 7.4
We know that each player's fear of ruin (disagreement) depends directly on the 
size of the gain relative to the minimum expectation it follows that at Pl . player 2 will 
be more fearful of player 1 declaring disagreement than player 1 fears of player 2 
declaring disagreement.9 To restore equality in players' generalized fear of ruin player 
2's payoffs has to be reduced and that of player 1 has to raised by tariff changes. 
Therefore, in the new sequence of bargaining process prompted by the world price 
change player 2 will ultimately concede, leading to a higher tariff rate in the new 
equilibrium.
The new tariff rate will be such that the induced domestic relative price remains 
unaffected, since the RTF and the level curves of the generalized Nash product are 
unaffected by changes in the international terms of trade, and therefore, the equilibrium 
point will also remain unaffected.
Result 7.2: The following explanation can be given to the result that an exogenous
increase in the stock of the specific factor in the import competing sector would lead to 
a fall in the rationalized tariff rate and/or a rise in the export subsidy. The remaining 
results (the effect of an increase in the stock of the specific factor in the exporting 
sector, and the Result 7.3, that is the effect of an increase in the supply of the mobile 
factor) can be explained in a similar way.
9 For details see the discussion on point B in the proof of Corollary 6.3.
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In order to simplify the diagrammatic exposition, while drawing the following 
diagram (figure 7.5), we have assumed that production functions are Cobb-Douglas in 
both sectors.
Suppose that £ 0, the point of tangency of Nash product NQ to the rent 
transformation frontier CD, is the initial equilibrium of the tariff game. Suppose further 
that the capital stock in sector 1 increases exogenously. Then, the RTF will shift 
upwards to CD . PXGEM predicts that, at an unchanged tariff rate and therefore at an 
unchanged domestic relative price, the output and rental income of sector 1 will 
increase and the output and rental income of sector 2 will fall. The point Ex describes 
the combination of the rental incomes (in economic equilibrium) of the two sectors.
Effects on the bargained traiff rate of an increase inATj 
Figure 7.5
From equation (7.1 lb) it can be seen that the slope of the RTF depends only on 
the relative price, since the distributive shares are constant under Cobb-Douglas 
production functions. If the point Ex on C D  and the point E0 on CD correspond to the 
same relative price, then the slopes of the frontiers at E0 and at El respectively should 
be equal. However, the absolute slope of the Nash product curve at Ex will exceed the 
slope of the Nash product curve at E0 (by homotheticity10, see the curve labelled N{).
10 When the payoffs at the point of minimum expectation are zero for both players, then the 
generalized Nash product reduces to a Cobb-Douglas type function. So, the generalized Nash product is
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Therefore, the curve N{ will not be tangent to the frontier CD at Ex. However, their 
slopes indicate that at Ex player l's fear of ruin will exceed player 2's fear of ruin. 
Therefore, in the new bargaining process, induced by the shock, player 1 will concede 
and the tariff rate on imports of commodity 1 will fall, leading to a fall in the relative 
price of commodity 1 in the domestic market. The new bargained equilibrium will be 
attained at E2 on CD where both players will be equally fearful of ruin.
The results, though consistent with general intuition in terms of the direction of 
responses, are very strong. In particular, the result that the domestic economy will be 
fully insulated against any terms of trade change in the world market can be debated. 
However, it should be noted that the results are subject to the assumption that the 
government is expected to be unconstrained with respect to tariff rates, and as a result 
the point of minimum expectation was the origin. The reference point, thus assumed, 
was insensitive to changes in the economic environment.
7.4.2 Comparative Static Results II: Support Maximizing Government
In this section we will study the comparative static properties of the bargained 
tariff rate under the assumption that the government is a support maximizer. It has been 
shown in the appendix to chapter 5 that if the government is a support maximizer, then 
it will offer a pricing functions that satisfies assumptions (Al) - (A3), and (A5). In 
particular, assumption (A5) implies that the prices offered by the government always 
falls between the autarkic and the free trade equilibrium price.
In the following subsections we first modify the model to accommodate the 
consequence of this assumption on the minimum expectations of the players which is 
followed by the comparative static result when the world price changes. Details of the 
other comparative static results are provided in the Appendix- 7 A.
7.4.2.1 Modification of the Model
Under the assumptions (Al)- (A3) and (A5), the payoff at the minimum 
expectation of the import competing sector will be equal to the payoff at the free trade 
price and the minimum expectation payoff of the exporting sector will be equal to the 
payoff at the autarkic price. Therefore we write
nd = nmin=(n;,n;)
clearly homothetic for the same reason as the Cobb-Douglas production function is - that the slope of the 
level curves at any point depend only on the ratio of the payoffs at that point.
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Table 73
Linearized version of the PEGEM under Cobb-Douglas production functions
and the self-financing assumption
The Political Market:
(7.28’) D , «  - < ) -  D2{k°2 -7 ta2) = y°2 -y?  - p[. 
(7.30') n° = kt + r° -  p°
Economic Markets:
Output supply functions:
/  \
j  = 1,2.
Labour demands functions:
The labour market equilibrium condition:
2
(3.38') l =
Sectoral rental rates:
Price equations:
(3.40') p[ = p\ + x° r, and 
(3.41’) p2° = 0
To obtain analytical results, which are not possible otherwise, we assume that 
the production functions in both sectors are Cobb-Douglas (not necessarily identical). 
This assumption implies that
and all distributive shares will be constant at all equilibria. In particular, It can be seen 
from equations (3.28) and (3.29) that Su = a., and SKi = ßi for each sector i.
With these modifications the first order condition of bargaining equilibrium 
(7.12) can be written as
Holding bargaining powers constant, equation (7.27) can be linearized and 
written in terms of percentage changes of the variables as
Oi =  ° 2  =  1
(7.27)
n.-nl n, qj2 
n2 -  n2 n2 02Pi?i
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(7.28) A «  -  < ) - D 2«  -  n l)  y \ - p \
where,
(7.29a)
n'
D , = -------—7 > 0 , andn °-n ;
(7.29b)
n a
D2 = 2 > 0 .2 n ; - n ;
Linearizing the equation (7.14), the percentage changes in rental incomes can be 
expressed in terms of percentage changes in rental rates as follows:
(7.30) n° -  +  r° -  p°
where it is understood that commodity 2 is the numeraire, and therefore, p ^ = 0 .
Now the linearized version o f the PEGEM can be written as in Table 7.3. Note 
that the systems of equations in Table 7.3 and 7.2 differ in two respects. First, the 
elasticities of factor substitution are set to unity in Table 7.3 because we are assuming 
Cobb-Douglas production functions. Second, the point of minimum expectation in 
Table 7.3 is not the origin. The system presented in Table 7.3 allows the payoff at the 
reference point (disagreement payoff) to respond to changes in exogenous variables.
7.4.2.2 World Price Changes and Response of the Tariff Rate
Now we apply a shock to the economy o f a small change in the relative price of 
the import competing good in the international market assuming that the factor 
endowments remain unchanged.
Since ki = 0 for each sector /, it follows from equation (7.30) that 
K  = r\ ~ P°\ > a n d  n\ = 'I *  -  A  •
Hence using equations (3.46) and (3A.6) that describe the response of rental functions 
in PXGEM (chapter 3) we can write
(7.31) P\ ^2^Ll 
A $K\Sk2
, and n\ P\ ^2^L\ 
A  SkI$K2
It has also been shown in chapter 3 that the RTF does not shift with respect to 
any change in the international terms of trade (or relative price). It simply induces a 
movement along the RTF. In other words, the shape o f the product transformation 
frontier is unaffected by the terms of trade change in the international market.
Therefore, for given tastes, the autarkic equilibrium is unaffected by changes in the 
international terms of trade. This implies that
*2=0.
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From equation (3.47) and equation (7.30) we get
(7.32) *2 =r2 = - ^\^LlP\
A Sk\Sk2
Similarly, by setting elasticities of factor substitution equal to unity, and holding 
endowment of factors constant, we obtain from equation (7.20) that
(7.33) y i - y i
l
^  ^ K l ° K 2
( K S L2 +  K S L \ ) P
0
1 *
Substituting these results that follow from PXGEM into equation (7.28) of 
linearized PEGEM (Table 7.3) we get
(7.34) D, * Ä ,
A  Sk\$K2
Pi ~
x '2s LX
A Sk\$K2
+ D, A°S Vn  ° K \ ° K 2
1 (X°SL2 + X02SL1)p?-
Solving this equation for p° we obtain
(7.35) 1a °<s s:n  ^ K \ ^ K 2
(DxX°2Sli + D2X\SL2 + l)p° -  Dx ^ 2 $ L l
A $k\Sk2
The coefficients on both sides of equation (7.35) are positive, it follows that
(7.36) A- > 0.
A
Equation (7.36) shows that the relative price of commodity 1 in the domestic 
market moves with the relative price of commodity 1 in the world market. In particular, 
it states that if the relative price of the domestic exportable increases in the world 
market, then the relative price of the exportable in the domestic market will also 
increase. Equation (7.35) can be solved, for the percentage change in the protection 
rate, as
(7.37) r t 1
1 + DxX°2SL i + D2X\Sl
d xa °sl x \ - d 2x°2sL2- i
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It can be shown that X \ l  A* > X \ !  A °  since X \  > X°2 by proposition 2.1, it can 
not be said a priori that the tariff rate will fall or rise as the relative price of the import 
competing good rises in the world market. Thus all the unambiguous results regarding 
the behaviour of the bargained tariff rate obtained in the previous case disappeared as 
we allowed the point of minimum expectation to respond to change in the exogenous 
variables.
The situation becomes still worse as we perform comparative static experiments 
by changing factor endowments. In these cases even the direction of changes of the 
domestic relative price appeared ambiguous let alone the response of the bargained 
tariff rate (see Appendix-7 A).
However, it is important to note that equations (7.28) and (7.29) hold for any 
arbitrary CES production functions provided that the distribution of the bargaining 
power is unaffected by the shocks. Since, equations (7.28) and (7.29) do not contain the 
terms representing the players’ relative bargaining powers the solution of the linearized 
version of PEGEM is independent of the distribution of the bargaining power. This 
means that the responses of the bargained tariff rate with any arbitrary CES production 
function are independent of the distribution of bargaining power. The distribution of 
bargaining power may affect the level of the tariff rate but not the magnitude of 
response in the tariff rate as the exogenous variables change. This is nonetheless a very 
remarkable result.
7.5 Summary
In this chapter, we obtained a policy endogenous general equilibrium model 
(PEGEM) by combining the conditions that characterize the Nash bargaining 
equilibrium in the political sphere, and the conditions that characterize an equilibrium 
in the economic sphere of a political economy. By arguing that the payoffs at the point 
of minimum expectation of the players can be a reasonably good reference point for 
bargaining in the tariff game, the concept of disagreement was made operational.
The comparative static responses of the bargained tariff rate were studied under 
two different assumptions on the nature of the government.
First, we considered the case of a coercive government, which had no restraint 
in choosing the domestic relative price. Consequently, the minimum expectations of 
both players were zero. The comparative static results, in this case, were conclusive and 
it was found, in particular, that the bargained tariff rate moved in the opposite direction 
to exactly offset the change in the world relative price of the domestic import 
competing good.
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When it was assumed that the government is a support maximizer, which 
maintains some restraint in choosing domestic relative price, the minimum expectations 
of the player 1 and 2 were given by the free trade and the autarkic equilibrium payoffs 
respectively. In this case, the minimum expectation payoffs became not only nonzero 
but also sensitive to changes in the exogenous variables. It was not possible to sign the 
comparative static responses of the tariff rate as the exogenous variables change. 
However, as in previous studies, it was found that ceteris paribus the domestic relative 
price always moves in the same direction as the international relative price moves. A 
clear-cut answer can be obtained easily by simulating the model numerically.
Therefore, in the next chapter we will simulate the PEGEM with some 
hypothetical data set that will also show how the model can be implemented.
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Appendix-7A: Derivation of Complete Comparative Static Results under a 
Popular Government and Cobb-Douglas Production Functions
From equation (7.30) we have,
(7A.1) <  -  K  = (^ i+K -p°x) - ( k i + K -  a  ) 
= (ri° ~  P i ) ~  ( r* ~  A*)-
For a given tariff rate, equation (3.46) can be used to obtain
} °  c c
(7A.2) r° -  p\  = - £ 2 u _  — p t W K  + -  /)
A Sri,Sr, A
Symmetrically, we can obtain from equation (3A.6) that 
(7A.3) r/ -  pi = — Pi’ — + ^ 2*2 -  0  •
/ I  J j / i d j " )  / l  J  r i
Using equations (7A.2) and (7A.3) into equation (7A.1) we can express 
(Tr" -  ^*) in terms of percentage change in the relative price, and percentage change in 
factor quantities.
Similarly, from equation (7.30), noting that commodity 2 is the numeraire in 
PXGEM, we can also write
(7 A.4) ( ^ - 7 r 2a ) =  ( ^  +  r2° ) - ( ^  +  r2a )
= r2 ~ ri-
Substituting (Tj = <J2 = 1 in defining equations (3B.11) - (3B.15) and then 
simplifying the terms in equation (3B.18) yields
(7A.5) r2a = 5 L2( ^ - / ) .
This equation shows that under a Cobb-Douglas production function, the rental income 
in sector 2 is independent of capital stock in sector l . 11
Therefore, making use of the result obtained in equation (3.47) together with 
equation (7 A.5) we can write
11 See also the discussion following equation (2B.18) in Appendix 2B. One implication of this 
result is that the payoff o f player 2 in the autarkic equilibrium, which is the minimum expectation of 
player 2, remains unaffected by changes in the capital stock in sector 1 since, the price of commodity 2 
has been held fixed by the choice of the numeraire.
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(7A.6) r2 - r 2 K S l
A ‘^ X 'l‘^ A'2
i a
A°St
+ S, fc2 +
\A 'S ki
+ S,
Substituting equation (7A.6) in equation (7A.4) we can express (n°2 -  n a2) in terms of 
percentage change in the relative price and percentage change in factor quantities.
(7A.7)
Finally, using equation (7.20) we can obtain
1 1 ( S ^ ,  —  5 ^ 2 )
y% -y\  -  a *2 — — kl + ^ K}_ 7 27/ -A°SKi A°SK2 A Sk\Sk2 A SKlSK2
Substituting equations (7A.1), (7A.4), and (7A.7) in equation (7.28) of the text
we obtain 
(7A.8)
2®C l o r
Dx 7 ^  + D , ~ Al^-2 +
v ^ SKlSK2 A Sk\$k2 A SKlSK2 y
A - tt
a;s2^ 1.1
^ Sk\$K2
A + n *^1
f At A n l
1 5 U *
1
^
 1 • 1
A‘SK
+
+
1 S
7  2 o 2 * A  
^ 2  _  _^2
A° A* A^L2
S „ u
+ A A 2
At
A°S 
1
+ 1 +  ■
AT2 y A°S.
*2
A0^
+ 1 + $K\ $K2
7
It is obvious that the coefficients of the variables p °, and p\ are positive, 
whereas the coefficients of the endowment variables ^ ^  and /, are ambiguous (we 
need specific values of the parameters to determine) in their signs. Thus, algebraically, 
we have the following comparative static results:
(i)
(ii)
A - > 0;
£ l S 0 • 
*■< ’
(iii) — <0; and
2^
(iv) 0.
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Moreover, as we go to estimate the response of the tariff rate, even the effect of 
relative price becomes indeterminate. The nice and clear result obtained in the previous 
case disappears here suggesting a need for a numerical simulation of the model.
Appendix-7B: Minimum Expectation and the Comparative Static Results when
If specialization in the employment of labour is feasible, then the aspiration 
level of player 1 is the rental income that can be obtained when all labour in the 
economy is employed in sector 1. Sector 2 will produce its output employing capital 
only. Therefore the payoff to the specific factors in sector 2, in this case, will be equal 
to its output. This represents the minimum expectation of player 2. Similarly, the 
aspiration level of player 1 is the rental income that it can obtain when all labour in the 
economy is employed in sector 2. Sector 1 will produce its output employing its capital 
stock only. Therefore, if this happens, the payoff to the specific factor in sector 1 will 
be equal to the quantity of output produced in sector 1.
We know that if L, = 0, then Yi = ß~ilpiKi since the production functions are 
assumed to be CES in both sectors. Therefore, the minimum expectation of each player 
i is given by
Now, replacing n f  by n™" defined by equation (7B.1) and linearizing the
PEGEM given in Table 7.1 we can obtain the linearized version of the model as listed 
in table 7.4. Where, as in equation (7.19), for each player i, D' is defined as
Comparative Static Results:
Making use of equations (7B.4) and (7B.5) equation (7B.3) can be written as
Specialization in Labour Employment is Feasible
(7B.1)
We can obtain from equation (3.46) that
(7B.7)
and from equation (3.47) we obtain
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(7B.8) _  a ; q - ,%A o n o  n o  r i
n o
Or-,
O c 
™ °K\ÖK2 A 'S l 2
( A f t + A ’ f c , - / ) .
Substituting the expressions for (/f -  p°) from equation (7B.7) and for r° from 
equation (7B.8) into equation (7B.6) we obtain
(7B.9)
A O n o  n o  A o n o  n o
V ^  ° x i ° x 2  n  ök \ök2 y V n  ^  °AT2 )
Substituting the expression for (y°2 -  y°) from equation (7.20) into equation 
(7B.9) and solving for p° we obtain
(7B.10) i-i
n 'S °
A ° n o
D'S°U 2ÖL2 
AO no  
n  ^K2 /
1^ ^ 0£ 0  (^2°2 + SL2^'\(*2 1^ Cri‘^Ä’2) K
D'S°U\^ L\______ D $L
A °  C° A ° ^ °n n j K2 y^ 2  +  ^ o ^ o  ( ^ 1 ° 1  +  *^L1^2ö ’l +  ^ 2 ^ 2 ^  K\ ) ^
k-1 _ 1_
A°
® 2 $ L 2 (  D VU \^L\ D X i  T
K l S il j
A ° c °
ö Kl a °s °K2 J.
where,
(7B.11)
' flT,<r,s;, | D X a X  N
A°<Z° <\° n  °X1°X2
A o n o  no  
n  °tfl°*2
+ C7i<T2
a o no no  
n  ° K \°K 2
( A ^ 2 + A ^ , ) + 1 > 0.
As in the case of coercive government, it follows from equation (7B.10) that 
changes in tariff rate will exactly offset any change in terms of trade in the international 
market. Thus the domestic economy will be insulated from terms of trade shock. This 
result follows because the variable p[ responds only to domestic endowment changes, 
but not to changes in the international relative price.
The effects of changes in the endowment variables in the domestic relative price 
is unclear. The size and direction of effects can only be obtained after the numerical 
simulation of the model.
Table 7.4
Linearized version of PEGEM: 
Specialized labour employment in disagreement
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The Political Market
(7B.3) D ; «  - T O "  D2'(*J -  a f )  = y2° -  -  r f .
(7B.4) n° -  kt + r° -  p°
(7B.5) Ttf* = i=l, 2.
Economic Markets: 
Output supply functions'.
f  n o  \  
no
\ > K j J
(3.36’) y°j =kj + <Jj (p;-w°);
Labour demands functions:
0.37') /;=* ,+§•(?;-« a
The labour market equilibrium condition:
2
(3.38') / = £ * ”/;.
7=1
j  = 1, 2.
j  =  1, 2.
Sectoral rental rates:
(3.39') r /= - ^ - ( p ; - $ > • ) ; j  =  1, 2
Price equations:
(3.40') = p\ + T° t, and
(3.41') p2° = 0
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CHAPTER 8
SOME ILLUSTRATIVE SIMULATIONS OF THE PEGEM 
Introduction
The comparative static results presented in the last chapter have indicated that, 
even in this simple model, if the point of minimum expectation responds to exogenous 
shocks, then a priori predictions on the behaviour of the bargained tariff rate are not 
straightforward matters. To be able to do so one has to evaluate complex algebraic 
expressions involving various shares corresponding to different equilibrium points and 
the payoffs at the point of minimum expectations. One way to overcome this problem is 
to solve the PEGEM numerically.
Therefore, the main purpose of this chapter is to implement the computable 
version of the PEGEM numerically. This implementation serves the following 
purposes. First, it demonstrates that the PEGEM is operational - that is, PEGEM can be 
simulated to observe the endogenous behaviour of the policy variables as the economy 
faces exogenous shocks. Second, it yields some predictions regarding the behaviour of 
the bargained tariff rate, which can then be compared with the findings and predictions 
of previous studies.
Though, numerical simulation is useful in obtaining definite answers to the 
questions of our interest, it is not free from disadvantages. The major disadvantage of 
this technique is that the responses of the endogenous variables thus obtained are not 
valid generally. They reflect the behaviour of the endogenous variables under a 
particular environment, which is determined by the chosen, estimated or the observed 
values of the parameters and the exogenous variables of the model. If the model is 
calibrated to the data set of a particular country, then its predictions would be valid only 
for that country. To retain the flavour of generality we have, therefore, opted to 
calibrate the model to different sets of hypothetical data and parameter values covering 
some extreme cases.
In particular, we have considered the equilibrium behaviour of the economy in 
three different cases. Case (a) depicts the economy as if it were in an environment of 
almost free trade. This situation is characterized by a very low tariff rate, and a large 
volume of trade. Case (b) depicts the economy as if it were in an environment of almost 
autarky. This situation is characterized by a very high tariff rate, and almost no trade 
with the rest of the world. Case (c) depicts an intermediate case in which the economy 
is described as if it had a moderate tariff rate and moderate volume of trade with the rest 
of the world.
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Simulation of the model under these three different cases allowed us to examine 
whether or not the results imply a general pattern in the responses of the bargained tariff 
rate, irrespective of the nature of the government and the parametric configuration.
In summary, the simulation results displayed a general pattern of the bargained- 
tariff response with respect to changes in the exogenous variables. Irrespective of the 
trade regime, the direction of the bargained-tariff response under a popular government 
followed the same pattern as under a coercive government, as described in the previous 
chapter. The precise magnitudes of the responses are of course different.
More importantly, it is observed that the behaviour of the bargained tariff rate is 
consistent with the predictions that follow from the maximization of a conservative 
social welfare function. This observation has far reaching consequences. First, it shows 
that the bargain-theoretic approach can be used to obtain a social welfare function that 
is consistent with self-interested behaviour of the politico-economic agents1. Second, if 
welfare theorists are prepared to accept the assertion that the positive social welfare 
function is an outcome of a (Nash) bargaining process, then the results presented here 
may help resolve the existing difference between the schools that believe in the ‘self- 
interest’ and those that believe in the ‘public-interest’ as a motive force working behind 
the policy making process.2
This chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section describes the 
simulation model, which is simply the linearized version of the PEGEM. The second 
section describes the calibration and simulation strategy, linearization errors, and the 
nature of the basic data sets to be considered to maintain a flavour of generality in the 
results.
The third section discusses the simulation results in two parts. In the first part, 
we hold the elasticities of factor substitution at unity, and consider economies at 
different tariff regimes. Here, we provide estimates of the bargaining powers of the 
players under the assumption that the observed data set represents the full equilibrium. 
We provide a detailed discussion of the simulation results by comparing the predictions 
of the policy-exogenous model with that of the policy-endogenous model. Finally, we 
explain why the bargained tariff rate responds to the shocks as predicted by the 
PEGEM. In the second part, we consider the case of an intermediate tariff regime and
1 For an axiomatic derivation of the Nash social welfare function see Kaneko and Nakamura 
(1979). For arguments against the use of the Nash social welfare function see (Ng, 1981) and also Yaari 
(1981). It is, however, noteworthy that all of these studies are limited up to the original version of Nash's 
solution that does not allow for unequal bargaining powers of the players. Whether the presence of 
asymmetric bargaining powers can dilute Ng's is a topic for further research.
2 See Martin (1990) for a comparative discussion of both theory and evidence on private and 
public interest approach in policy formulation.
examine the behaviour of the tariff rate with different production technologies. The 
testable propositions that follow from these simulation exercises are listed in section 
four.
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In section five, we evaluate the credibility of the hypotheses forwarded by this 
study against the results of previous studies. It is found that each of the predictions of 
the PEGEM can find support in previous empirical or theoretical works. In section six 
we have applied this model to provide an alternate explanation of some of the 
commonly raised issues such as why developing countries tax agriculture and 
developed countries subsidize it. Finally, this chapter is concluded in section seven.
8.1 PEGEM: The Simulation Model
The linearized version of the PEGEM in its full form is listed in Table 8.1. This 
model describes the conditions for equilibrium in the political market as well as in the 
economic market. The condition for equilibrium in the political market is the condition 
for a generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem in the tariff game. The 
conditions for equilibrium in the economic markets are the conditions that describe the 
PXGEM. The endogenous economic variables are determined by the economic markets 
and the policy variable - the tariff rate, is determined by the political market. Full 
equilibrium is attained when both markets are simultaneously in equilibrium. This 
occurs when the values of the economic variables determined in the economic market 
also satisfy the condition for equilibrium in the political market.
The economic markets contain three sub-models of which one is factual and two 
are counterfactual (see Table 8.1). The first component, which is the factual one, is the 
basic sub-model that lists the conditions of equilibrium in the observed state of the 
economic markets. It is simply the linearized version of the PXGEM component of the 
PEGEM listed in Table 7.1. The set of equations in the basic sub-model differs from the 
set of equations listed in Table 7.3 or in Table 7.4 (see Appendix 7B) in that it includes 
the demand side of the economy, namely equations (8.1), (8.3), (8.4), and (8.6), which 
have been ignored so far. These equations, pertaining to the demand side, can be 
obtained in the following way.
Linearizing the consumer demand equation (3.19') we can obtain 
(8.1) c°= -p°  + '£H°(p°+y°)  + H l z \  j  = \2.
i= 1
where,
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(8.2a) / / ; =  2 SÜZ----- , i = l,2;
i= i
(8.2b) « 3“ = t —  --------and
Y^P°Y° + Z °
«=1
Z° represents the tariff revenue in the observed equilibrium of the economy. In 
percentage change form it can be expressed as
(8.3) z° = p* +mf + t / T°
where, t is the change in percentage points of the rationalized tariff rate, T°, on imports 
of good 1.
The defining equations (8.2a) and (8.2b) show that the H° terms are the shares 
of sectoral value-added and tariff revenue respectively in total income of the national 
(representative) consumer, which is the sum of the sectoral value-added and the tariff 
revenue.
To clear the market of good 1 we must have C° = Y° + M°. Expressing this 
condition in percentage change form we get
(8.4) c{ = J°y°x + J\n$
where,
(8.5a) J° = ^ ~  and
v '  1 n o
M
(8.5b)
PX°M°,
P°C°
are the shares of domestic output and import in the domestic consumption of good 1 
respectively.
We have already noted that the trade balance constraint represents the market 
clearing condition in the foreign exchange market. Expressing the trade balance 
constraint in percentage change form and noting that good 2 is the numeraire we get
(8.6)
Table 8.1
Simulation model of a political economy: PEGEM
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The Full Model
The Political Market:
(7.28') Dj(«f -  < ) - D2(n° - n a2) = y°2 - - p\. 
(7.30’) n° = ^ + r° -  p°
Economic Markets: PXGEM 
The Basic Sub-model
(a) Commodity Markets 
Output supply functions
(3.36’) y°j kJ + ai
f  r o  \
zR
S° (p ;-w °); y=i ,  2.
Consumer demand, and tariff revenue
(8.1) c ;= -p ;+ i« r < A , +jf)+flj*'. j = 12.
i = i
(8.3) z° = p[ +mf + t /  Tf 
Market clearing equations
(8.4) <=A>r+AX
(Trade balance constraint)
(8.6) m2 = P\ +
(b) The Labour Market 
Labour demands functions
(3 .3 7 ) /; = * ,+ I H p ; - * ’); 7 = 1,2.
The labour market equilibrium condition
2
(3.38) / = £ a*/;.
7=1
(c) Sectoral Rental Rates
(3.39') r? = -L (p "  -  S^tv"); =1,2
(c) The Price Equations 
(3.40’) = /?* + t° t, and
(3.41') p2°= 0 ____________________________________
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Table 8.1 (contd.)
The Free Trade Sub-model
(a) Commodity Markets 
Output supply functions
(3A.1-) y’j = ki + a ,
\
S *
Consumer demand
(8.7) c ^ - p ’ + j
«=1
Market clearing conditions
(8.8) c\ = J[y\ + J'2n\
(Trade balance)
(8.9) m2 = Pi +
(b) The Labour Market 
Labour demands functions
(3A.2') l ' ,=k,+^- (p ' , - w ' y .
The labour market equilibrium condition 
(3A.3') ‘ = ’L K lr
(c) The Rental Rates
(3A.4')
7 = 1, 2.
7 =  12.
j  = 1, 2.
j  = 1,2.
(d) Price Normalisation Rule 
(3A.5') p\ = 0.
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Table 8.1 (contd.)
Autarkic Sub-model:
(a) Commodity Markets 
Output supply functions:
(3B.2) y* = kj +a j
(  a a  \
IR
StV * /  J
( p ; - w a);
Commodity demand functions
(3B.3-) c ;= -p ;+ X « r (r f+ y T );  ,
Market clearing condition 
(3B.7) Cj
(b) The Labour Market 
Labour demands functions
(3B.4') 1° =k/ + ^ - (p ° - w° y ,
The labour market equilibrium condition 
(3B.5') / =
y= i
(c) The Rental Rates
(3B.6') r‘ = ± - (p
^Kj
(d) Price Normalisation Rule 
(3B.8') pi  = 0.
7 =  1, 2.
7 =  1,2
y = l, 2. 
/  =  1, 2.
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Note that equations (8.4) and (8.6) require that the markets for good 1 and 
foreign exchange continue to clear after each disturbance to the economy, and the 
labour market will continue to clear by equation (3.38'). It does not say anything about 
the market of good 2. It will continue to clear by Walras' Law.
The second component of the full model has been called the free trade sub­
model. It describes the equilibrium of the economy under free trade. This set of 
equations has been obtained from the set listed in Table 3A.1 by adding, as in the main 
model, equations (8.7) - (8.9) that represent the demand side of the economy. The way 
these demand side equations have been derived is similar to that in the main model.
Note that there are no variables to represent tariff revenue and tariff rate since they do 
not exist under free trade regime. The purpose of including this component into the full 
model is to obtain expression for the payoff at the minimum expectation of player 1 
(owner of the specific factor in the import competing sector). Thus the free-trade sub­
model will yield the changes in the minimum expectation of player 1 as exogenous 
variables change.
The third component of the full model has been called the autarky sub-model. 
The equations listed in this group have been copied from Table 3B.2. Note that under 
autarky the market of each commodity clears domestically. There are no net imports 
and therefore, whatever the tariff rate, tariff revenue collection is always zero. We have 
stated the market clearing condition for good 1 and the market of good 2 will clear by 
Walras' Law. This component of the model yields the behaviour of the endogenous 
variables if the economy maintains an autarkic regime before and after a given shock.
In particular, this sub-model yields the expression for the minimum expectation of 
player 2 - the exporting sector.
8.2 Some Strategic Considerations
This section contains three subsections. The first subsection outlines the 
simulation strategy that will be employed in obtaining the counterfactual data sets. The 
second subsection discusses the linearization errors and consequently examines the 
accuracy of the counterfactual data sets. In the third subsection we consider the issue 
concerned with maintaining the flavour of generality of the simulation results while 
choosing the hypothetical basic data sets.
8.2.1 Simulation Strategy and Calibration of the PEGEM
It can be seen from Table 8.1 that the implementation of the model requires both 
factual and counterfactual information. Factual information, that includes the elasticities 
of factor substitution in the two sectors and various quantity and value shares at the
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observed state of equilibrium (or ‘base year’), is required to calibrate the basic sub­
model. Counterfactual information, that includes the quantity and value shares both at 
the free trade equilibrium and at the autarkic equilibrium, is required to calibrate the 
free trade sub-model and the autarkic sub-model of the PEGEM. This information is 
also required to calculate the coefficients Di, and Ö2 (see equation 7.29). Therefore, 
the following 3-step strategy has been adopted to generate the counterfactual data sets 
(see figure 8.1).
In the first step we calibrate the basic sub-model using the base year data set.
The quantity and value shares are calculated from the base year data set (for example 
from the input-output table) under the normalization that the base year domestic prices 
of both goods are equal to unity. The general nature of the data set required to obtain 
sufficient information to calibrate the basic sub-model and generic rules to calculate the 
relevant shares are outlined in the Appendix 8A. We assume that the elasticities of 
factor substitution are known from extraneous sources and remain constant throughout 
experiments.
The basic sub-model contains 13 variables in 13 equations. The endogenous 
variables are the percentage changes of the following variables: 2 sectoral outputs, 2 
domestic demands, 2 net import quantities, 2 sectoral employments of labour, 2 rental 
rates, 1 wage rate, 1 domestic relative price, and 1 tariff revenue. It contains five 
exogenous variables four of which - 2 stocks of sector specific capital, 1 economy wide 
supply of labour, 1 relative price of good 1 in the world market - are in percentage 
change form, and one policy variable - the rationalized tariff rate - is in the form of 
change in percentage point.
In this model net capital inflow is assumed to be zero. Therefore, the 
assumptions that goods and foreign exchange markets clear imply that trade remains 
balanced at the world price. The above division of the variables into endogenous and 
exogenous variables is sufficient to close the model, and in what follows it is referred to 
as the natural closure of the basic sub-model. Of course, commodity 2 is the numeraire 
and therefore the change in its price is set to zero. Once the model has been 
parameterized (either by calibration or estimation) it can be simulated for any given 
change in the exogenous variables.
Simulation strategy
Shock of 
Tariff
Elimination
Shock of 
Import 
Elimination
1. Estimation of the Disagreement payoffs
2. Calibration of the PEGEM
3. Simulation of the PEGEM for Different 
Shocks.
Observed Data Set 
Calibration of the 
PXGEM
(Basic Sub-Model)
Simulation of the PXGEM
Data Base Updates 
Calibration of the 
Autarky Sub-Model
Simulation of the PXGEM
Data Base Updates 
Calibration of the 
Free Trade Sub-Model
Figure 8.1
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In step 2 we simulate the basic sub-model with two different closures. In the 
first simulation, we use the natural closure, and eliminate the observed tariffs 
completely and evaluate the behaviour of the economy under free trade. For example, 
if, in the observed equilibrium, the rationalized tariff rate is 25 per cent, then we set the 
change in percentage points of the rationalized tariff rate, t= -25, holding other 
exogenous variables constant. Simulation of the basic sub-model yields the effects of 
this tariff cut on the endogenous variables of the model. The result is then used to 
update the observed (or base year) data set. The updated data set, then, describes the 
state of the economy at the free trade equilibrium. In other words, this will depict the 
state of the economy had it followed the free trade policy instead of following what has 
been the observed policy. The updated data set is then used to calibrate the free trade 
sub-model of the PEGEM.
In the second simulation we change the closure of the model. This time we treat 
the tariff rate as an endogenous variable, and the net import of good 1 as the policy 
variable. This swapping of the endogenous and exogenous variable does not affect the 
numbers of the endogenous and the exogenous variables. Holding other exogenous 
variables constant, we apply an exogenous policy shock of 100 per cent cut in the 
import of good 1 and simulate the model to obtain its effect on the set of endogenous 
variables. The result of the simulation yields, among others, a percentage point increase 
in the rationalized tariff rate that would be consistent with zero imports of good 1. This 
will also imply a 100 per cent reduction in the export of good 2 since the model 
maintains a binding trade balance constraint. Thus, we obtain the tariff rate that induces 
zero trade in both commodities. Updating the base year data set using these results 
yields the levels of the endogenous variables that describe the economy under autarkic 
equilibrium. The updated data set is then used to calibrate the autarky sub-model of the 
PEGEM listed in Table 8.1.
In step 3 we make use of these two counterfactual descriptions of the economy 
with the observed one to calibrate the full model, which is then used to evaluate the 
behaviour of the bargained tariff rate as the exogenous variables change.
In the updated (counterfactual) data sets, nominal magnitudes are measured in 
units of commodity 2, since commodity 2 is the numeraire. The rental payment in sector 
2 is the payoff of player 2 under autarky. Therefore, the rental payments of sector 2 
under autarky represents the minimum expectation of player 2. To obtain the payoff of 
player 1 under free trade, which is measured in units of commodity 1, we have to divide 
the rental payments of sector 1 by the relative price of commodity 1 at free trade 
equilibrium. The relative price of commodity 1 can be obtained from the updated data 
set. For example, if, after the elimination of the tariff, the relative price of commodity 1
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falls by 10 per cent, then the relative price of commodity 1 at the free trade equilibrium 
will be 0.90, since it is equal to unity at the observed equilibrium. The parameters Di, 
and Ö2 can be estimated by combining the payoffs at the point of minimum expectation 
with the observed payoffs according to the defining equation (7.29) that completes the 
calibration of the PEGEM.
8.2.2 Simulation of the Basic Sub-model and Linearization Errors
The system of equations in the basic sub-model is the linearized version of the 
system of nonlinear equations describing the PXGEM (the economic markets of 
PEGEM listed in Table 7.1). In other words, the equations listed here (Table 8.1) are 
the linear approximations to the actual relationships among the model variables. Each 
curve, describing the actual functional relation, is replaced by its tangent at the point of 
observed equilibrium. Therefore the solutions obtained from the simulation of the 
linearized system will show movements along the tangents not along the actual curves 
thus producing linearization errors.
Linearization errors can be ignored for small changes or shocks. However, if the 
shocks are large in magnitude producing large changes in the endogenous variables, 
then the errors due to linearization may be significant.
In both of our simulations, the shocks can be quite large. Therefore, the linear 
solutions could produce large errors, and the description of the economy under the free 
trade regime or under the autarkic regime, obtained by following the above procedure, 
may be inaccurate. Clearly, the nature of the problem warrants the use of a solution 
procedure that can approximate the exact nonlinear solutions as accurately as desired.
We have used GEMPACK3 version 4.0.2 to simulate the models. This version 
of the software has the capability to obtain multistep solutions by updating the data base 
after each step of simulation. For example if we selected a 2-step solution of the model, 
then it will first divide the shock into two equal parts and performs linear simulation of 
the model for the first part of the shock. It then updates the base data, recalculates the 
shares, etc. and recalibrates the model at the new point defined by the updated data set. 
Then, it simulates the model for the second part of the shock. The basic principle can be 
understood as a polynomial approximation to a curve. By increasing the number of 
linear segments (of a given shock) the final solution can be made very close to the 
actual solution. Moreover, it also provides a solution using the Richardson
The GEMPACK Software System for solving large economic models was developed by the 
Impact Project, University of Melbourne, Melbourne Australia. Details o f user guidelines, syntax and 
semantic can be found in Pearson and Codsi (1991a, 1991b). In the GEMPACK referencing system the 
documents are normally identified as GED-30, and GED-31 respectively.
extrapolation4 based on the results of 2 or 3 multi-step solutions. The errors due to 
linear approximations can, therefore, be reduced considerably by increasing the number 
of steps in the multi-step simulation.
While simulating the basic sub-model, we have used tariff revenue as a criterion 
to judge the accuracy of the results, since tariff revenue has to be zero at both the free 
trade equilibrium and the autarkic equilibrium. In each simulation we initially requested 
the extrapolated solution based on three multi-step - 2-step, 4-step, and 8-step solutions. 
If the updated data after the simulation did not yield a zero tariff revenue collection, 
then the numbers of steps were changed to 5-steps, 10-steps, and 20-steps. If the tariff 
revenue still did not vanish in the updated data set, then the numbers of steps were 
increased further and so on until the tariff revenue vanished or became approximately 
zero. The updated data set is, then, checked to ensure that markets clear domestically at 
the autarkic equilibrium and the trade account balances at the free trade equilibrium. 
This final check ascertains that the update commands have been correctly specified and 
executed.
Though our simulation is intended to be illustrative only, we have insisted, in all 
cases, on extrapolated results.
8.2.3 Preliminary Considerations on Basic Data Sets
Now, we ask what sort of hypothetical data sets would be required to capture the 
possible extreme responses of the bargained tariff rate? On the basis of the analytical 
results obtained from the comparative static exercise of the previous chapter, one may 
suspect that the direction of response of the bargained tariff rate with respect to the 
exogenous variables can possibly be altered if there are extreme changes in the 
magnitude of the parameters Di and D2. Particularly, if Di is much larger than D2, 
then the tariff rate may rise when the price of good 1 rises in the world market, and vice 
versa. This is equivalent to hypothesizing that the direction of tariff change for a given 
shock depends on where the economy is on the production (or rent) transformation 
frontier, since Di takes its largest value if the observed equilibrium is very close to the 
free trade equilibrium and its smallest value if the observed equilibrium is close to the 
autarkic equilibrium. Similarly, D2 will take its largest value if the observed 
equilibrium is very close to the autarkic equilibrium and its smallest value if the 
observed equilibrium is very close to the free trade equilibrium. Therefore, one may 
argue that the direction of response of the bargained tariff rate will be different if the
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4 For details on Richardson extrapolation see Pearson (1991).
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observed equilibrium is close to the free trade equilibrium instead of being close to the 
autarkic equilibrium.
Such an argument may not be valid because it fails to consider the general 
equilibrium effects of a movement of the observed equilibrium point on other 
parameters. For example, consider the case with Cobb-Douglas production functions. It 
can be seen from equation (7A.8) or (7.37) that the effect that a terms of trade loss has 
on the tariff rate can be positive if Di > D2. However, if we consider the case of an 
observed equilibrium which is close to the free trade equilibrium so that we get Di >
Ö2, then we will also obtain the result that each sector's share in total employment of 
labour will not differ by much from that at the free trade equilibrium. Therefore, the 
term (X2 / A* -  X°2/ A°) in equation (7.37) will decline and tend to zero as the observed 
equilibrium moves closer towards the free trade equilibrium. Thus, in effect, the decline 
in the value of the term {X\ / A* -  X°2 / A0) may more than offset the increase in the 
value of Di preventing the reversal of the direction of the response of the domestic 
tariff rate with respect to the international terms of trade. Moreover, if the production 
functions are not characterized by unitary elasticities of factor substitution, then the 
distributive shares will also change and the exact behaviour of the tariff rate as 
exogenous variables change remains, nevertheless, an empirical issue.
Thus, it follows that the parameters of concern are the observed tariff rate and 
the elasticities of factor substitution. The first one positions the observed equilibrium 
somewhere between free trade and the autarkic equilibrium, and the second one affects 
the behaviour of the distributive share parameters. Therefore, as an illustration of how 
this issue can be resolved and also maintain a flavour of some degree of generality we 
perform numerical simulations in two parts.
In part I we maintain that the production functions are Cobb-Douglas, and 
simulate the model to observe the behaviour of the tariff rate with respect to the 
exogenous variables in three different cases: Case (a) depicts the observed equilibrium 
of the economy as if it was in an environment of almost free trade. This situation is 
characterized by a very low tariff rate, and a large volume of trade. Case (b) depicts the 
economy as if it was in an environment of almost autarky. This situation is 
characterized by a very high tariff rate, and almost no trade with rest of the world. Case 
(c) depicts an intermediate case in which the economy is described as if it had a 
moderate tariff rate and a moderate volume of trade with rest of the world. These 
experiments will allow us to examine the pattern of the endogenous response of the 
bargained tariff rate under different tariff regimes. The hypothetical data sets used in the 
simulations are presented in Table 8.2. Such a variation in the tariff regime could have 
been caused by various reasons, including different distribution of bargaining powers of 
the players.
210
In part II, we observe the behaviour of the tariff rate by varying the combination 
of the elasticities of factor substitution while holding the observed equilibrium at the 
intermediate tariff regime (case c).
These simulation exercises are not the same as a sensitivity analysis, in its strict 
sense. They can, nevertheless, be viewed as a weak sensitivity check of the direction of 
effects.
83 Simulations of the PEGEM
83.1 Calibration, Simulation, and Discussion of the Results: Part I
The descriptions of the observed equilibrium of three different economies under 
three different tariff regimes are provided in Table 8.2. The figures in Table 8.2 are 
values at domestic prices, where the units were chosen so as to make the domestic base- 
prices of both goods equal to unity. Therefore, the figures can also be regarded as 
expressions in units of either good, whatever is convenient. From the values of net 
imports it is apparent that the tariff revenue in cases (a) and (b) is 1 unit of the 
numeraire, whereas in case (c) it is 5 units of the numeraire. The rationalized tariff rate 
is 2 per cent in case (a), 100 per cent in case (b) and 25 per cent in case (c), whatever 
had been the actual rates of tariffs and subsidies.5
In each of the three cases, we followed the three-step simulation strategy, 
described above, to calibrate the PEGEM. The counterfactual data, which describe the 
equilibrium under autarky and the equilibrium under free trade, were generated in the 
first two steps of the simulations of the basic sub-model, and are presented in the top 
portion of the Tables 8.4-8.6 respectively.
Given the ‘observed’ equilibrium of the economy, the figures under simulated 
autarky indicate the state of the economy in equilibrium, if the country adopts autarkic 
trade policy, which represents the worst outcome to the exporting sector. Similarly, the 
figures under simulated free trade indicate the state of the equilibrium, if the economy 
adopts a free trade policy, which represents the worst outcome to the import competing 
sector. Clearly, these two parts represent the counterfactual information yielding the 
minimum expectations of the players. To repeat again, these figures were obtained by 
multi-step simulations of the PXGEM for shocks that eliminate all imports, and tariffs 
respectively.
These factual and counterfactual data sets describe the bargaining environments 
fully. In the next section, we will estimate the implied bargaining powers of the players
5 See Appendix -8A for methods of calculation.
under the assumption that the ‘observed’ data set also represents the bargaining 
equilibrium - that is, it corresponds to the full equilibrium of the political economy.
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Table 8.2
Basic data sets: ‘observed equilibrium’ in three different cases
wage rent value-added Consum- net imports
ption exp.
Case (a): Almost free trade regime
Sector 1 70 30 100 151 51
Sector 2 40 60 100 50 -50
Case (b): Almost autarkic regime
Sector 1 70 30 100 102 2
Sector 2 40 60 100 99 -1
Case (c): Intermediate regime
Sector 1 70 30 100 125 25
Sector 2 40 60 100 80 -20
83.1.1 Estimates of the Bargaining Powers of the Players
Since the ‘observed’ data corresponds to the full equilibrium of the economy, 
and the minimum expectation of player 1 is obtained at the free trade equilibrium and 
the minimum expectation of player 2 is obtained at the autarkic equilibrium, the data 
presented in the first part of each Table 8.4-8.6 should satisfy the necessary and 
sufficient condition of the generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem in the 
tariff game. Rewriting condition (7.12) as
n°-n;Y a2y° ' 
n»-n ;JW T /
The right hand side of this equation contains known terms, and therefore it can be used 
to solve for the values of the parameters Oj and 0 2, which measure the bargaining 
powers of player 1 and player 2 respectively, in the unit interval. The solutions thus 
obtained yield normalized bargaining powers of the players.
Under Cobb-Douglas production function the elasticities of factor substitution 
are unity. The values of output (value-added) in both sectors are chosen, for simplicity, 
to be equal. We can cancel the numerator and the denominator of the last term on the
(7.12’) o.
n;
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right hand side of the above equation. The bargaining powers of the players can now be 
estimated by making use of the data presented on the first part (top portion) of the 
Tables 8.4-8.6, in each of the three cases as follows.
Thus, it can be seen that the exporting sector holds more bargaining power 
(approximately 24 times) than the import competing sector in case (a), whereas the 
import competing sector holds more bargaining power (approximately 28 times) than 
the exporting sector in case (b). The players seem to hold almost equal bargaining 
power in case (c). Though the numbers obtained accord well with the notion of 
bargaining power, the three cases do not necessarily represent the same economy and 
therefore are not directly comparable.
Table 8.3
The implied bargaining powers of the players in the three cases
0j / 0 2. Bargaining power of player 1
relative to player 2 
0 j : Bargaining power of player 1 
0 2: Bargaining power of player 2
case(a) case(b) case(c)
0.04082 28.00 1.07143
0.04 0.97 0.52
0.96 0.03 0.48
Note that these estimates of bargaining powers are not very robust. Granted the 
validity of the fictitious numbers used in their estimation, the estimates of the 
bargaining powers are subject to the choice of the production functions and on the way 
the disagreement payoffs are operationalized. The first issue is clearly empirical, and it 
is concerned with robust estimation of the production functions. The second issue, 
however, can be taken up to the conceptual level, and it is concerned with question such 
as whether the point of minimum expectation is actually the reference point of the 
players in bargaining or not.
Following Roth (1977) and Thomson (1981), this study argues that the point of 
minimum expectation can serve as a reasonable reference point to bargaining problems 
in the tariff game, and the point of the minimum expectation of player 1, who has stakes 
in the import competing sector only, is the payoff at the free trade equilibrium, and the 
minimum expectation of player 2, who has stakes in the exporting sector only, is the 
payoff at the autarkic equilibrium. If the reference point or the disagreement payoff can 
better be specified in a different way, then the estimates of the bargaining powers can 
certainly be different from what we have obtained here. For example, if the 
disagreement payoffs can be shown to be zero, then the bargaining powers implied by
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our hypothetical data set under Cobb-Douglas production functions would be equal for 
each player.
These estimates are, nevertheless, based on a consistent set of assumptions 
therefore, the approach can provide at least a useful benchmark for future studies.
83.1.2 Discussion of the Simulation Results
In the second part of the Tables 8.4 - 8.6 we have presented the comparative 
static responses of the relevant endogenous variables as predicted by PEGEM and 
PXGEM as the exogenous variables increase by a one percent. Before we discuss these 
results, it might be helpful to recall that PXGEM and PEGEM differ in their treatment 
of the tariff rate. PEGEM determines the tariff rate endogenously, whereas PXGEM 
treats tariffs as exogenously determined. Therefore, the results obtained from simulating 
the PXGEM represent the responses of the endogenous variables with respect to the 
exogenous variables had the tariff rates been held constant at the observed level. The 
PEGEM allows players to bargain and adopt a new tariff rate, if that is agreeable, as 
exogenous variables change. Hence, the results obtained by simulating the PEGEM also 
take into account the endogenous responses of the tariff rate while predicting the 
responses of other economic variables. Naturally, the predictions of the PXGEM and 
PEGEM are different.
For example, if the international terms of trade changes by a one percent, then 
PXGEM has to predict, by definition, that the domestic relative price will also change 
in the same direction by a one percent, whereas in PEGEM the tariff rate may also 
change and therefore, the change in the domestic relative price, as predicted by the 
PEGEM, will not be the same as predicted by the PXGEM. The domestic relative price 
may change by more or less than a one percent. As a consequence, the other 
endogenous variables pertaining to the economic market, which are governed by 
changes in the domestic relative price, will also show a different response under 
PEGEM compared to the prediction of the PXGEM.
We have presented the predictions of both models for each of the three cases. 
The results presented under both models are extrapolated results based on 1-step, 2- 
step, and 4-step simulations, and therefore, are comparable.
The simulation results are discussed in the following three sections. First, we 
explain only those aspects of the results that are due to the particular structures assumed 
in the model. These results will not necessarily hold when those particular structures, 
for example Cobb-Douglas production functions, are replaced by different ones. Then, 
we compare the responses of the endogenous variables under PXGEM with those of the 
PEGEM, and explain why the responses of the endogenous variables differ when the
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policy variable is also endogenous. Finally, we explain, both intuitively and 
mechanically, why the policy variable, the bargained tariff rate, changes in the direction 
as shown by the simulation results.
83.1J  The Consequences of the Assumed Structures
The four columns in the lower part of each of the Tables 8.4 - 8.6 list the 
response (elasticities) of the endogenous variables in terms of their percentage changes 
(with two exceptions) over their observed values for a one percent increase in the 
exogenous variables. The exogenous variables are the relative price of the import 
competing good in the international market, stock of specific factor in sector 1, stock of 
specific factor in sector 2, and the economy-wide endowment of labour respectively.
The two exceptions are: the variables t and z (not listed in the Table). The variable t 
measures the change in the percentage point of the rationalized tariff rate and the 
variable z measures change (instead of percentage change) in tariff revenue collected. It 
is because the tariff rate and the tariff revenue can sometimes take the value zero (for 
example at the free trade equilibrium) in which case percentage changes of these 
variables are not defined.
The following patterns appeared quite distinctly in the simulation results 
presented under PEGEM in Tables 8.4 - 8.6, which are either simply due to the 
assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions or because of the choice of the initial 
data sets and the small country assumption.
First, in each case and for each shock, we have obtained that the response of 
sectoral output, y°, and the response of the payoff to player i, n°, are identical. This is
due to the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions, which implies that the 
factor shares in each sector remain globally constant.
Second, the rental income of player 2 at the autarkic equilibrium has remained 
constant (that is, its percentage changes are zeroes) on two occasions: when world price 
changes, and when the stock of capital in sector 1 changes. The first result follows from 
the independence of the autarkic equilibrium in the domestic market from world price 
changes. The second result is the consequence of an assumption of Cobb-Douglas 
production functions (See Appendix-3B) in both sectors.
Table 8.4
Simulation results: Part I 
Case (a): Almost free trade
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Wage Rent Value-
added
Con.
Exp.
Net
Imp.
Price
Level
The observed data 
Sector 1 70 30 100 151 51 1.0
Sector 2 40 60 100 50 -50 1.0
Simulated autarky
Sector 1 143 61 204 204 0 1.69
Sector 2 27 40 67 67 0 1.0
Simulated free trade
Sector 1 68 29 97 149 52 0.98
Sector 2 40 61 101 49 -52 1.00
Simulation results
Effects of 1 %  Increase in
Endogenous
Variables p ; a 2
L
PEGEM: Policy-endogenous General Eauilibrium Model
0.48 0.44 -0.29 0.85
y°2 -0.49 -0.14 0.89 0.25
r° 1.43 -0.57 -0.26 0.84
r2 -0.49 -0.14 -0.10 0.25
W 0.73 0.22 0.16 -0.37
A 0.94 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
t  (change in -0.06 -0.02 0.03 -0.01
percentage pt.)
n [ 0.48 0.44 -0.29 0.85
n°2 -0.49 -0.14 0.89 0.25
* 0.52 0.46 -0.32 0.86
A
0.00 0.00 0.60 0.40
PXGEM: Policy-exogenous General Eauilibrium Model
y [ 0.51 0.45 -0.31 0.85
y°2
-0.52 -0.15 0.91 0.24
r° 1.52 -0.54 -0.31 0.85
r2° -0.52 -0.15 -0.09 0.24
w 0.78 0.23 0.13 -0.36
1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
P\
Table 8.5
Simulation results: Part I 
Case (b): Almost autarkic
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Wage Rent Value- Con. Net Price
added Exp. Imp. Level
The observed data 
Sector 1 70 30 100 102 2 1.0
Sector 2 40 60 100 99 -1 1.0
Simulated autarky 
Sector 1 71 31 102 102 0 1.01
Sector 2 40 59 99 99 0 1.00
Simulated free trade 
Sector 1 19 8 27 81 54 0.50
Sector 2 53 80 133 79 -54 1.0
Simulation Results
Effects of 1% Increase in
Endogenous
Variables p;
k 2 L
PEGEM: Policv-endoeenous General Equilibrium Model
y°x 0.02 0.31 -0.01 0.70
y °2 -0.02 -0.01 0.61 0.39
rx° 0.07 -0.97 0.57 0.41
r2° -0.02 -0.01 -0.39 0.39
w 0.04 0.01 0.58 -0.59
_ o
P\ 0.05 -0.28 0.58 -0.29
t (change in -1.89 -0.57 1.16 -0.58
percentage pt.)
n[ 0.02 0.31 -0.01 0.70
n\ -0.02 -0.01 0.61 0.39
*nx 1.37 0.70 -0.82 1.12
K
0.00 0.00 0.59 0.40
PXGEM: Policv-exogenous General Equilibrium Model
y°x 0.51 0.45 -0.31 0.85
y°2 -0.52 -0.15 0.91 0.24
r° 1.52 -0.54 -0.31 0.85
r2 -0.52 -0.15 -0.09 0.24
w 0.78 0.23 0.13 -0.36
o
A 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Table 8.6
Simulation Results Part I:
Case (c) - Intermediate tariff regime and sector I relatively labour intensive
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Wage Rent Value- Con. Net Price
added Exp. Imp. Level
The observed data 
Sector 1 70 30 100 125 25 1.0
Sector 2 40 60 100 80 -20 1.0
Simulated autarky 
Sector 1 96 41 137 137 0 1.24
Sector 2 35 53 88 88 0 1.00
Simulated free trade 
Sector 1 49 21 70 111 41 0.8
Sector 2 45 67 112 71 -41 1.0
Simulation Results
Effects of 1% Increase in
Endogenous
Variables p,‘ * 2
L
PEGEM: Policv-endosenous General Eauilibrium Model
y.° 0.28 0.38 -0.17 0.78J 1
-0.28 -0.08 0.77 0.31
J 2
r° 0.81 -0.75 0.11 0.641
r° -0.28 -0.08 -0.23 0.312
W 0.42 0.12 0.35 -0.47
p°\
0.54 -0.14 0.28 -0.14*1
t (change in 
percentage pt.)
-0.57 -0.17 0.35 -0.17
< 0.28 0.38 -0.17 0.781
n 2
-0.28 -0.08 0.77 0.31
* 
K. 0.73 0.52 -0.44 0.92
n a 0.00 0.00
PXGEM: Policv-exosenous General Eauilibrium Model
0.60 0.40
y,0 0.51 0.45 -0.31 0.85J1
r°
-0.52 -0.15 0.91 0.24
1.52 -0.54 -0.31 0.851
r; -0.52 -0.15 -0.09 0.242
W 0.78 0.23 0.13 -0.36
A 1.00 0.00 0.00
0.00
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Table 8.7
Simulation Results Part I:
Case (c) - Intermediate tariff regime and sector 1 relatively capital intensive
Wage Rent Value- Con. Net Price
added Exp. Imp. Level
The observed data: 
Sector 1 30 70 100 125 25 1.0
Sector 2 60 40 100 80 -20 1.0
Simulated autarky 
Sector 1 42 98 140 140 0 1.30
Sector 2 54 36 90 90 0 1.00
Simulated free trade 
Sector 1 22 52 74 110 36 0.80
Sector 2 64 43 107 71 -36 1.00
Simulation results
Effects of 1% Increase in
Endogenous
Variables p;
k 2 L
PEGEM: Policv-endoeenous General Equilibrium Model
0.17 0.82 -0.07 0.25
y°2 -0.17 -0.12 0.47 0.65
r° 0.68 -0.51 0.13 0.39
r2
-0.17 -0.12 -0.53 0.65
W 0.11 0.08 0.35 -0.43
_ o
P\ 0.51 -0.33 0.19 0.14
t (change in -0.61 -0.42 0.24 0.18
percentage pt.)
< 0.17 0.82 -0.07 0.25
n°2 -0.17 -0.12 0.47 0.65
*nx 0.35 0.95 -0.14 0.19
k 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.60
PXGEM: Policv-exoeenous General Equilibrium Model
y \ 0.33 0.93 -0.13 0.20
y°2 -0.33 -0.23 0.53 0.70
r° 1.33 -0.07 -0.13 0.20
r2 -0.33 -0.23 -0.46 0.70
w 0.22 0.16 0.31 -0.46
_ o
A 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Finally, the responses of the endogenous variables with respect to each of the 
exogenous variables under PXGEM are exactly the same in the three cases. This should 
be of no surprise because of two reasons: the small country assumption, and the 
identical supply-side information. The small country assumption links domestic price 
only with the world price, so the domestic relative price is independent of any change in 
domestic demand and supply condition. Identical supply-side information means that 
the two sectors in the three cases employ the same amount of factors, apply the same 
production technology, produce the same quantities of outputs, and face the same 
prices. The three cases differ only in the structure of the consumer's demand. Therefore, 
the responses of the supply side variables have to be the same. This provides a good 
basis against which the predictions of the PEGEM can be compared.
83.1.4 A Comparison between the Predictions of PXGEM and PEGEM
Consider first the shock to the domestic economy, which was initially in almost 
free trade equilibrium, of a one per cent increase in the relative price of the home 
importable in the international market - Table 8.4. PXGEM predicts that domestic 
relative price of good 1 will increase by a one percent, and consequently the output of 
good 1 will increase by 0.51 per cent, output of good 2 will fall by 0.52 per cent, the 
rental rate in sector 1 will increase by 1.52 per cent, the rental rate in sector 2 will fall 
by 0.52 per cent and the wage rate will rise by 0.78 per cent, all measured in units of 
commodity 2. These results are consistent with the predictions of standard general 
equilibrium models.
However, the PEGEM predicts that as the relative price of the home importable 
good rises in the world market by a one percent the protection awarded to the domestic 
import competing sector will be reduced through a tariff cut of 0.08 percentage points. 
So, the new tariff rate will be 1.92 per cent ad valorem on imports of commodity 1. The 
domestic relative price will increase by 0.92 per cent only. Consequently, the responses 
of other economic variables are reduced accordingly. The output of commodity 1 
increases by 0.48 per cent, the output of commodity 2 falls by 0.49 per cent, the rental 
rate in sector 1 increases by 1.43 per cent, the rental rate in sector 2 falls by 0.49 per 
cent, the wage rate rises by 0.73 per cent, the payoff of player 1 increases by 0.48 per 
cent and the payoff of player 2 falls by 0.49 per cent. For each of the variables, the 
PEGEM has predicted a smaller change (gain or loss) than the PXGEM. This occurs 
simply because policy (tariff) change has prevented a foreign price change to be 
transmitted fully into the domestic economy.
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Now let us consider the effects of a one percent increase in each of the 
endowment variables, ceteris paribus, in the case (c), which assumes that the economy 
was initially in an intermediate equilibrium (Table 8.6).
When Kx increases by a one percent the bargained tariff rate falls by 0.17 
percentage points, the gain in sector 1, obtained through capacity expansion, is partly 
eroded by a decline in the price of its output. The output in sector 1 grows by 0.38 per 
cent only, which is less than 0.45 per cent as predicted by the PXGEM. The output of 
sector 2 falls but by less than that predicted by the PXGEM. Similarly, as K2 expands 
by a one percent the tariff rate increases by 0.35 percentage points, which increases the 
protection awarded to the import competing sector. As a result, output in the exporting 
sector increases and the output in the import competing sector falls but by less than that 
predicted by the PXGEM. A similar interpretation can be given to other figures.
The effects of an increase in the supply of labour in the economy display the 
effect of the difference of factor intensity between the two sectors. Output of the sector 
which is labour intensive expands at a faster rate than the output of the sector which is 
capital intensive.
The simulation results for case (b) are presented in Table 8.5. Note that in this 
case the economy is in almost autarkic equilibrium, and the tariff rate at the observed 
equilibrium is 100 per cent and so, the value of r° is 0.5.
WTien the models were shocked by a one percent increase in the relative price 
of good 1 in the international market PXGEM predicted that the output of the import 
competing sector will increase by 0.51 per cent and the output of the exporting sector 
will decrease by 0.52 per cent.
The predictions of the PEGEM are quite different. It predicts that the tariff rate 
will fall by 1.89 percentage points. So, the relative price of commodity 1 in the 
domestic market will increase by 0.05 per cent only. Consequently, the changes in other 
variables remained very small. The output of sector 1 increased by 0.02 per cent and 
that of sector 2 decreased by 0.02 per cent and so on.
Similarly, as Kx increased by a one percent, ceteris paribus, PEGEM predicted 
a decline in the protection awarded to sector 1. The tariff rate fell by 0.57 percentage 
points and the domestic relative price fell by 0.28 per cent. This price change partially 
compensated for the loss in the rental income of player 2 arising out of the expansion of 
sector 1, which otherwise would bid some of the mobile factor away from sector 2. 
Consequently, the output and the rental income of sector 2 remained almost unaffected 
by the shock.
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As K2 increased by a one percent, ceteris paribus, the tariff rate increased by 
1.16 percentage points raising the protection to sector 1. The relative price of 
commodity 1 increased by 0. 58 per cent. Consequently, output in sector 1 did not 
decline by as much as was predicted by the PXGEM. In fact, it remained almost 
unchanged. Output in sector 2 increased by 0.61 per cent. The most surprising result is 
that the rental rate in sector 1 increased by 0.56 per cent! We would expect it to fall as 
in case (a). The PXGEM predicts that the rental rates in both sectors fall as the capital 
stock increases in either sector. This unusual result can be explained as follows.
Since, the relative price of commodity 1 increased by 0.58 per cent and the wage 
rate also increased by 0.58 per cent in the new equilibrium, the real wage faced by 
sector 1 remained almost unchanged. Output and employment of labour (not shown, but 
can be inferred from equation (3.37') in Table 8.1) in sector 1 has remained almost 
unchanged. Under Cobb-Douglas production functions the distributive shares are 
constant implying that the share of output of sector 1 that goes to the specific factor has 
not changed either. The relative price of commodity 1 has gone up by 0.57 per cent 
implies, therefore, that the rental rate and the rental income of sector 1 (in units of 
commodity 2) should go up by 0.57 per cent keeping the payoff to player 1 (rental 
income in units of commodity 1) unchanged. This is precisely what has happened.
83.1.5 The Exogenous Shocks and the Bargaining Equilibrium
The fundamental question is that why does the tariff rate change in the first 
place as the exogenous variables change? Once this factor is understood properly the 
responses of all other variables can be explained as in a conventional policy exogenous 
CGE model. In terms of the arguments developed so far, the perturbation, as the 
exogenous variables change, in the equality of the players' generalized fear of ruin holds 
the key.
More precisely, we have seen (in chapter 6) that the generalized Nash solution 
to the bargaining problem in the tariff game is characterized by the condition
©, © 2
where,
f  n;-n;f - i '
Anj-n^dn.MnJ
is the ratio of the two players' fear of ruin (see Appendix 6A), and 0, is the ‘exogenous’ 
bargaining power of player i.
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Recall that a player's fear of ruin is simply the inverse of his boldness, which is 
the maximum probability of conflict that the player is prepared to accept for a small 
gain in the payoff. It has been shown in chapter 6 that a player's boldness declines as his 
payoff relative to the minimum expectation payoff increases. In other words, a player's 
fear of ruin (conflict) will increase if either his payoff has increased with unchanged 
minimum expectation or his payoff at the minimum expectation has fallen at unchanged 
current payoff level or a combination of both. Intuitively, this means that the more a 
player has been able to obtain a net gain relative to his minimum expectation the more 
fearful he will be of conflict with his bargaining opponent. In a Nash bargaining process 
the player who fears more relative to his bargaining power will reduce his demand. A 
Nash equilibrium in the bargaining process is attained when both players’ fear of ruin 
are proportional to their bargaining powers.
Now, if an exogenous shock perturbs the distribution of the payoffs without 
affecting both the minimum expectation payoffs and the bargaining powers of the 
players, then the player's fear of ruin, who gains from the shock, will increase and the 
other player's fear of ruin, who loses will fall. A similar reasoning holds when both the 
current payoffs (after the shock at the unchanged policy) and the payoffs at the point of 
minimum expectation are affected by the shock. The player's fear of ruin, who has 
gained more relative to his new minimum expectation, will also increase by more than 
that of the other player, who has gained less relative to his new minimum expectation 
payoff.
Let us consider, for simplicity, Cobb-Douglas production functions again. Then, 
using equation (7.11), which yields the slope of the RTF, we can write
X AA
nr-n;
ni-ni
C p o \
/
Therefore, the generalized Nash solution is obtained when we have
With an unchanged tariff rate after a shock if x  > ©i / ®2 in the immediate 
economic equilibrium, then player l's generalized fear of ruin exceeds that of player 2 
and the political market will be out of equilibrium. Therefore, in the new bargaining 
process player 1 will concede and the tariff rate will fall. The direction of tariff change 
will be reversed if £  < 0 t / 0 2.
After each shock the PXGEM- updated value of x  can be obtained as
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where all endogenous variables are as predicted by PXGEM. Note that the PEGEM 
predictions of n\, and n\ are the same as that of PXGEM.
By comparing the updated value of X with the relative bargaining power of 
player 1, in each of the three cases and for each of the shocks, we can predict the 
direction of change in the bargained tariff rate. For example, in case (a) we have
/ 0 2 = 0.0408, and x* equals 0.0421, 0.0412, 0.0404, and 0.0409 respectively as the 
world relative price of good 1, stock of specific factor in sector 1, stock of specific 
factor in sector 2, and the supply of labour increases by a one percent in turn. That is, at 
the unchanged tariff rate x* exceeds 0 t / 0 2 as the world relative price of good 1, the 
stock of the specific factor in sector 1, or the supply of labour in the economy increase 
by a one percent, and x* falls short of 0! / 0 2 as the stock of specific factor in sector 2 
increases by a one percent. This, in turn, means that player l's generalized fear of ruin 
relative to that of player 2 increases. Therefore the bargained tariff rate falls, as the 
world price of commodity 1, the specific factor in sector 1, or the supply of labour in 
the economy increase, and player 2's generalized fear of ruin relative to that of player 1 
increases. Therefore the bargained tariff rate will thus rise, as the stock of the specific 
factor in sector 2 increases.
The exact magnitude of change in the bargained tariff rate is determined by 
parametric configurations and therefore we need PEGEM to evaluate them. One can 
verify that the PEGEM updated value of £ , in each case is equal to 0 t / 0 2 - the 
relative bargaining power of player 1. This implies that at the PEGEM solution the 
players' generalized fears of ruin are equalized.6 Thus, the simulation results 
demonstrate the overall consistency and the implementation of the PEGEM developed 
in the previous chapters at least in cases with Cobb-Douglas production functions.
8.3.2 Recalibration, Simulation and Discussion of the Results: Part II
To see the behaviour of the tariff rate under CES production functions we 
performed two different sets of simulations: one with =1.5 and <J2 = 2, and the other 
with ax = 2 and cr2 = 1.5. The results are presented in Tables 7.7 and 7.8 respectively.
In both simulations the initial characterization of the economy was as in case (c). The
6 Note that the numbers given in the Tables have been rounded several times. Therefore, we can 
see that the PEGEM results satisfy this condition only approximately.
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state of the economy at autarky and at the free trade also differ from that obtained in 
Table 8.6, since the elasticities of factor substitution are different from unity. Therefore, 
PXGEM was simulated again with new parameter values to obtain the counterfactual 
information required to calibrate the PEGEM.
The simulation results presented in Tables 8.8 - 8.9 display similar patterns of 
behaviour of the endogenous variables as was displayed by the results presented in 
Tables 8.4 - 8.6. These results can be understood by the same set of arguments. The 
differences, as expected, are that the responses of the payoffs and the sectorial outputs 
are no longer identical; the minimum expectation of player 2 now responds to changes 
in the stock of specific factor in sector 1. This is simply the consequence of assuming 
that the production functions are not Cobb-Douglas.7
The most important observation is that the bargained tariff rate has fallen with 
an increase in the world relative price of the home importable, the stock of the specific 
factor in the import competing sector, or the supply of labour in the economy (it is 
labour intensive), and has risen with an increase in the stock of the specific factor in the 
exporting sector. The pattern of the responses of the tariff rate has remained intact even 
when the factor intensities of the sectors were reversed (see Table 8.7) or when the 
assumption that the production functions are Cobb-Douglas was dropped and the 
functions were characterized by CES production functions.
Thus, the pattern of the behaviour of the bargained tariff rate is similar to that 
analytical results obtained in the case of a ‘coercive’ government (chapter 7). The 
difference is that the tariff changes in these cases, unlike the case with a ‘coercive’ 
government, do not fully insulate the economy from world price changes. This is 
because the point of minimum expectation responds to the changes in the exogenous 
variables, and unlike the case with a coercive government the point of minimum 
expectation does not coincide with the origin. The responsiveness of the point of 
minimum expectation to the shocks not only changes the bargaining set, but also alters 
the curvature of the level curves of the generalized Nash product by shifting their 
asymptotes.
7 We have assumed that the long run elasticities of factor substitution are at least unity. The 
production functions are not Cobb-Douglas implying that the elasticities are greater than unity. Then, it 
follows from equation (3B.18) and the subsequent discussion in Appendix -3B that the rental income of 
play» 2 will in fact fall as the stock of the specific factor in sector 1 increases.
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Table 8.8
Simulation Results Part II:
Case (c) - Intermediate tariff regime and 
CES production functions with <7^=1.5, o 2- l
Wage Rent Value- Con. Net Price
added Exp. Imp. Level
The observed data 
Sector 1 70 30 100 125 25 1.00
Sector 2 40 60 100 80 -20 1.00
Simulated autarky 
Sector 1 94 38 132 132 0 1.44
Sector 2 29 55 84 84 0 1.00
Simulated free trade 
Sector 1 40 20 60 111 51 0.80
Sector 2 56 66 122 71 -51 1.00
Simulation results
Effects of 1% Increase in
Endogenous
Variables
k 2 L
PEGEM
y°x 0.45 0.38 -0.07 0.68
y°2 -0.45 -0.08 0.67 0.42
r° 0.77 -0.52 0.19 0.34
r° -0.23 -0.04 -0.17 0.21
jL
w 0.34 0.06 0.25 -0.31
P\ 0.47 -0.11 0.23 -0.12
t (change in -0.66 -0.14 0.29 -0.15
percentage pt.)
K 0.30 0.59 -0.04 0.45
k -0.23 -0.04 0.83 0.21
*
K\ 1.06 0.79 -0.29 0.50
k 0.00 0.02 0.77 0.21
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Table 8.9
Simulation Results Part II:
Case (c) - Intermediate tariff regime and 
CES production functions with 0^=2, <t2=1.5
Wage Rent Value- Con. Net Price
added Exp. Imp. Level
The observed data 
Sector 1 70 30 100 125 25 1.00
Sector 2 40 60 100 80 -20 1.00
Simulated autarky 
Sector 1 96 38 134 134 0 1.18
Sector 2 31 54 85 85 0 1.00
Simulated free trade 
Sector 1 41 21 62 111 49 0.80
Sector 2 52 68 120 71 -49 1.00
Simulation results
Effects of 1% Increase in
Endogenous p ; K x K , L
Variables i
PE GEM
y° 0.39 0.34 -0.11 0.77
y\
r°
-0.39 -0.04 0.71 0.33
0.67 -0.43 0.20 0.22
r2° -0.26 -0.03 -0.19 0.22
w 0.39 0.04 0.29 -0.33
0.47 -0.10 0.26 -0.16
t (change in 
percentage pt.)
-0.65 -0.12 0.33 -0.20
0.19 0.67 -0.06 0.39
k -0.26 -0.03 0.81 0.22
*
K, 0.70 0.79 -0.27 0.48
k 0.00 0.03 0.71 0.26
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Intuitively the mechanism behind the endogenous response of the tariff rate can 
be explained as follows. An increase in the world relative price of good 1 not only 
increases the rental income of player 1 at the unchanged tariff rate but also raises the 
payoff of player 1 at the free trade equilibrium, which is the minimum expectation of 
player 1. The minimum expectation of player 2 remains unaffected, since the autarkic 
equilibrium is unaffected by changes in the world prices. Since an increase in the payoff 
at the minimum expectation has the effect of reducing a player's fear of ruin, therefore, 
for a given increase in the world price of good 1, the increase in player l's fear of ruin 
under a support maximizing government will be lower than that under a coercive 
government, whereas player 2's fear of ruin declines by the same amount in both cases. 
This means that player 1 will have to forgo less, in terms of a tariff cut, to attain a new 
bargaining equilibrium under a support maximizing government than under a coercive 
government, in which case the point of minimum expectation remains at the origin 
irrespective of the shocks. This, in turn, means that endogenous changes in the tariff 
rate under a support-maximizing government will not be sufficient to offset the world 
price changes.
We conclude this section with a remark. Since, the simulation results show that 
the bargained tariff rate, and hence the domestic relative price, responds to changes in 
the endowment variables even if the bargaining powers of the players are unchanged. 
This means that the domestic relative price may lie anywhere between the autarky and 
the free trade price had the endowment variables been configured (or change) 
appropriately.
Therefore, it is important to note the fact that a player holding more bargaining 
power than his opponent is neither necessary nor sufficient for the location of the full 
equilibrium either closer to the free trade equilibrium or closer to the autarkic 
equilibrium. The location of the full equilibrium point depends not only on the 
bargaining powers of the players but also on the configuration of the endowment 
variables as well.
8.4 Some Testable Hypotheses
On the basis of these results we may put forward the following hypotheses or 
refutable propositions regarding the behaviour of the bargained tariff rate. Ceteris 
paribus -
(HI) If the international relative price of the home importable falls (rises) in the 
world market, then its relative price in the home market also falls (rises), but 
the bargained tariff rate will rise (fall).
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(H2) If the stock of the specific factor in the import competing sector increases 
(decreases) exogenously, then the bargained tariff rate will fall (rise).
(H3) If the stock of the specific factor in the exporting sector increases 
(decreases), then the bargained tariff rate will rise (fall).
(H4) If the supply of labour (or the mobile factor) in the economy increases 
(decreases) exogenously, then the bargained tariff rate will fall (rise) 
provided that the import-competing sector is more labour (capital) intensive 
compared to the exporting sector. The tariff rate will remain unaffected by 
changes in the supply of labour if both sectors are equally labour intensive.
Before we go on to apply the model to explain some issues of practical interest 
it is necessary to validate the model itself. One approach towards the validation of the 
model is to check whether the hypotheses that follow from the model are consistent 
with the observed facts. An elaborate statistical test of these hypotheses is beyond our 
scope. For the present purpose we will simply compare the predictions of PEGEM with 
the hypotheses, observations, and findings of previous studies.
8.5 Existing Literature and Credibility of the Hypotheses
The first hypothesis is consistent with Hillman's (1982) hypothesis that a 
declining industry will continue to decline even if there are politically motivated tariffs 
to retard the rate of decline of such industries. Long and Vousden (1991), in a more 
general setting than that considered by Hillman, also obtained the result that, though the 
result depends on the way tariff revenue is distributed among the factor owners, 
Hillman's hypothesis remains robust provided that the owner of specific factor in the 
unprotected sector is not significantly less risk averse than the owner of the specific 
factor in the protected sector.
The remaining hypotheses can be related to the findings of Magee, Brock and 
Young (1989), who have deduced that any increase in the endowment of a factor in an 
economy always leads to an increase in the policy favoured by the factor (p. 209). This 
means that an increase in the stock of the specific factor in sector 1 should lead to an 
increase in the tariff rate and an increase in the stock of the specific factor in sector 2 
should lead to a fall in the tariff rate. The hypotheses (H2) and (H3), in particular, 
indicate the contrary. This apparent disagreement between Magee, Brock and Young's 
result and the predictions of the PEGEM can be reconciled by noting that they have not 
distinguished between the interests of the owners of the specific factors (capital) in the 
two sectors because they do not have the specific factors. Theirs is a long-run model. 
Magee, Brock and Young's result is based on the assumption that capital is capital 
wherever it is employed, which runs against the implication of their three tests of
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Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (pp. 101-10; and p. 293-4), where it is shown that both 
capital and labour favour protection if they are in the import competing sector and 
favour free trade if they are in the exporting sector. PEGEM is based on this distinction. 
Therefore the predictions of the two models differ.
Moreover, observing that tariff rates in the US declined over this century,
Brock, Magee, and Young (1989) also attempted to correlate this decline with the 
movements of factor endowments, and the US terms of trade changes. They found that 
changes in the labour-capital ratio had a statistically insignificant effect on tariff rates, 
whereas terms of trade changes had the expected sign and significant effect on the tariff 
rate. However, when the first difference of the labour-capital ratio was employed to 
explain tariff changes it was found to be significant
The predictions of PEGEM imply that changes in the capital stock in different 
sectors have opposing effects on the tariff rate, and therefore, nothing a priori can be 
said about the effect of a change in the aggregate stock of capital on the tariff rates. For 
example, if the capital stocks in both sectors increase in proportion to their effects on 
the tariff rate, then their effects on the tariff rate may cancel each other, and one may 
observe that the tariff rate did not change even with an increase in the aggregate stock 
of the capital. Several other possibilities can be conceived in which the movement of 
the tariff rate may appear independent of changes in the aggregate endowments of the 
factors. Therefore, we conjecture that if the stock of capital was disaggregated by 
import competing and exporting sectors, it is likely that we may observe the type of the 
relationship consistent with the prediction of the PEGEM.
8.6 An Application of the Model and some Additional Hypotheses
Of the four hypotheses, (H2) and (H3) relate the level of domestic protection to 
the structure of capital formation in the domestic industries. The hypotheses imply that 
if an exogenous increase in the stock of the specific factor in the import-competing 
sector is sufficiently large to more than offset the positive effect on the tariff rate of an 
increase in the stock of capital in the exporting sector, then the country will lower the 
protection awarded to the import competing sector.
The process of capital formation may take several forms. Protection by itself can 
be a source of surplus generation in the import competing sector which, attracted by the 
higher rents under protection, can be reinvested within the sector thereby further 
increasing the stock of the specific factor in the import competing sector. Moreover, 
new investors may come in, or the sector may experience specific factor augmenting 
technical progress.
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Table 8.10
The responses of endogenous variables 
to an increase of a 200% in Kx
(Details o f the multi-step and extrapolated simulation results)
Endogenous
V ariables
100-step 
Results
200-step
Results
400-step 
Results
Extrapolated
Results
y f 146.470 146.360 146.314 146.274
y l -17.7247 -17.6953 -17.6875 -17.6843
< 77.6859 77.5900 77.1922 76.5611
C°2 27.4964 27.4809 27.2405 26.8450
< -198.609 -198.400 -197.393 -195.783
-198.609 -198.400 -197.393 -195.783
h° 55.5755 55.4609 55.4240 55.4007
11 -27.7752 -27.7241 -27.7088 -27.7002
K -28.3828 -28.2843 -28.2246 -28.1578
< -41.3285 -41.1904 -41.1105 -41.0235
r i -17.7247 -17.6953 -17.6875 -17.6843
w 13.8654 13.8508 13.8499 13.8531
z (change) -2.95317 -2.91209 -3.39410 -4.21115
t (change) -35.4785 -35.3554 -35.2807 -35.1972
A 146.470 146.360 146.314 146.274
A -17.7247 -17.6953 -17.6875 -17.6843
A 174.082 173.968 173.911 173.853
A 2.19E-07 .000000 .000000 7.30E-08
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Table 8.11
Effects of a 200% increase in K x on the levels of the main variables
(Values are in units of commodity 2)
Wage Rent Value-
added
Con.
Exp.
Net Imp. Price
Level
The Economy Before the Shock:
Sector 1 30 70 100 125 25 1.0
Sector 2 60 40 100 80 -20 1.0
The Economy After the Shock:
Sector 1 53.08 123.84 176.92 158.55 -18.37 0.72
Sector 2 49.39 32.93 82.31 101.47 19.16 1.00
Assume that the import competing sector is more capital intensive than the 
exporting sector. Assume further that the initial equilibrium of the economy is as given 
in Table 8.7. We may now ask what happens to the bargained tariff rate if sector 1 
experiences a sufficiently high growth in its stock of the specific factor - say, by a 200 
per cent? We can use PEGEM to answer this question. It also provides a ground to 
compare two otherwise similar economies that differ only in the stock of capital in 
sector 1.
We used the factual and counterfactual data from Table 8.7, and simulated the 
PEGEM to obtain the result shown in Tables 8.10 and 8.11.
Since the size of the shock was very large a convergence problem was 
encountered. The numbers of steps were increased to 100, 200 and 400. The three 
multistep solutions and the extrapolated solution of the model are presented in Table 
8.10, and the updates of the base data (based on the extrapolated solution) are given in 
Table 8.11.
The results shown in Table 8.10 display the same feature as was seen in the 
previous results: the output and employment of labour in sector 1 expand while those in 
sector 2 contract; rental rates in both sectors fall; wage rate increases; tariff rate falls by 
35 percentage points, relative price of commodity 1 falls; and so on. The percentage 
change in sectoral output is identical with the percentage change in the payoff of the 
respective player, and the minimum expectation of player 2 has remained unaffected - 
both consequences of the assumption of Cobb-Douglas production functions.8
8 However, some of the variables are not showing the sign of convergence. Convergence requires 
that the difference between 400-step and 200-step solution be less than the difference between 200-step 
and 100-step solution. Tariff revenue, consumer demand, and quantities of net imports have not satisfied 
this criterion. Out o f these three nonconverging variables, the source of the problem is the tariff revenue
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The updated data base (Table 8.11) shows that commodity 1 will be exported in 
the new equilibrium instead of being imported, and the exports of commodity 1 will be 
taxed at the rate of 10 per cent ad valorem. Initially, the imports of commodity 1 were 
being taxed at the rate of 25 per cent ad valorem. On the basis of this exercise we draw 
the following additional hypotheses:
A sufficient increase in the stock of a specific factor in the import competing 
sector will lead to
(H5) A reversal in the direction of trade: commodity 1 will be exported and 
commodity 2 will be imported.
During the process of the reversal in the direction of trade, sector 2 contracts 
and sector 1 expands in terms of output and employment. This result is 
consistent with the empirical findings of Martin and Warr (1992), who 
observed that capital accumulation and technical change, biased against 
agriculture, have been the most important determinants of the decline in 
agriculture's share of GDP in Thailand. In case of Indonesia, capital 
accumulation has been the principal cause of decline in agriculture's share of 
GDP (Warr, 1991).
Martin and Warr have explained this phenomenon by invoking the 
Rybczynski effect, which implies that an increase in the stock of capital would 
lead to an increase in the output of capital intensive sector (non-agriculture) 
and a decline in the output of labour intensive sector (agriculture). The 
mechanism of this effect involves a movement of both capital and labour away 
from agriculture to the non-agriculture sector, which is more capital intensive 
than agriculture, and therefore this is equivalent to an increase in the stock of 
capital in non-agriculture sector and a decline in the stock of capital in 
agricultural sector. Both changes, in PEGEM, imply a decline of agriculture 
and expansion of non-agriculture sector.
(H6) A reversal in the direction of tariff protection: exports of commodity 1 or the 
imports of commodity 2 will be taxed or the production of commodity 2 will 
be subsidized.
Initial tariff policy implied a tax on imports of commodity 1 or a tax on the 
exports of commodity 2 or a subsidy in the production of commodity 1. Thus
change variable. It is fluctuating, thereby affecting the consumer's income which in turn has affected the 
consumer demand and consequently, the quantities of net imports. Since the size of the error seems very 
small, we decided not to increase the number of steps any further.
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PEGEM can possibly provide some additional explanation as to why 
developing countries tax agriculture and subsidize manufacturing, and 
developed countries subsidize agriculture and tax manufactures (Anderson and 
Hayami, 1986; Honma and Hayami, 1986; Krueger, Schiff and Valdes, 1988).
(H7) If a country continues to ‘over-invest’ in the import-competing sector relative 
to the exporting sector, then over time it will adopt a policy of unilateral trade 
liberalization. In other words, trade liberalization will eventually turn out to be 
the dominant strategy for a highly protective economy.
This hypothesis appears to be consistent with Drysdale and Gamaut's (1992) 
observation that recent trade liberalization in the Western Pacific countries has 
been mostly non-discriminatory and unilateral. They argue that the 
‘observation of the highly beneficial effect of one country's liberalization on 
its own trade expansion, has led each Western Pacific economy to calculate 
that, whatever the policies of others, it will benefit more from keeping its own 
borders open to trade than from protection’ (p.5).
(H8) Over a long period, some countries may display tariff cycles.
The base of the rationalized tariff changes as the capital stock in the import 
competing sector keeps on increasing, and the tariff rate on the imports of 
previously exported commodity (commodity 2) starts rising. This provides a 
leverage to sector 2 through protection, and the capital stock in sector 2 may 
start to accumulate. The tax on exports of good 1 or on imports of good 2 will 
start to fall as capital accumulation in sector 2 takes momentum, and hence the 
tariff cycle.
The approach underlying the construction of the PEGEM may help explain the 
existence of tariff cycles. The current model is too crude to be able to provide 
a complete description of the tariff cycles. A more detailed explanation can be 
found in Cassing, McKeown, and Ochs (1986), who, by assuming that players 
have spatially concentrated asset distribution and markets in such assets are 
incomplete, have been able to show not only the existence of tariff cycles but 
also that tariff cycles match the pattern of the business cycles. Some of the 
empirical evidence cited in their paper are not inconsistent with our 
hypothesis, however.
(H9) For given technologies of production, tastes of the domestic consumer, and the 
total supply of the mobile factor (labour), there is a unique configuration of 
the stocks of sector specific-factors that will yield free trade as the generalized 
Nash solution to the bargaining problem in the tariff game. In other words, any
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imbalances among factor endowments, tastes and technologies will lead to a 
positive tax on either domestic exports or on imports, whichever way it is 
viewed.
Though this hypothesis follows from (H2), it is not easy to check its empirical 
validity because of its nonrefutable character. However, if this hypothesis is 
correct, then one may expect to find almost every country with a positive tax 
on trade, since it will be almost impossible to maintain the equilibrium 
configuration of the factor endowments.
8.7 Summary
In this chapter, a computable version of the PEGEM was developed and some 
illustrative simulations were performed on hypothetical data sets. The results 
demonstrate that the bargain-theoretic approach can be used to construct a policy- 
endogenous general equilibrium model and that the behaviour of the endogenous 
policies can be predicted as the economic and political environments change.
The numbers that have been used in simulating the model are all hypothetical. 
Therefore, the magnitudes of the elasticities are not meaningful either. However, the 
simulation results have shown some degree of consistency in the direction of change of 
the response of the bargained tariff rate with respect to changes in the exogenous 
variables. They were similar to the directions that were obtained analytically in the 
previous chapter for a special case of a ‘coercive’ government These results prompted 
a number of hypotheses regarding the behaviour of the tariff rate.
All of the above hypotheses, implied by the PEGEM, very closely parallelled 
the predictions of the approach that maximizes a conservative social welfare function 
(Corden, 1974), in which increases in income are given relatively low weights and 
decreases very high weights (Corden, 1974: p.107). At the heart of this function lies the 
idea that any significant reduction in real incomes of any significant section of the 
community should be avoided (Corden, 1974: p.107). A number of reasons such as 
fairness, social insurance, and avoidance of social and political conflict have been 
forwarded in defence of this approach.
For example, if the relative price of the import competing good falls in the 
world market, then the tariff rate increases by (HI) implying that the policy change 
compensates, at least partly, for the loss in the real income of player 1. Similarly, the 
response of the tariff rate implied by (H2) - (H4) can also be predicted by conservative 
social welfare theorists on grounds of fairness, and so on.
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The predictions of the PEGEM, however, were not derived by maximizing a 
conservative social welfare function. They are the outcomes of bargaining between the 
two players, where the government is viewed as a self-interested agent, which 
maximizes its political support by implementing the agreement reached by the two 
players.
Hillman (1982) has suggested a point of difference between the two approaches. 
He argued that the conservative social welfare maximizing approach implies that policy 
change ought to be directed at arresting industry decline, whereas (HI) or a politically 
motivated behaviour of the government implies that a declining industry will continue 
to decline. However, as we saw in chapter 7 if the government is ‘coercive’ in nature, 
then the policy supplied by the government will meet his criteria of maximizing the 
conservative social welfare function, which is also the prediction of Stigler-Peltzman 
model (see Hillman, 1982) that policy changes will fully compensate terms of trade 
changes.
Therefore, it follows that there are problems in differentiating a conservative 
social welfare-maximizing government, and a self-interested, politically motivated, 
support-maximizing government. This is true in the case of a ‘coercive’ government. It 
is impossible to characterize a government simply by observing the policies chosen by 
it. Some further method needs to be devised. However, as argued by Posner (1974) and 
Vousden (1990), the social welfare-maximizing approach lacks explanation on how 
such functions are formed and translated into legislation, whereas the bargain-theoretic 
approach, while being able to predict as much, does not suffer from this criticism.
However, if the conservative social welfare function is considered as an 
outcome of a (Nash) bargaining process, then this study can be used to reconcile the 
difference between the conservative social welfare maximizing approach and the 
political support maximizing approach to the policy determination.
In the next chapter, this work will be summarized and the limitations will be 
discussed.
236
Appendix-8A: Generic calculation of share parameters
Table 8A.1
The Base year data set
Wage Rent Value
Added
Consumption
Expenditure
Value of 
Net Import
Sector 1 WLi RlKi PlY i P1C1 PlM i
Sector 2 WL2 r 2k 2 p 2y 2 P2C2 P2M2
These data should satisfy the following restriction:
(a) Zero profit condition - that is for each i we must have
WLi + RiKi = PYt
(b) Market clearing conditions - that is for each i we must have
pp^p^+m,-
It is clear that conditions (a) and (b) together imply that the aggregate budget constraint 
of the national consumer holds.
From this data set, we can make the following calculations:
(1) Tariff revenue equals the sum of the values of net imports at domestic price . 
That is
Z= P1M1+ P2M2
by the condition that trade balances at world prices.
(2) The rationalized tariff rate
T i = - Z / P 2M2
(3) Employment shares:
; -  W L i 
‘ WL. + WL,
by the assumption of perfect mobility and homogeneity of labour.
(4) Distributive shares:
Su = WLi /PiYi and
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SB = /  PYt
because zero profit condition holds.
(5) Tariff coefficient
T = i / o + r 1).
The share parameters H's and Ts can be calculated by using the defining equations (8.2) 
and (8.5) respectively.
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CHAPTER 9
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION AND LIMITATIONS
The major concern of this study has been to provide a coherent analytical 
framework which can explain the process of the formation of a government’s 
redistributive policies. Tariff policy has been chosen as the specific subject matter of 
this study because, among other things, it provides both a sharp focus on the issue of 
redistribution, and a methodological basis developed from existing literature on 
endogenous tariff. Consequently, the immediate questions addressed by this study have 
been how the tariff rates in a political economy are determined and how they respond to 
exogenous shocks.
Thus, this study explained the process of endogenous tariff formation while, at 
the same time, illustrating the formation of a government’s redistributive policies. In so 
doing the study adopted a political economy approach to policy formation and assumed 
that the political process admits cooperative behaviour among the conflicting interest 
groups. The logical sequence involved in deriving a general equilibrium model of a 
political economy that determines the tariff rate endogenously can be summarized as 
follows.
9.1 Summary
The literature concerned with the endogenous determination of the tariffs was 
reviewed in chapter 2 in order to obtain some guidelines for modelling the process of 
tariff formation. Basically, two competing approaches emerged, yielding similar 
predictions. One approach is based on the assumptions that there exists a social welfare 
function of some kind (conservative or other), and that the government is a social 
welfare maximizer. Thus, in effect, this approach assumes the maximization of social 
welfare to be the process that determines a government’s policies. The other approach is 
based on the assumption that a government is a political support maximizer. This 
approach puts forward a model of complex strategic interactions between government 
and the conflicting private interest groups in the political sphere in the pursuit of self- 
interest as the process of determining government policies. In this model, each of the 
private interest groups behaves strategically in mobilizing political support for the 
government so as to enhance their own welfare in the economic sphere; the government 
behaves strategically in supplying policies affecting the economic sphere, in particular 
the welfare of the interest groups, so as to maximize political support for itself in the 
political sphere.
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The first approach suffers from two major problems: (i) how to ascertain the 
existence and uniqueness of a social welfare function; and (ii) the logical problem of 
assuming that the government is a benevolent agent, which does not suffer from the 
classic principal-agent problem, and that the other individuals are self-interested agents. 
The second approach views all agents in the political economy as self-interested and 
attempts to obtain policies as a device of conflict resolution. This approach does not 
suffer from the above two problems. Thus, the review clearly indicated that the (tariff) 
policy formation process could be coherently modelled if one adopts the second 
approach rather than the first.
Though the political economy approach did provide a consistent analytical 
framework within which the policy formation process could be modelled, the existing 
literature subscribing to this view has nevertheless left several fundamental questions 
unresolved. In particular, the existence of an equilibrium in a productive political 
economy was an open question. Logically, it is necessary that the existence of an 
equilibrium in a political economy be established prior to the analysis of its equilibrium 
behaviour. The question of the existence of an equilibrium in a political economy had 
therefore to be addressed before the political economy approach could be employed to 
address the questions of endogenous determination of the tariff rate and its comparative 
static behaviour. Hence, this study developed a general equilibrium model of a political 
economy by integrating a model of the political sphere with a model of the underlying 
economic sphere, and addressed the question of the existence of an equilibrium in such 
an economy. Subsequently, the questions concerned with the formation of tariff policy 
were addressed in their logical order.
The modelling work of this study began in chapter 3, where a Ricardo-Viner 
type simple 2-sector general equilibrium model of the economic sphere of a political 
economy was described, assuming that the outcome of the political sphere, that is the 
policies of the government (tariff rates), is exogenously given. The comparative static 
properties of the endogenous variables in the economic sphere were obtained, and on 
the basis of those results some general properties of the solution functions of the general 
equilibrium model of the economic sphere were deduced.
In chapter 4, the results obtained in chapter 3 were employed to obtain some 
further results that were critical to the later chapters. First, it was shown that if in each 
sector (i) the output supply function is concave in own relative price and (ii) the 
elasticity of factor substitution is at least unity, then the real rental functions are 
increasing and concave in own relative prices. Second, the rent transformation frontier, 
which describes the Pareto efficient distribution of rental incomes between the two 
sectors, was derived and its comparative static properties were analysed. The rent
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transformation frontier summarized the general equilibrium effects of tariff changes on 
the sectoral rental incomes.
The first order property of the rent transformation frontier showed that the two 
owners of the specific factors (or simply sectors) have opposing interest in the 
government’s tariff policy. The second order property of the frontier showed that the 
real-rent possibility set is convex provided that the elasticities of factor substitution are 
at least unity. It is important, however, to note that these results are based on the 
assumption that the production functions in both sectors are characterized by constant 
returns to scale and CES. As far as CGE models are concerned this assumption is fairly 
common. Chapters 3 and 4 together completed the description of the economic sphere.
Chapter 5 described the political process of tariff determination as a 
noncooperative game and studied the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the political 
economy in two steps.
In the first step, as in previous studies, it was assumed that the government 
offers a lobbying sensitive pricing function, which satisfies some reasonable properties, 
to the conflicting interest groups. Each player was assumed to choose his or her own 
lobbying effort to maximize his or her real rental income subject to the general 
equilibrium of the economic sphere by taking the lobbying effort of the other player as 
given. For a given pricing function offered by the government, then, this study proved 
the existence of a Nash equilibrium in the tariff game by analysing the Nash behaviour 
of the two players. It also considered the case where, in offering a pricing function, the 
government is constrained by the budgetary implications of that pricing function (in that 
it could not afford a net subsidy on foreign trade while supporting the equilibrium 
price). In this case, although free trade was feasible, a Nash equilibrium necessarily 
implied a positive tax on trade.
In the second step, it was demonstrated that the assumed properties of the 
government’s pricing function are sufficient to guarantee the maximum of a Peltzman- 
type political support function of the government at each Nash equilibrium of the tariff 
game. These results in effect established that there exists an equilibrium in the political 
economy, where the government behaves as a Stackelberg leader in maximizing its 
political support, and the private interest groups behave as Nash followers in lobbying 
the government in order to maximize their real rental income.
t
Another interesting aspect of this result is that it showed that the two strands of 
the existing political economy approach to endogenous tariff theory, which have either 
considered support-maximizing behaviour of the government without considering the 
reactions of the lobbyists, or considered the lobbying equilibrium for a given pricing
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function without showing how such function was obtained, are mutually compatible. 
They imply the same policy-equilibrium if the political economy admits a unique 
equilibrium.
This noncooperative Stackelberg-Nash equilibrium describes the frontier of the 
existing endogenous tariff literature. The formal demonstration of the results derived in 
chapter 5, though conjectured previously by various authors, are new.
Though the political economy thus described in terms of a noncooperative game 
was capable of integrating the political sphere with the underlying economic sphere, it 
was not yet sufficient to capture a complete description of the political process that 
would lead to an equilibrium in a political economy. In particular, it did not allow for 
the possibility that the interest groups may communicate and negotiate with each other 
in order to obtain a cooperative solution that will Pareto dominate the noncooperative 
outcome in the tariff game. Since a cooperative solution will be the one agreed by the 
two conflicting parties, the government will maximize its political support by enforcing 
it. There were no compelling reasons to continue assuming that the political sphere is 
characterized by noncooperation.
Therefore, in chapter 6, this study proceeded further and allowed the interest 
groups to search for a cooperative solution if it was individually rational, and from that 
chapter onwards the political process of tariff determination has been viewed as a 
bargaining problem between the two conflicting interest groups.
The bargaining problem in the tariff game was formally defined in chapter 6 
assuming that the disagreement payoffs are known a priori. The rent transformation 
frontier, derived in chapter 4, was employed to define the bargaining set. The results 
obtained in chapters 3 and 4 guarantee that the bargaining set is compact and convex. 
The bargaining problem thus defined satisfied the conditions required for the existence 
and uniqueness of a Nash solution to the bargaining problem set out by earlier studies. 
The sufficient condition for a unique Nash bargaining solution is that the elasticities of 
factor substitution be at least unity. On the other hand, if the polity does not admit 
cooperative behaviour, then the sufficient conditions for the existence of a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium are (i) the elasticities of factor substitution be at least 
unity and (ii) the output supply functions in each sector be strictly increasing and 
concave in own-relative-price. Thus, the question of whether an equilibrium in a 
political economy exists is fully answered. This study has shown that an equilibrium 
exists in a political economy regardless of whether the political sphere admits a 
cooperative behaviour or not. These results allowed us to characterize a general 
equilibrium in a political economy and study its properties. Therefore, we proceeded to
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obtain the necessary and sufficient condition for a unique Nash bargaining solution in 
the tariff game in order to address the remaining questions.
The original Nash solution to any arbitrary bargaining game, and issues related 
to its generalization in the presence of asymmetric bargaining powers were discussed in 
considerable detail which did yield some useful results. First, it was shown that if the 
distribution of bargaining power is included in the mathematical description of the 
bargaining game, then the Nash solution with asymmetric bargaining power is also 
symmetric. Second, it was shown that an alternate necessary and sufficient conditions 
for the generalized Nash solution to a bargaining problem are that (i) the players’ fear 
of ruin be strictly positive, and (ii) the players’ fear of ruin relative to their bargaining 
power be equal. This is a new and interesting characterization of the Nash bargaining 
solution. In particular, this result implies that a player who expects to gain clearly in the 
economic sphere under a changed circumstance (after a shock) will concede in the 
political market. He will offer a concession to the opponent by agreeing on policy 
adjustments. It is because he will be more fearful of ruin (disagreement) relative to the 
other player who does not expect to gain by as much. This result is important not only 
from the point of view of the endogenous tariff theory but also from the point of view 
of the Nash bargaining theory. This is because the result provides an intuitive 
explanation of the Nash bargaining process. It has been employed to explain the results 
obtained in subsequent chapters. Thus, in summary, chapter 6 provided the condition 
characterizing the bargaining equilibrium and a mechanism to summarize the 
bargaining process, which explains the directions of movement of the bargaining 
equilibrium in response to exogenous shocks.
In chapter 7, the condition characterizing the Nash bargaining solution was 
combined with the conditions of general equilibrium in the economic sphere, described 
in chapter 3, and a policy-endogenous general equilibrium model of the political 
economy was obtained. The bargained tariff rate, which depended on the entire politico- 
economic environment, was obtained as the solution of the model. This completed the 
construction of a policy-endogenous general equilibrium model in which the tariff rate 
is the only policy variable of the government.
However, the condition of a bargaining equilibrium contained terms 
representing the disagreement payoffs, which were not yet identified. The problem of 
identification of the disagreement payoffs was resolved by adopting the reference point 
solution concept. It was further argued that the payoffs at the point of players’ 
minimum expectation in the tariff game could serve as a reference point during the 
bargaining process. Minimum expectation payoffs were identified for two different 
types of government namely, coercive and popular. The coercive government, 
introduced for the sake of reference, was defined to be one that can be captured by the
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winning player and is prepared to subsidize trade to benefit the winning player. Players’ 
minimum expectation under such a government was shown to be always zero. A 
popular government, on the other hand, was characterized by support-maximizing 
behaviour with self-financing policy constraint. Under such a government, the 
minimum expectation of the owner of the specific factor in the import competing sector 
was shown to be the payoff at the free trade relative price and that in the exporting 
sector it was shown to be the payoff at the autarkic relative price.
With these two different reference points the model of the political economy 
was subjected to two different sets of comparative static experiments in order to see 
how the tariff rate would change as the exogenous variables of the model change. 
Throughout those experiments it was assumed that the relative bargaining powers of the 
players remained unaffected by the shocks.
The model did admit conclusive analytical solutions under a coercive 
government. It was shown that the bargained tariff rate with a coercive government 
provides a perfect insulation to the domestic relative price from the international terms 
of trade shocks. Moreover, the bargained tariff rate was also found to be responsive to 
changes in the domestic endowments of the factors of production. In general, it was 
observed that tariff changes tend to compensate the loser for the relative loss arising out 
of the exogenous shocks. The results were explained intuitively.
However, the analytical results of the comparative static exercise with a popular 
government were not entirely conclusive. This was because the point of minimum 
expectation responded to the shocks; the expressions yielding the response of the 
bargained tariff rate proved complex enough to make any deductions very difficult. 
Nevertheless, with Cobb-Douglas production functions it was shown that domestic 
relative price moves in the same direction as the international relative price.
In chapter 8, the policy-endogenous general equilibrium model was simulated 
numerically using hypothetical data sets that covered some extreme cases. The 
procedures adopted in obtaining the minimum expectation payoffs, and the calibration 
of the model were also discussed in detail. The simulation results showed that, in 
general, the directions of response of the bargained tariff rate under a popular 
government were not different from that under a coercive government. The magnitudes 
of the responses were, of course, different. Some hypotheses that followed from these 
comparative exercises were stated formally. Those hypotheses were then checked and 
found to be consistent with the results of previous studies. It was seen that, in general, 
the bargained tariff rate changes in response to an exogenous shock so as to 
compensate, at least partly, for the relative loss of the losing player as a result of the
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shock. Uneven changes in the players’ generalized fear of ruin was shown to be the 
principal mechanism leading to the comparative static results obtained in this study.
Furthermore, the policy-endogenous general equilibrium model was simulated 
to predict the consequence of a very large growth in the stock of the specific factor in 
the import competing sector. The results showed a reversal in the direction of trade. The 
commodity that was imported before the shock was exported after the shock and vice 
versa. The commodity that was being taxed before the shock was subsidized after the 
shock. Several interesting hypotheses followed from the results of this simulation, 
which are consistent with the predictions of previous studies and the stylized facts. For 
example, if the characteristic feature that differentiates between developed and 
developing countries is the faster rate of capital accumulation and technological growth 
in the non-agricultural sector relative to the agricultural sector, then on the basis of the 
simulation results one could predict that a developing country exporting agricultural 
products will be taxing the farmers and a developed country exporting mainly non- 
agricultural products will be taxing the producers of non-agricultural products. Thus, 
we may employ the political economy approach to explain why developing countries 
tax agriculture and developed countries subsidize it. This completes our study of the 
process of endogenous tariff formation and the comparative static behaviour of the tariff 
rate.
9.2 Central Conclusions
The central conclusion of this study can be stated as follows.
Whether a political economy admits a cooperative behaviour or not, there exists 
at least one equilibrium under fairly general conditions.
A government’s redistributive policy can consistently be viewed as an 
equilibrium outcome of a bargaining process between the organized interest groups 
holding conflicting interests on the level of the redistributive policy. If some exogenous 
shock disturbs the bargaining equilibrium, then in the new equilibrium the level of 
redistributive policy of the government will change so as to compensate, at least partly, 
for the relative loss of the losing player.
The distribution of the relative bargaining power between the interest groups is 
one of the factors that determines the equilibrium level of the redistributive policy. But, 
so long as the distribution of relative bargaining powers is unaffected by the shocks, the 
changes in the redistributive policy in response to the shocks will be independent of the 
distribution of the bargaining power.
245
The mechanism underlying the process of policy adjustments is the dynamics of 
the fear of ruin, which moves in the same direction as the relative gain of a player. In 
particular, if an exogenous shock (a) causes a decline in the gain perceived by the 
owner of the specific factor in the import-competing sector relative to his minimum 
expectation, while (b) that of the owner of the specific factor in the exporting sector 
rises relative to his minimum expectation, then the fear of ruin held by the owner of the 
specific factor in the import competing sector falls, while that of the owner of the 
specific factor in the exporting sector rises. In the new bargaining equilibrium the 
rationalized tariff rate will rise.
9.3 Implication
This study has two implications to policy modelling. First, it demonstrates that 
the bargain-theoretic approach can provide a theoretically consistent and numerically 
implementable analytical framework in modelling the policy formation process in a 
political economy. Second, this approach is potentially capable in reconciling the two 
diverging approaches to policy modelling that are based on two different views on the 
motivation of the government, namely, that of self-interest and that of the public- 
interest. Such a possibility arises because the comparative static behaviour of the 
bargained tariff rate turns out to be strikingly similar to the predictions that follow from 
the maximization of a conservative social welfare function (see chapter 2). So, if 
bargaining is accepted as the underlying process that generates the (positive) 
conservative social welfare function (CSWF), then the problem of identification of the 
social welfare function vanishes. Furthermore, the implementation of a social welfare 
function will not be inconsistent with the self-interested behaviour of the government. 
The difference between the political economy approach and the welfare function 
maximizing approach can be disregarded.
The fact that the predictions of Corden's CSWF and that of the policy- 
endogenous general equilibrium model (PEGEM) based on the bargain-theoretic 
approach are indistinguishable prompts us to investigate the internal relationship 
between the two approaches. CSWF maintains that policy changes should be directed to 
avoid any significant absolute reductions in real incomes of any significant section of 
the community. No function has been specified to represent this CSWF, however.
What constitutes a significant level of reduction and what defines a significant 
section of the community are questions which are yet to be addressed by the CSWF 
theorists. However, we can now specify one functional form that is consistent with the 
CSWF by assuming some answers to the above questions.
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The first question concerns the segments of population whose welfare is 
considered important by the state. This is essentially equivalent to the question of 
number of players in the game. The second question is essentially related to the 
question of the reference point in the Nash bargaining game, since in a Nash bargaining 
game the payoff of no player is allowed to fall below the ‘disagreement’ payoffs, i. e., 
the level of reference payoffs. One may logically disagree on a particular choice of the 
reference point, but to solve a Nash bargaining problem one has to assign a value to it in 
one way or the other.
If the players in the bargaining game are the significant sections of the 
community, and the reference point used in the bargaining problem is the same as the 
reference point implied by the CSWF, then it follows that the CSWF is 
indistinguishable from the generalized Nash product which will be maximized by the 
choice of the tariff rate subject to the rent transformation function. Therefore, the 
generalized Nash product may be viewed as a specific form of the conservative social 
welfare function and the bargaining process in the political sphere as the underlying 
mechanism of generating it.
9.4 Limitations
Though this study attempted to derive the analytical results rigorously, it, 
nevertheless, suffers from distinct limitations, some of which were necessary to keep 
the model tractable and simple. The major limitations can be described as follows.
First, this study assumed that the trade tax is the only redistributive policy 
instrument available to a government. This was, of course, a simplification. The 
government has numerous instruments of intervention, none of which is in the real 
world completely equivalent to any other in every respect (see, Warr and Parmenter, 
1986; Hertel, 1989). The choice of instruments itself may require separate politico- 
economic explanations (see Lloyd and Falvey, 1986, and Falvey and Lloyd, 1991). 
These may eventually extend the generality of the model presented in this study. In 
order to keep the analysis simple, well focused on a specific issue and to understand the 
process of policy determination as clearly as possible an assumption of this sort was 
necessary.
Second, this study did not consider how the tariff revenue was distributed. It 
assumed that the tariff revenue is simply a transfer to the consumer. But, the response 
of the tariff rate with respect to the exogenous shocks could be sensitive to the way 
tariff revenue is distributed among the factor groups (Long and Vousden, 1991). The 
purpose in not modelling the distribution of tariff revenue explicitly was to make the 
rationalized tariff rate the only instrument of income redistribution. Otherwise, tariff
revenue itself would be another instrument in affecting the income distribution. 
Consistency in the model of a political economy would require that some sort of 
revenue-seeking activity also be modelled.
Third, this study has ignored other policies of a government that could be 
directed to macroeconomic stabilization and growth. Rausser (1983) and Rausser and 
Foster (1990) have argued that a model that does not consider both ‘pie-expanding’ and 
‘pie-sharing’ policies together is likely to yield incorrect answers to the questions of 
endogenous policy responses. In this sense, the model described in this study is not 
exhaustive, as it described only a sub-game of a much larger policy game actually 
played in a political economy. A direct reflection of this limitation was observed in 
chapter 7 while determining the minimum expectation of the players.
Fourth, this study also assumed that the mobile factor is fully employed at the 
wage rate that clears the market. This is another simplification. However, this 
assumption could be relaxed by specifying the mobile factor market in a more realistic 
way. For example, one may consider that the wage rate is exogenously determined and 
model the unemployment/ employment level as an endogenous variable. Alternately, a 
labour supply function that responds to changes in the wage rate can be built into it. 
These are possible extensions that can be handled easily within the present framework.
Fifth, this study has not modelled a coalition of the owners of the mobile factor 
as a separate, independent player. In the political sphere, they are considered as 
rationally ignorant voters. However, one may model enterprise bargaining, and then 
consider the existence of unemployment and the strategic behaviour of the owners of 
the mobile factors at the same time. Wallerstein (1987) could provide some guidelines 
in modelling these two issues related to the labour market.
Sixth, the interest groups in this study were assumed to maximize the real rental 
income, not the utility that they can obtain from it. Hence the existence result obtained 
in this study needs to be understood with appropriate qualifications. Moreover, since in 
the standard Nash bargaining theory players’ payoffs are defmed in terms of utilities, 
the solution to the bargaining problem obtained in this study is therefore a Nash-like 
solution, because the players’ payoffs are measured in terms of real rental income. This 
simply underscores the importance of further research in this area. Binmore (1987c) and 
Rubinstein, Safra and Thomson (1992) may provide the axiomatic foundation for such 
studies.
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Seventh, in a more realistic model, one may introduce the inter-industry 
relationship by incorporating the input-output structure into the model of the economic
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sphere. The technique for doing so is already well developed in the literature (see, for 
example, Dixon, et al., 1982).
Eighth, the solution to the bargaining problem has been made operational by 
taking a somewhat ad hoc approach in specifying the disagreement payoffs. The point 
of minimum expectation, which has been assumed to summarize the worst scenario in 
disagreement, has been identified by imposing a particular restriction, namely the self­
financing, on the government’s behaviour. This restriction is justified so long as the 
tariff rate is the only policy instrument available to the government. One may, however, 
systematically disagree on the imposition of this restriction and on the use of minimum 
expectation payoffs as the reference point in the bargaining process. A better theory of 
disagreement, if available, could improve the theoretical structure of the policy- 
endogenous general equilibrium model.
Ninth, this study also assumed that the distribution of relative bargaining power 
among the players is exogenously given. This was justified by Binmore, Rubinstein, 
and Wolinsky’s demonstration that difference among players in their time preference 
rates, and the fear of disagreement due to exogenous intervention could be captured in 
the static representation of the game by the asymmetric distribution of the bargaining 
power. However, there could be other strategic behaviours of the players, not modelled, 
that affect the opponent’s perception of exogenous risk, and hence the distribution of 
the relative bargaining power. A systematic analysis of factors that determine a player’s 
bargaining power would therefore enrich the model presented in this study.
9.5 Suggestions for Further Research
The above limitations of this study suggest some areas of future research in 
policy modelling. In particular, future research in this area of policy modelling may 
extend this study in three different directions.
The first direction of research might be towards the application of the general 
equilibrium model of a political economy described in this study to country specific 
data sets which could then be pooled together to obtain a regional model of general 
equilibrium. Such work has already been done with policy-exogenous models (see, for 
example, Industry Commission, 1991; Whalley, 1985). Use of policy-endogenous 
general equilibrium models instead in the construction of a regional model would allow 
for the political constraints faced by the governments of each country, and therefore, 
would offer a more general analytical framework to study the possibilities of regional 
cooperation. This framework would provide sufficient ‘ behind-the-scene’ information 
to models of trade wars and negotiation such as studied by Harrison, Rutstrom and 
Wigle (1989), Markusen and Wigle (1989) and Harrison and Rutstrom (1991).
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The second direction of research could be towards the generalization of the 
present model. As indicated above, the present model suffers from many limitations due 
to several simplifying assumptions. In particular, the following areas of research seem 
to be interesting and feasible.
(a) The existence result provided in this study is based on a particular structure of the 
production functions, namely the CES functions, and real rent maximizing 
behaviour of the owners of the specific factors. An analytically challenging work 
is to study the existence of an equilibrium in a political economy with general 
production functions, and utility maximizing behaviour on the part of the owners 
of the specific factors. As a first step one may impose some restrictions on the 
nature of the utility functions that would define a one-to-one correspondence with 
the real rental income and the utility level it yields.
(b) This study followed the Nash bargaining approach to solve the bargaining 
problem in the tariff game. One may test the robustness of the results obtained in 
this study by following other solution concepts provided in cooperative game 
theory. Moreover, to operationalize the concept of disagreement, one might also 
examine whether there exist other uniquely defined reference points, which are 
more appealing in terms of their empirical relevance than the point of minimum 
expectation and whether a shift in the reference point affects the conclusion of 
this study qualitatively.
(c) A more challenging area of research in policy modelling would, of course, be to 
attempt to model the government expenditure on productive activities as well 
rather than to assume that the (tariff) revenue of a government is transferred to the 
‘individuals’ in a lump-sum manner. A model of political economy that also 
describes government expenditures more realistically would bring the ‘pie­
expanding’ policies of the government into the purview of general equilibrium 
modelling. In such models, government policies will create not only a movement 
along a given rent transformation frontier but also the possibilities of shifts on the 
frontier as well. The results obtained from such models would be more realistic 
than the results obtained from models that allow for the redistributive policies 
only, such as the predictions of the present study (see, Weingast, et al., 1981; 
Rausser, 1983; and Rausser and Foster, 1990).
(d) There exist several possibilities to extend the structure of the present model by 
improving the specification of the general equilibrium structure of the economic 
sphere. For example, one may consider the following straightforward cases, (i) 
This study considered the case of two traded goods only. One may introduce a 
non-traded good into the model and study the endogenous behaviour of the tariff
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rate. The model presented in Cassing and Warr (1985) could be employed to 
describe the behaviour of the economic sphere of a political economy with three 
goods of which one is non-traded. A model of the political economy could be 
obtained by superimposing the political sphere onto it. (ii) One may also consider 
introducing inter-industry dependency by incorporating the input-output structure 
in the description of the economic sphere. A simple modification of the 
description of the economic sphere of the present study is sufficient to do this 
exercise. Dixon, et al., (1982) provides the required methodology for that. In fact, 
one may consider a generalization to n-commodity case. However, with arbitrarily 
chosen n-commodity aggregates and the corresponding input-output structure one 
may not always obtain a well-behaved bargaining set. This will make the model 
solution sufficiently complex and one may have to look into mixed strategy space 
for the solution.
(e) Finally, the third direction of research could be towards empirical validation of 
the political economy approach in policy modelling. This can be done in two 
ways. First, one may take the predictions of the analytical models or calibrated 
numerical models and test whether the predictions are consistent with history. For 
example, the prediction of this study that if capital accumulation and/or 
technological progress in the import competing sector dominates that in the 
exporting sector, then the protection afforded to the import competing sector 
declines is refutable. Second, one may attempt to estimate the game 
econometrically and administer the diagnostic tests rigorously. Data limitations to 
the second type of tests is likely to be a limiting factor.
Studies in these directions are important for the following reasons.
First, if policy changes are actually governed by the politico-economic structure 
of the society, then the mere realization of this fact may save resources of the society at 
large from going to the design and implementation of policies that do not confirm to 
this reality. The society as a whole can be made better off by policy changes that were 
from the beginning directed to the political reality of the society.
Second, if bargaining is a fact of life, then economists can better guide society 
by predicting the bargaining outcomes than by proposing changes that will never be 
implemented.
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